kackjennedy's review against another edition
challenging
dark
informative
relaxing
medium-paced
4.25
anti_formalist12's review against another edition
5.0
The utter refusal of the Nazis to surrender in the face of an unstoppable Soviet juggernaut is not hard to explain. They were staunch anti-bolsheviks and knew that the various war crimes they perpetrated would only earn them a hangman's noose. But why did normal people keep fighting? Why didn't the army collapse? Why did generals hold out until what seemed like the bitter end? And why did civilians blithely wait for the end to come, offering no resistance to the regime that threatened to destroy their country? This last point seems especially true, considering revolution and political upheaval had been so important in bringing about the end of WW1.
Kershaw lays out in his typical scintillating prose why the vast majority of Germans waited quietly waited for the end. They were terrified of the Nazi government, and with good reason. And any potential leaders who could lead a movement against the Nazis had either been ousted during the 30s, or had played a substantial role in the crimes perpetrated by the regime, and therefore their bridges were burned. The people who could end the war, therefore had no reason to do so, and the people who needed the war to end had little way to bring that about.
Kershaw lays out in his typical scintillating prose why the vast majority of Germans waited quietly waited for the end. They were terrified of the Nazi government, and with good reason. And any potential leaders who could lead a movement against the Nazis had either been ousted during the 30s, or had played a substantial role in the crimes perpetrated by the regime, and therefore their bridges were burned. The people who could end the war, therefore had no reason to do so, and the people who needed the war to end had little way to bring that about.
nelsta's review against another edition
5.0
What a unique read! This book is the spiritual child of Shirer's "The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich" and a Ph.D. thesis. Ian Kershaw is a respected biographer of Adolf Hitler and he wields his expertise masterfully in this book. He immediately sets about dismantling many of the misconceptions and outright lies that coagulate like a noxious brume around the demise of the Nazi party. Was the Wehrmacht just following orders, its hands innocent of Nazi crimes? Were most Germans naively unaware of Hitler's real purpose? Were the people of Germany victims just as much as those who suffered elsewhere? Each of these questions is answered and Kershaw does not provide much room for subsequent debate. This book is a stunning evisceration of myths and misconceptions. It is a mic drop after a devastating dressing down.
Not only does Kershaw expertly argue his point, but he tells the story of the Third Reich's collapse, too. And he proves his point on every page. In fact, you could read this book, ignore its central premise altogether, and still come away marveling at his excellent story-telling abilities. But that would be like listening to one of Aesop's fables and then leaving, marvelling at the biologically-accurate descriptions of tortoises and hares.
This book endeavors to answer a central question: "Why did Germany hold out until the very end?" You might think to yourself, "I know the answer to this. It's obvious." I admit that I, too, thought this at the beginning. But let me ask you a question: Which of the following reasons do you think was the dominant reason Germany held out until the bitter end?
1. The increased dominance of the Nazi Party after July 1944
2. The prominence of Bormann, Goebbels, Himmler, and Speer
3. The terror instilled by the thought of Bolshevik occupation
4. The underlying German mentalities of organization and Hitler's rule
5. The willingness of high-ranking officials to continue working
6. The lingering popular support of Hitler after the attempt on his life in July 1944
7. Hitler's ferocious terror apparatus
All of these played a part, but one stands above the rest. If you're curious to learn the answer, I encourage you to read the book. It's worth it. If I had the power, I would staple "The End" to the back of every copy of Shirer's "The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich" and demand they be read in conjunction. I can't force you, but I strongly encourage you to do so.
Not only does Kershaw expertly argue his point, but he tells the story of the Third Reich's collapse, too. And he proves his point on every page. In fact, you could read this book, ignore its central premise altogether, and still come away marveling at his excellent story-telling abilities. But that would be like listening to one of Aesop's fables and then leaving, marvelling at the biologically-accurate descriptions of tortoises and hares.
This book endeavors to answer a central question: "Why did Germany hold out until the very end?" You might think to yourself, "I know the answer to this. It's obvious." I admit that I, too, thought this at the beginning. But let me ask you a question: Which of the following reasons do you think was the dominant reason Germany held out until the bitter end?
