julesmv's review

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5.0

Very informative and important read. The fact that the U.S has played such a major role in this conflict doesn’t surprise me. What did surprise me is that no new infrastructure had been created for Palestinians since ~1970’s. That’s absolutely insane. Another thing, their hope for Obama fell short and was disappointing. The last few lines in the book hit: “Until it’s final day in power, the Obama administration continued to believe that Israel would move toward a two state solution. If only the United States explained that the alternative is apartheid. The logic was irrefutable they believed so it was inevitable that Israel would eventually grasp its truth. 8 years of failed policy were founded on the stubborn delusion that sufficiently passion rhetoric, Israel could be persuaded to make concessions that it did not consider to be in its interest. Obama achieved less than any of its recent predecessors because when it came to Israel force was a language he could not or would not understand”   

brianmagid's review against another edition

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4.0

started reading during long days alone at the cold spring harbor library when I was home for a month. thrall's clear eyed no-bullshit approach to diplomacy was a welcome reprieve in companionship from hotheaded emotional arguments with my family on this topic. this book is randomly out of print but I found a copy at West Hollywood library upon returning to my lonely west coast life and just finished it this morning. the most essential essays here are about the failure of U.S. diplomacy strategies, and the abortive ways in which attempts to "condemn" Israeli settlement growth act as a substitute for genuine diplomatic pressure; an approach that serves to distance the annexationist wing of the occupation from the government that supports, finances and arms it; a shield for the occupation that such policies are ostensibly meant to bring to an end. the book is bleak but not hopeless. cuts through lots of noise about "trust building" and "no partner for peace" and all the other bad narratives that bedevil this conflict and determines clearly and simply that the parties involved in any diplomatic negotiation only make deals when force is present; when the risk of maintaining the status quo becomes more dangerous than the vision of a better world.

gadicohen93's review against another edition

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4.0

This collection of Thrall's thoughts on Israel/Palestine from around 2010-2016 treads an established path: Oslo — and the overall American-led peace process — was a facade that enabled Israel to further entrench the occupation. Israelis' experience of the status quo — insulated by American support and carte blanche and veto power at the UN — is not nearly enough pressure for them to approach the negotiation table in good faith, or to even consider a concession that is reasonable enough for the Palestinians to accept. It's not necessarily the most groundbreaking insight but the book proves its point with ample evidence.

I especially enjoyed the historical sections: how Carter pressured Israel to enter negotiations, and how the peace with Sadat was a leftover, secondary to the failure to even get Begin to consider any Israeli-Palestinian arrangement. The takedown of Avi Shavit, also, was sharp and rang true: Shavit seems to express horror at the atrocities at Lydd, a synecdoche for the Nakba, while still claiming that it was necessary for the Zionist project to be realized — without examining if the realization of one's project permits the destruction of another's life.


Will flesh this out later — but the most riveting part was the beginning, the history — especially Carter’s role. The rest less new or insightful but I generally very much agree with the idea that Israel needs force to make concessions. Would have been interested in more discussion of BDS as technique to create change

impasto's review against another edition

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informative medium-paced

3.5

molika04's review against another edition

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challenging informative medium-paced

3.5

smokeyshouse's review

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informative

4.0

skitch41's review against another edition

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4.0

Few international issues are as intractable as the Israel-Palestine conflict and there are many books that have been written about it. There is [b:Innocent Abroad: U.S. Diplomacy and the Effort to Transform the Middle East|4200840|Innocent Abroad U.S. Diplomacy and the Effort to Transform the Middle East|Martin S. Indyk|https://images.gr-assets.com/books/1348154931s/4200840.jpg|4248214] by [a:Martin S. Indyk|305143|Martin S. Indyk|https://s.gr-assets.com/assets/nophoto/user/u_50x66-632230dc9882b4352d753eedf9396530.png], which is a firsthand account of the peace process. And there is [b:My Promised Land: The Triumph and Tragedy of Israel|15798334|My Promised Land The Triumph and Tragedy of Israel|Ari Shavit|https://images.gr-assets.com/books/1365463707s/15798334.jpg|22435242] by [a:Ari Shavit|6459199|Ari Shavit|https://s.gr-assets.com/assets/nophoto/user/u_50x66-632230dc9882b4352d753eedf9396530.png], which deals with the historical roots of the conflict. But few of these books are as critical of the current process as this one. Mr. Thrall's analysis is incredibly insightful and disheartening as he concludes that peace between the two parties has metastasized into a stalemate where everyone has become comfortable with there being neither peace nor war. His conclusions about how US policy during the Obama years and moving forward has done little and often will be counterproductive. His conclusion from his historical analysis in the first chapter and throughout is that only force has moved either side to make the concessions necessary to move towards peace. And he is not talking about the rhetorical kind of force Pres. Obama deployed during his first term in office, but military action. Quite honestly, this is the best analysis you will find on the issue today.

However, this book is not perfect. First, his first chapter, which examines the history of the conflict from Israel's founding to the present, was very long at nearly 80 pages. It would've been better if he had broken this up a little bit. Second, his analysis of the Palestinians' historical position in the first chapter doesn't neatly fall in line with Mr. Thrall's initial thesis that force is necessary to move the parties forward. Finally, one chapter is dedicated to a criticism of Ari Shavit's My Promised Land. This chapter felt unfairly harsh and unnecessary and Mr. Thrall's criticism of Mr. Shavit's politics extends into other chapters as well.

Still, I would highly recommend this book to anyone interested in the current state of the peace process in Israel-Palestine.

strickvl's review

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3.0

A collection of articles from recent years. Thrall is an analyst associated with the International Crisis Group and the New York Review of Books. If you've followed his work, you'll be familiar with these pieces. The headliner article opens the volume outlining an argument that suggests force (from any/all parties, including those external to the conflict) is actually far more efficient as a way of achieving results. The argument was intriguing, though I don't really know enough to be able to judge the veracity of what he's suggesting. Certainly, it was a reminder to decouple moral claims from what is practically possible. Thrall comes off as a sensitive analyst in this book, sparing nobody -- least of all [a:Ari Shavit|6459199|Ari Shavit|https://s.gr-assets.com/assets/nophoto/user/u_50x66-632230dc9882b4352d753eedf9396530.png] and his book [b:My Promised Land: The Triumph and Tragedy of Israel|15798334|My Promised Land The Triumph and Tragedy of Israel|Ari Shavit|https://images.gr-assets.com/books/1365463707s/15798334.jpg|22435242] -- in the various pieces that follow.
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