pingthevile's review against another edition
4.0
Slow to start, but picks up in later chapters. Dennett presents a convincing argument that religious claims should be scrutinized just like any other claim instead of given a wide berth or handled with kid gloves.
adamz24's review against another edition
4.0
Dennett establishes the foundations of an empirical program for the study of religion, which requires that he establishes (and he does) reasons for thinking of religion as a natural phenomenon, using meme theory and evolutionary theory to do so. Dennett dispels some of the myths and prejudices surrounding religion and its 'special status' in the eyes of both hardline religious folk and sensitive mutliculturalist academic/leftist sorts. Aside from some pretty minor issues, this is a sophisticated philosophical account of how the discourse surrounding religion functions, and how we might hope to break the spell.
Dennett is an atheist, and although he's been identified as one of the four horsemen of New Atheism, along with Harris, Dawkins, and Hitchens, he is, unlike them (Harris is something of a different case than Dawkins and Hitchens, as he was a Philosophy undergrad and is quite careful intellectually), not really a polemicist, although he is a terrific rhetorician. For those of us familiar with Dennett, it's not hard to figure out that he thinks that breaking the spell is the first step toward the death of religion, or at least its more pernicious forms, but the book itself is not an atheistic screed, even if you go beyond Dennett's rhetoric, as it genuinely seeks to establish a way of properly understanding religion and the discourse surrounding it, instead of just yelling at 'the other side' in a pseudo-debate.
Dennett is an atheist, and although he's been identified as one of the four horsemen of New Atheism, along with Harris, Dawkins, and Hitchens, he is, unlike them (Harris is something of a different case than Dawkins and Hitchens, as he was a Philosophy undergrad and is quite careful intellectually), not really a polemicist, although he is a terrific rhetorician. For those of us familiar with Dennett, it's not hard to figure out that he thinks that breaking the spell is the first step toward the death of religion, or at least its more pernicious forms, but the book itself is not an atheistic screed, even if you go beyond Dennett's rhetoric, as it genuinely seeks to establish a way of properly understanding religion and the discourse surrounding it, instead of just yelling at 'the other side' in a pseudo-debate.
iggymcmuffin's review against another edition
2.0
Felt sort of muddled, as if Dennett rushed off a manuscript without really knowing where he intended to take it. Some different ways of thinking about things, but nothing ground breaking. A few glaring errors as well to balance it out.
clivemeister's review against another edition
5.0
Overall, this is an excellent review from Daniel Dennett of the ways in which religions might have emerged as natural phenomena in early humans, and how the pressures of evolution on this new set of social constructs might have then produced many of the traits we see in today's religions.
His argument adds important elements to a pure psychological view of religion, although it certainly starts there. In the early chapters, Dennett argues that humans have what he calls an "intentional stance": that in order to best predict the world, we tend to think of things in the world as rational agents, and figure out the desires, and thus the actions, of that agent. This works brilliantly for other humans, and it works pretty well for the animals that early humans might need to hunt or escape. Thus it's easy for us to see how we might extend the same logic to other things - the weather, diseases, and so forth. From this, we can see how we might have grown to attribute apparently random changes in (say) the weather to an unseen entity behind the weather itself, and to then see the changes in the weather as reflecting true intentions of that entity. If you want to get it to rain, therefore, it makes perfect sense to try and communicate with the entity behind it, and to get the entity to cause it to rain. We attribute "agency" to the weather, and it makes sense then to try and bargain with the agent.
(As I write this, we're in lockdown due to the COVID-19 epidemic, and this desire to treat the disease as an entity with intentions, capricious or malignant though they might be, is very visible in the way many people talk about it.)
From here, Dennett grows the argument. Everything we value, or are fearful of, we value or fear for reasons. This view of the world gives us challenges in everyday living, which early folk religions enabled us to handle, psychologically. Once in the culture, these folk religions were susceptible to the same evolutionary pressures - this time at the level of "memes" that thrive or die out - as humans themselves, only many many times faster that physical evolution. Only the best variants of these beliefs will propagate - and "best" means most successful in meeting our deep psychological and physical needs.
As human societies grew, specialised intercessors to these agents emerged ("shamans", he calls them for convenience). Dennett goes on to suggest that these shamans, and others, had time to become more reflective, and so from these early folk religions, organized religions began to emerge. Sometimes, the simple beliefs in the folk religions were bolstered or even entirely replaced by carefully crafted reasoning. At this point, it might have become necessary to put some of these religious views out of the reach of "gnawing skepticism", as Dennett puts it. This leads to an interesting way of splitting the world:
Dennett rightly spends a fair while on this point. Is it right that we treat religion, by definition, as "systematically immune to confirmation or disconfirmation? ... No religion lacks these effects, and anything that lacks them is not really a religion, however much it is like a religion in other regards." Dennett rightly points out that this view wasn't shared by the shamans themselves: if they saw they were losing their flock to the shaman down the road, they were quite prepared to take on new approaches and ideas - to evolve. So one of the important features that emerged as folk religion merged and became organized religions was this secrecy and systematic invulnerability to disconfirmation.