1. The increased dominance of the Nazi Party after July 1944
2. The prominence of Bormann, Goebbels, Himmler, and Speer
3. The terror instilled by the thought of Bolshevik occupation
4. The underlying German mentalities of organization and Hitler's rule
5. The willingness of high-ranking officials to continue working
6. The lingering popular support of Hitler after the attempt on his life in July 1944
7. Hitler's ferocious terror apparatus
All of these played a part, but one stands above the rest. If you're curious to learn the answer, I encourage you to read the book. It's worth it. If I had the power, I would staple "The End" to the back of every copy of Shirer's "The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich" and demand they be read in conjunction. I can't force you, but I strongly encourage you to do so.
fourtriplezed's review against another edition
5.0
In this excellent book Ian Kershaw scrutinises the fall of Nazi Germany from the Assassination attempt on Hitler in July 44 through to the final unconditional surrender.
Fascinating analysis is given throughout each chapter. Brilliant footnotes through to works cited (bibliography) that should have anyone interested in the subject of the last year of Nazi Germany’s demise salivating. For those who may wonder why Nazi Germany fought to the very limits of their capabilities this book covers many possible discussion points. A few follow.
The failed July 20th assassination plot left any possible opposition to the regime utterly leaderless, leading to the further politicisation of the Wehrmacht upper echelons. Any hint of insubordination towards even military tactics was treated as treasonous. With that any thought of political involvement in a movement to discuss the end with the allies was made moot once there was a demand for unconditional surrender. With military power now in the hands of Nazis it was now committed to victory or downfall. Also considered is if the assassination had been successful there could have been another ‘stab in the back’ legend.This played on the minds of many.
The blame game following the fall of France to the Allies was an event that was a great shock to all Germany. An example covered is that in September 1944 Aachen was the first city in Germany proper to come under Allied attack with the panic of the citizens and inability of the Nazi Party to organise and assist causing a “shambles” to quote the author. 116th Panzer Division arrived and took control of the civilian population by stopping the ‘stupid evacuation’. This evacuation comment by the commander General Gerd Graf von Schwerin lead to his eventual dismissal even with the defence becoming fierce. Hitler ordering an utmost radical defence of the city. Relationships between the Nazi Party and the Wehrmacht Officer class broke down with the Officer Class accused of being ‘saboteurs of war’ by even their own soldiers. To quote the author “…..sunk resignation, not burning rebellion….” became the course of the bitter defence.
Operation Bagration may have prolonged the war. Instead of a four front attack “a huge concentrated surge” through south Poland to cut off Centre and North army groups may possibly have allowed the Wehrmacht to be “patched up and fight on.” Inhabitants of East Prussia, with memories of Russian incursions in The Great War, were also more susceptible to Nazi anti Bolshevik propaganda than their western German counterparts. Those that had listened to the troops returning from the east knew that the war had been bitter and that atrocities towards Jews and the civilian populations had now become a serious issue for the average German with the Red Army on the doorstep.
The Battle of the Bulge and the decline of German economic output as the Allies attacks on transport networks etc takes its toll. A Werner Bosch, who worked for Speer, while under interrogation by the allies after the war had ended, was quoted as saying that people in his position “….could do nothing except get on with their own work” even considering that he thought the war lost in the Spring of 1944. He was one of many effective in keeping the war going for as long as it did no matter how desperate the situation. The regime also let the allied Morgenthau plan be known to the public at large. With this the plan to split Germany into a “powerless, dismembered country with a pre-industrial economy” played very much into the thoughts that there was ‘no opportunity’ for individuals ‘to take action against the war’.
So called defeatist attitudes were heavily punished. All ranks fought on due to fear of reprisals to their family plus general apathy in some circumstances. Even when most thought the war nearly over an automatic sense of obedience was held as other than family what else was there to do! Fatalism was a major issue with many. For those that deserted there was death. Many received death sentences from flying courts and those left fighting had little more to do than conform or face the harshest of penalties. Added was a propaganda campaign that at this point became shriller than all previous with specific reference to the “Asiatic hordes” as Nazi racial policy since 1933 had been ingrained into the masses. This caused mass panic among the civilian population with the soldiers being bombarded with exhortation to fight against those that would slaughter their women and children. Fear of foreigners was rife and even at the end the public invariably had no issue with the treatment of the prisoners on death marches as they were considered criminals.
