simonmee's review against another edition
3.0
The War for the Seas inhabits a world where we can cheaply consume minute details about World War II. You can watch for free a video discussing the underwater performance of warship shells.
In going general, The War for the Seas needs to offer something a bit extra to be a truly great book.
This is certainly a good book. It is a smooth-running summary of six years of naval warfare covering multiple theatres. It is British friendly in idiosyncratic ways, such as telling us Oahu has the area of Greater London, gallantly trying to convince us that the British Fleet was better prepared for war than commonly perceived, that those 6 inch guns of Achilles and Ajax really did batter the Graf Spee, and the British contribution deserves more credit than it is often accorded today.
And I should not be too harsh. Mawdsley points out that the Royal Navy sank or crippled several Axis (and, um… French) capital ships up to April 1942. The Mediterranean campaign is a highlight, and I would be interested to see Mawdsley take a proper shot at that aspect. Otherwise, he threads the concept of sea/air battle through his book, which adds a spine, with a clear sense of progression up to the Third Fleet’s dominance of the air above Formosa in late 1944.
The problem, as evidenced in his repetition of the view that the (crucial) Battle of the Atlantic was never such a 'near-run thing' as it is often depicted gives away the weakness of the book. At best, Mawdsley can say sea power enabled the war to be won. Pre-war, the Western Allies operated the two largest fleets in the world. While there were some hairy moments, pivotal battles, and clear development of doctrine and resources that ensured victory, realistically the naval war was going to have one result. This is particularly true considering that the Americans enacted the gigantic “Two Ocean Navy” law before it had even mobilized for war.
This leads to the related issue, ironically encapsulated in a statement suggesting a paucity of naval resources:
A month after a few dozen planes tried to defend Ceylon, the RAF would send 1,000 heavy and medium bombers against Cologne.
Despite the massive outpouring of resources, the Western Allies did operate under constraints. Manpower was the most notable one. Skilled manpower was the most most notable one. While their navies and air-forces showed increasing levels of overwhelming force, the record of British and American armies appears to have been more mixed, particularly against top tier German opponents.
I am not suggesting an all-out criticism as per Hasting’s [b:Armageddon|55404|Armageddon The Battle for Germany, 1944-1945|Max Hastings|https://i.gr-assets.com/images/S/compressed.photo.goodreads.com/books/1388216136l/55404._SY75_.jpg|53993]. There are plenty of examples in attack and defence where British and American soldiers did well. However, what I feel The War for the Seas (subdued) triumphantism does not quite convey is that there were opportunity costs between how the Western Allies chose to fight, getting to the stage where Britain was disbanding divisions due to lack of manpower. The War for Seas makes it appear a bit simpler for them than it actually was.
I would be willing to accept that the United States and Britain made the right call to emphasise their respective navies and airforces. However, a general history published in 2019 needs to make that judgement. Or do something interesting.
I am not saying this a bad book. It is a good book. But we are not lacking in good World War Two books. It’s an interesting summation of more detailed books. But I’m going to need more to wax lyrical.
In going general, The War for the Seas needs to offer something a bit extra to be a truly great book.
This is certainly a good book. It is a smooth-running summary of six years of naval warfare covering multiple theatres. It is British friendly in idiosyncratic ways, such as telling us Oahu has the area of Greater London, gallantly trying to convince us that the British Fleet was better prepared for war than commonly perceived, that those 6 inch guns of Achilles and Ajax really did batter the Graf Spee, and the British contribution deserves more credit than it is often accorded today.
And I should not be too harsh. Mawdsley points out that the Royal Navy sank or crippled several Axis (and, um… French) capital ships up to April 1942. The Mediterranean campaign is a highlight, and I would be interested to see Mawdsley take a proper shot at that aspect. Otherwise, he threads the concept of sea/air battle through his book, which adds a spine, with a clear sense of progression up to the Third Fleet’s dominance of the air above Formosa in late 1944.
The problem, as evidenced in his repetition of the view that the (crucial) Battle of the Atlantic was never such a 'near-run thing' as it is often depicted gives away the weakness of the book. At best, Mawdsley can say sea power enabled the war to be won. Pre-war, the Western Allies operated the two largest fleets in the world. While there were some hairy moments, pivotal battles, and clear development of doctrine and resources that ensured victory, realistically the naval war was going to have one result. This is particularly true considering that the Americans enacted the gigantic “Two Ocean Navy” law before it had even mobilized for war.
This leads to the related issue, ironically encapsulated in a statement suggesting a paucity of naval resources:
A month after a few dozen planes tried to defend Ceylon, the RAF would send 1,000 heavy and medium bombers against Cologne.
Despite the massive outpouring of resources, the Western Allies did operate under constraints. Manpower was the most notable one. Skilled manpower was the most most notable one. While their navies and air-forces showed increasing levels of overwhelming force, the record of British and American armies appears to have been more mixed, particularly against top tier German opponents.
I am not suggesting an all-out criticism as per Hasting’s [b:Armageddon|55404|Armageddon The Battle for Germany, 1944-1945|Max Hastings|https://i.gr-assets.com/images/S/compressed.photo.goodreads.com/books/1388216136l/55404._SY75_.jpg|53993]. There are plenty of examples in attack and defence where British and American soldiers did well. However, what I feel The War for the Seas (subdued) triumphantism does not quite convey is that there were opportunity costs between how the Western Allies chose to fight, getting to the stage where Britain was disbanding divisions due to lack of manpower. The War for Seas makes it appear a bit simpler for them than it actually was.
I would be willing to accept that the United States and Britain made the right call to emphasise their respective navies and airforces. However, a general history published in 2019 needs to make that judgement. Or do something interesting.
I am not saying this a bad book. It is a good book. But we are not lacking in good World War Two books. It’s an interesting summation of more detailed books. But I’m going to need more to wax lyrical.
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