wilte's review
3.0
Conly argues for not the most popular notion: Coercive Paternalism. Rules that forbid stuff that is bad for you in the long run. Brave, because the Libertarian Paternalism of Sunsteins and Thaler is often attacked (Conly describes differences and similarities with that position). Coercive Paternalism is even more hard paternalism.
p.173 "the moral nexus: whether we are allowed to override personal choice in order to benefit the chooser." summs it up pretty well. The core of her argument is in the introduction, which can be read here:
http://www.cambridge.org/servlet/file/store6/item7135691/version1/9781107024847_excerpt.pdf
Many counterarguments that can be made are not specific to paternalism; "All government is dangerous. To have a government at all is to have given others power over us. There is no need to think , though, that paternalistic measures make a government any more dangerous than one that is not paternalstic." (p.148). Mill, defending Utilitarianism is quoted (p.73): "there is no difficulty in proving any ethical standard whatever to work ill, if we suppose universal idiocy to be conjoined with it (Ch 2, p.275)".
Some chapters dive too deep into philosophy and close-reading of Mill (On LIberty) et al. I skimmed those passages.
Chapter 6 on Applications contained 4 sensible criteria to use in decidinf if coercive paternalism is the appropriate strategy (can be applied to any strategy basically):
1. The activity to be prevented on pateralistic grounds really is one that is opposed to our long-term ends (we don't want to allow 'paternalistic' intervention just because an action is vulgar or aesthetically unpleasing or immoral.
2. Coercive measures actually have to be effective
3. The benefits have to be greater than the costs (material and psychological)
4. The measure in question needs to be the most efficient way to prevent the activity. (p.150-151).
This pragmatic approach makes sense to me; coercive paternalism is one of the tools in the tool box to be effective. Personally, I guess I would use it less often than Conly, but she makes a good case why it should be considered in the first place.
p.173 "the moral nexus: whether we are allowed to override personal choice in order to benefit the chooser." summs it up pretty well. The core of her argument is in the introduction, which can be read here:
http://www.cambridge.org/servlet/file/store6/item7135691/version1/9781107024847_excerpt.pdf
Many counterarguments that can be made are not specific to paternalism; "All government is dangerous. To have a government at all is to have given others power over us. There is no need to think , though, that paternalistic measures make a government any more dangerous than one that is not paternalstic." (p.148). Mill, defending Utilitarianism is quoted (p.73): "there is no difficulty in proving any ethical standard whatever to work ill, if we suppose universal idiocy to be conjoined with it (Ch 2, p.275)".
Some chapters dive too deep into philosophy and close-reading of Mill (On LIberty) et al. I skimmed those passages.
Chapter 6 on Applications contained 4 sensible criteria to use in decidinf if coercive paternalism is the appropriate strategy (can be applied to any strategy basically):
1. The activity to be prevented on pateralistic grounds really is one that is opposed to our long-term ends (we don't want to allow 'paternalistic' intervention just because an action is vulgar or aesthetically unpleasing or immoral.
2. Coercive measures actually have to be effective
3. The benefits have to be greater than the costs (material and psychological)
4. The measure in question needs to be the most efficient way to prevent the activity. (p.150-151).
This pragmatic approach makes sense to me; coercive paternalism is one of the tools in the tool box to be effective. Personally, I guess I would use it less often than Conly, but she makes a good case why it should be considered in the first place.
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