At the top level many excuses were used from the duty not to the break loyalty pledge to Hitler, fear of Bolshevism through to the likes of Keitel, Jodl and Kesselring claiming they fought on in hope of the fracturing of the Allies into east and west camps. The state had built a cult around Hitler that was so solid in structure that there was little that could be changed. The elites had been divided and never had the “..collective will nor the mechanisms of power to prevent Hitler taking Germany to total destruction.”
Easily one of the the best books I have read. Highly recommended.
Fascinating analysis is given throughout each chapter. Brilliant footnotes through to works cited (bibliography) that should have anyone interested in the subject of the last year of Nazi Germany’s demise salivating. For those who may wonder why Nazi Germany fought to the very limits of their capabilities this book covers many possible discussion points. A few follow.
The failed July 20th assassination plot left any possible opposition to the regime utterly leaderless, leading to the further politicisation of the Wehrmacht upper echelons. Any hint of insubordination towards even military tactics was treated as treasonous. With that any thought of political involvement in a movement to discuss the end with the allies was made moot once there was a demand for unconditional surrender. With military power now in the hands of Nazis it was now committed to victory or downfall. Also considered is if the assassination had been successful there could have been another ‘stab in the back’ legend.This played on the minds of many.
The blame game following the fall of France to the Allies was an event that was a great shock to all Germany. An example covered is that in September 1944 Aachen was the first city in Germany proper to come under Allied attack with the panic of the citizens and inability of the Nazi Party to organise and assist causing a “shambles” to quote the author. 116th Panzer Division arrived and took control of the civilian population by stopping the ‘stupid evacuation’. This evacuation comment by the commander General Gerd Graf von Schwerin lead to his eventual dismissal even with the defence becoming fierce. Hitler ordering an utmost radical defence of the city. Relationships between the Nazi Party and the Wehrmacht Officer class broke down with the Officer Class accused of being ‘saboteurs of war’ by even their own soldiers. To quote the author “…..sunk resignation, not burning rebellion….” became the course of the bitter defence.
Operation Bagration may have prolonged the war. Instead of a four front attack “a huge concentrated surge” through south Poland to cut off Centre and North army groups may possibly have allowed the Wehrmacht to be “patched up and fight on.” Inhabitants of East Prussia, with memories of Russian incursions in The Great War, were also more susceptible to Nazi anti Bolshevik propaganda than their western German counterparts. Those that had listened to the troops returning from the east knew that the war had been bitter and that atrocities towards Jews and the civilian populations had now become a serious issue for the average German with the Red Army on the doorstep.
The Battle of the Bulge and the decline of German economic output as the Allies attacks on transport networks etc takes its toll. A Werner Bosch, who worked for Speer, while under interrogation by the allies after the war had ended, was quoted as saying that people in his position “….could do nothing except get on with their own work” even considering that he thought the war lost in the Spring of 1944. He was one of many effective in keeping the war going for as long as it did no matter how desperate the situation. The regime also let the allied Morgenthau plan be known to the public at large. With this the plan to split Germany into a “powerless, dismembered country with a pre-industrial economy” played very much into the thoughts that there was ‘no opportunity’ for individuals ‘to take action against the war’.
So called defeatist attitudes were heavily punished. All ranks fought on due to fear of reprisals to their family plus general apathy in some circumstances. Even when most thought the war nearly over an automatic sense of obedience was held as other than family what else was there to do! Fatalism was a major issue with many. For those that deserted there was death. Many received death sentences from flying courts and those left fighting had little more to do than conform or face the harshest of penalties. Added was a propaganda campaign that at this point became shriller than all previous with specific reference to the “Asiatic hordes” as Nazi racial policy since 1933 had been ingrained into the masses. This caused mass panic among the civilian population with the soldiers being bombarded with exhortation to fight against those that would slaughter their women and children. Fear of foreigners was rife and even at the end the public invariably had no issue with the treatment of the prisoners on death marches as they were considered criminals.