Now we see Dennett broaden the view out from the leaders to the groups who also believed. He sees this as in many cases an entirely rational decision to join on the part of individuals, who would see benefits from being part of a group regardless of possible supernatural benefits from the gods themselves. There are also many possible psychological benefits in belief, but there is a darker side as well - tribalism in humans is very often reinforced by conflict, and the tendency of religions to spark conflicts and wars from prehistory to the modern day is terrifying. Of course it could be argued that they were being co-opted by pre-existing power structures, but none the less the features of very many religions do seem to be shaped, and often thrive, on conflict.
At this point, Dennett spends a while talking about "belief in belief". This, he argues, is a very powerful force, in religions and elsewhere, and can completely transform them. For example, he points out that many feel it's important to maintain the belief in democracy, regardless of its flaws. So we tend to play down the flaws and play up the benefits, and in doing so lose track of the logic which may (or may not) support the arguments for its value. Similarly with science - we may believe in science, we may believe that "e=mc2", without knowing (or caring) how it is so. None the less, we believe! And, he argues, the same is true of religions. Even very devout followers may not share identical views on details of doctrine, and many lay believers will turn out to have quite different interpretations of major points. But it doesn't matter - what matters is that they all share the belief in the importance of their beliefs.
Finally, Dennett looks at religions today. He starts to talk about whether religion is, all things considered, a good thing. Is religion good for people, he asks? There is definitely evidence that belonging to religious organisations can improve the morale, and hence the health, of participants. Believers would also argue that the meaning it gives their lives is immeasurably valuable. More specific experiments, for example on the benefits of "intercessory prayer", give mixed results, and include at least one notorious case of academic fraud. Finally, almost all religious people see their religion as the foundation of their morality. On this point, Dennett comments
There is a lot I really liked about this book. The arguments are thorough, carefully constructed, and evidence is sought wherever possible. Some technical material is present in appedices, a couple of which I found useful I am, I should point out, not a religious believer of any creed, although I do think that there is a deep human need (which I feel) for the spiritual, and so I can't comment on how a theist would have felt. I hope they would have been able to read the arguments through to the end, and Dennett I feel does a good job of presenting the best arguments on both sides.
There were a few irritations, for me at least. The very first chapter or two nearly caused me to give up, as Dennett spends an entirely unnecessary (for me) amount of time justifying the whole enterprise. He's also very fond of italics to emphasise key words in his paragraphs, and sometimes this is perhaps too heavy handed. But it's a forgiveable style. Four and a half stars, rounded up to five on final consideration.
His argument adds important elements to a pure psychological view of religion, although it certainly starts there. In the early chapters, Dennett argues that humans have what he calls an "intentional stance": that in order to best predict the world, we tend to think of things in the world as rational agents, and figure out the desires, and thus the actions, of that agent. This works brilliantly for other humans, and it works pretty well for the animals that early humans might need to hunt or escape. Thus it's easy for us to see how we might extend the same logic to other things - the weather, diseases, and so forth. From this, we can see how we might have grown to attribute apparently random changes in (say) the weather to an unseen entity behind the weather itself, and to then see the changes in the weather as reflecting true intentions of that entity. If you want to get it to rain, therefore, it makes perfect sense to try and communicate with the entity behind it, and to get the entity to cause it to rain. We attribute "agency" to the weather, and it makes sense then to try and bargain with the agent.
(As I write this, we're in lockdown due to the COVID-19 epidemic, and this desire to treat the disease as an entity with intentions, capricious or malignant though they might be, is very visible in the way many people talk about it.)
From here, Dennett grows the argument. Everything we value, or are fearful of, we value or fear for reasons. This view of the world gives us challenges in everyday living, which early folk religions enabled us to handle, psychologically. Once in the culture, these folk religions were susceptible to the same evolutionary pressures - this time at the level of "memes" that thrive or die out - as humans themselves, only many many times faster that physical evolution. Only the best variants of these beliefs will propagate - and "best" means most successful in meeting our deep psychological and physical needs.
