Reviews
Semantic Perception: How the Illusion of a Common Language Arises and Persists by Jody Azzouni
spacestationtrustfund's review against another edition
3.0
« I want to state as simply and as plainly as I can the major thesis of this book. It’s this: human beings involuntarily experience certain physical items, certain products of human action, and certain human actions themselves, as having monadic meaning-properties: for example, as possessing meanings, as referring, or as having (or being capable of having) truth values—thus the main title of the book, Semantic Perception. My thesis is that we (human beings) involuntarily see uttered words, among other things, as possessing certain monadic meaning-properties, and that we involuntarily see uttered sentences as possessing other (but related) monadic meaning-properties.
By “monadic meaning-properties” I mean that we experience these properties as properties of uttered words and sentences similar to how we perceive ordinary objects to have as monadic properties shape and color (but not location). We don’t experience the meaning-properties of uttered words and sentences (for example) as due to background conventions or regularities or as relations to context, nor do we experience them the way that we experience codes. We don’t see them as relations (between uttered words and sentences and us) that are due to the interactional effects of the items in question and our minds, or aspects of our minds; we don’t experience these meaning-properties as derivative from the expectations and intentions of the producers of these items (or as due to the mutual actions of speakers and the audience).
This doesn’t mean that we don’t, during conversation or during reading events, recognize the expectations or intentions of speakers or writers (or those of our own). We always recognize, for example, that the sentences uttered in conversations are uttered intentionally. It does mean, however, that we experience the meaning-properties—the meanings—of the produced items as independent of the speaker’s intentions in exactly the same way that we experience an object’s shape as independent of its color.
I call the view that human beings see a large class of physical objects and human actions (such as pointing) as possessing monadic meaning-properties the semantic perception view.
I don’t claim that when we see meaningful physical items, such as the words on this page, or when we hear people speak that we see these physical instantiations of words and sentences to have meaning-properties the way that we see a book to have a red cover. That’s why I’ll often fall back on the broader word “experience” rather than “see” or “perceive.” Nevertheless, “see,” “perceive,” and their cognates are usually understood broadly enough all on their own that “semantic perception” shouldn’t mislead. »
By “monadic meaning-properties” I mean that we experience these properties as properties of uttered words and sentences similar to how we perceive ordinary objects to have as monadic properties shape and color (but not location). We don’t experience the meaning-properties of uttered words and sentences (for example) as due to background conventions or regularities or as relations to context, nor do we experience them the way that we experience codes. We don’t see them as relations (between uttered words and sentences and us) that are due to the interactional effects of the items in question and our minds, or aspects of our minds; we don’t experience these meaning-properties as derivative from the expectations and intentions of the producers of these items (or as due to the mutual actions of speakers and the audience).
This doesn’t mean that we don’t, during conversation or during reading events, recognize the expectations or intentions of speakers or writers (or those of our own). We always recognize, for example, that the sentences uttered in conversations are uttered intentionally. It does mean, however, that we experience the meaning-properties—the meanings—of the produced items as independent of the speaker’s intentions in exactly the same way that we experience an object’s shape as independent of its color.
I call the view that human beings see a large class of physical objects and human actions (such as pointing) as possessing monadic meaning-properties the semantic perception view.
I don’t claim that when we see meaningful physical items, such as the words on this page, or when we hear people speak that we see these physical instantiations of words and sentences to have meaning-properties the way that we see a book to have a red cover. That’s why I’ll often fall back on the broader word “experience” rather than “see” or “perceive.” Nevertheless, “see,” “perceive,” and their cognates are usually understood broadly enough all on their own that “semantic perception” shouldn’t mislead. »
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