At the top level many excuses were used from the duty not to the break loyalty pledge to Hitler, fear of Bolshevism through to the likes of Keitel, Jodl and Kesselring claiming they fought on in hope of the fracturing of the Allies into east and west camps. The state had built a cult around Hitler that was so solid in structure that there was little that could be changed. The elites had been divided and never had the “..collective will nor the mechanisms of power to prevent Hitler taking Germany to total destruction.”
Easily one of the the best books I have read. Highly recommended.
troy66's review against another edition
4.0
This book explained why the Nazi's and Germany continued to fight despite it being obvious they had lost. The assassination attempt on Hitler seemed to draw people closer to him. If he had died then the 3rd Reich would fail. It also started his major followers to consolidate and expand their power. There are plenty of military histories about the last days of the Reich but only this one explaining why they fought to the end and were willing to let Germany be destroyed rather then surrender.
kathykekmrs's review against another edition
4.0
I enjoyed reading about the various reasons Germany chose not to end the Second World War sooner than May 1945. There are many things to think about in this book.
brownboydigital's review against another edition
4.0
This is one of the best Ian Kershaw books I have read. He presented the information in a very clear and easy-to-understand way, as well as making it an interesting narrative to follow. In some sequences, it felt like watching a movie. My only caveat to this would be the amount of repetition that was used to hammer down points.
Overall, a very good book that I suggest people to read
Overall, a very good book that I suggest people to read
kazeneko20's review against another edition
3.0
This book is well written in such a way as to keep a readers interest. And is an interesting approach to the end of the war. However I found it to be lacking in cohesion. This book has a lot of well researched information however it could have been condensed into half the number of pages.
Some interesting points where
Pg 14 In speaking as to why the leadership held out "They were sustained in the main not blind Faith in hitler. More important for arch nazis was the feeling that they had the future without hitler. provided a powerful negative bond their fates were inextricably linked.
And on pg 379
In the 10 months between July 1944 and May 1945 for more German civilians died than in previous years of the war mostly through air raids and the calamitous conditions in the eastern front after January 1945 and all more than 400,000 were killed and 800,00 injured".
Some interesting points where
Pg 14 In speaking as to why the leadership held out "They were sustained in the main not blind Faith in hitler. More important for arch nazis was the feeling that they had the future without hitler. provided a powerful negative bond their fates were inextricably linked.
And on pg 379
In the 10 months between July 1944 and May 1945 for more German civilians died than in previous years of the war mostly through air raids and the calamitous conditions in the eastern front after January 1945 and all more than 400,000 were killed and 800,00 injured".
tanyarobinson's review against another edition
3.0
In this heavy volume, Kershaw (Hitler specialist extraordinaire) traces the decline of the German war machine from the July 1944 failed assassination attempt to the final surrender in May 1945. He sets out to answer the intriguing question, "Why did Germany keep fighting so long after their defeat was obvious and inevitable?"
I will say that I was intrigued by that question when I began the book. Now I feel like it has been beaten into the ground. The End is thorough to the extreme, and became redundant as we moved month by month through fanatical obedience and cowed passivity in the face of declining fortunes. I certainly can't fault Kershaw's scholarship, but - like the people of the bombed and battered German cities - I just wanted it to be over!
I will say that I was intrigued by that question when I began the book. Now I feel like it has been beaten into the ground. The End is thorough to the extreme, and became redundant as we moved month by month through fanatical obedience and cowed passivity in the face of declining fortunes. I certainly can't fault Kershaw's scholarship, but - like the people of the bombed and battered German cities - I just wanted it to be over!
erictlee's review against another edition
5.0
Ian Kershaw's book aims to answer just one question: why did the Germans continue to fight even after the second world war was clearly lost? He reviews a number of explanations given, ranging from the reasonable to the ludicrous, and settles on an interpretation of how the Nazi state had been established and how it was still running in 1944-5 that prevented popular rebellion or a military coup, even when almost no one believed the war could still be won. Hitler's dreaded a 1918-style end to the war, with soldiers' mutinies and workers' strikes. He and his regime managed to make these impossible. A beautifully-written, well-researched investigation into a historical nightmare.