As human societies grew, specialised intercessors to these agents emerged ("shamans", he calls them for convenience). Dennett goes on to suggest that these shamans, and others, had time to become more reflective, and so from these early folk religions, organized religions began to emerge. Sometimes, the simple beliefs in the folk religions were bolstered or even entirely replaced by carefully crafted reasoning. At this point, it might have become necessary to put some of these religious views out of the reach of "gnawing skepticism", as Dennett puts it. This leads to an interesting way of splitting the world:
"This winnowing has the effect of sequestering a special subset of cultural items behind the veil of systematic invulnerability to disproof - a pattern found just about everywhere in human societies. As many have urged, this division into the propositions that are designed to be immune to disconfirmation and all the rest looks like a hypothetical joint at which we could well carve nature. Right here, they suggest, is where (proto-)science and (proto-)religion part company"
Dennett rightly spends a fair while on this point. Is it right that we treat religion, by definition, as "systematically immune to confirmation or disconfirmation? ... No religion lacks these effects, and anything that lacks them is not really a religion, however much it is like a religion in other regards." Dennett rightly points out that this view wasn't shared by the shamans themselves: if they saw they were losing their flock to the shaman down the road, they were quite prepared to take on new approaches and ideas - to evolve. So one of the important features that emerged as folk religion merged and became organized religions was this secrecy and systematic invulnerability to disconfirmation.
Now we see Dennett broaden the view out from the leaders to the groups who also believed. He sees this as in many cases an entirely rational decision to join on the part of individuals, who would see benefits from being part of a group regardless of possible supernatural benefits from the gods themselves. There are also many possible psychological benefits in belief, but there is a darker side as well - tribalism in humans is very often reinforced by conflict, and the tendency of religions to spark conflicts and wars from prehistory to the modern day is terrifying. Of course it could be argued that they were being co-opted by pre-existing power structures, but none the less the features of very many religions do seem to be shaped, and often thrive, on conflict.
At this point, Dennett spends a while talking about "belief in belief". This, he argues, is a very powerful force, in religions and elsewhere, and can completely transform them. For example, he points out that many feel it's important to maintain the belief in democracy, regardless of its flaws. So we tend to play down the flaws and play up the benefits, and in doing so lose track of the logic which may (or may not) support the arguments for its value. Similarly with science - we may believe in science, we may believe that "e=mc2", without knowing (or caring) how it is so. None the less, we believe! And, he argues, the same is true of religions. Even very devout followers may not share identical views on details of doctrine, and many lay believers will turn out to have quite different interpretations of major points. But it doesn't matter - what matters is that they all share the belief in the importance of their beliefs.
Finally, Dennett looks at religions today. He starts to talk about whether religion is, all things considered, a good thing. Is religion good for people, he asks? There is definitely evidence that belonging to religious organisations can improve the morale, and hence the health, of participants. Believers would also argue that the meaning it gives their lives is immeasurably valuable. More specific experiments, for example on the benefits of "intercessory prayer", give mixed results, and include at least one notorious case of academic fraud. Finally, almost all religious people see their religion as the foundation of their morality. On this point, Dennett comments
"I have uncovered no evidence to support the claim that people, religious or not, who don't believe in reward in heaven and/or punishment in hell are more likely to kill, rape, rob, or break their promises than people who do. The prison population in the United States shows Catholics, Protestants, Jews, Muslims, and others - including those with no religious affiliation - represented about as they are in the general population ... Indeed, the evidence to date support the hypothesis that atheists have the lowest divorce rates in the United States, and born-again Christians the highest."
There is a lot I really liked about this book. The arguments are thorough, carefully constructed, and evidence is sought wherever possible. Some technical material is present in appedices, a couple of which I found useful I am, I should point out, not a religious believer of any creed, although I do think that there is a deep human need (which I feel) for the spiritual, and so I can't comment on how a theist would have felt. I hope they would have been able to read the arguments through to the end, and Dennett I feel does a good job of presenting the best arguments on both sides.
There were a few irritations, for me at least. The very first chapter or two nearly caused me to give up, as Dennett spends an entirely unnecessary (for me) amount of time justifying the whole enterprise. He's also very fond of italics to emphasise key words in his paragraphs, and sometimes this is perhaps too heavy handed. But it's a forgiveable style. Four and a half stars, rounded up to five on final consideration.
buncie's review against another edition
challenging
hopeful
informative
inspiring
reflective
slow-paced
4.0
iggymcmuffin's review
2.0
Felt sort of muddled, as if Dennett rushed off a manuscript without really knowing where he intended to take it. Some different ways of thinking about things, but nothing ground breaking. A few glaring errors as well to balance it out.
pingthevile's review
4.0
Slow to start, but picks up in later chapters. Dennett presents a convincing argument that religious claims should be scrutinized just like any other claim instead of given a wide berth or handled with kid gloves.
ryanjjung's review
3.0
On the whole, a good book, and he makes some great points, but I don't think at all that the book accomplishes much that he set out to accomplish with it. This kind of philosophical argument doesn't go over well with most religious types, so it's hard to think of giving this book to, say, my mother, to convince her that maybe I'm not horrible for raising my kids without religion.
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