alexander0's review
4.0
This book makes an interesting contribution to cultural anthropology and evolutionary psychology. From my read, this is sort of an alternative to Dennett's theory of mind that makes a couple distinctions metaphysically from his. Foremost, Sperber denies that we have any sort of objective access to minds. Where Dennett would argue we can reduce minds to what its affiliated matter does, Sperber argues our reference to minds is at best an indirect reference.
It is also interesting to compare this with Bruno Latour. Sperber has different objectives than Latour, but the practical outcomes of earlier arguments in the book seem to situate well with Actor-Network Theory despite two different goals in explanation. Latour is interested in action where Sperber is interested in limitations of naturalizing and explaining cognition.
My main critique is that, while Sperber's writing can be commendably approachable and accessible, it often seems to lean on very simplistic arguments which are easy to disagree with. That is, it does not seem very hard to come up with counter-examples to the logic he applies. This might be due to the fact that his simple writing style would be interrupted by more pedantic developments of arguments, and less because they are wrong. I'm just left with questions at times on whether I should agree or not. For example he argues in respect to other disciplines "Anthropology is free of ontological constraints," without much explanation. I'm not sure I agree with that, for anthropology or in respect to other disciplines. Certainly many disciplines are ontologically constrained, but many are not. He often makes assumptions like this throughout the book which at times can be critical to the argument, and I think it cheapens his argument.
As a final note with respect to my interest in this work, while Sperber is opposed to memetics as it was explained by Dawkins and Dennett at the time, Sperber could be said to have forwarded an alternative memetic theory. In a way, I'm tempted to say this is moving towards justifying a more semiotic system of memetics. Memetics has been critiqued in the past (such as by Terrance Deacon) for simply being a lesser developed discussion of Peircian or Saussurian signs. Sperber could be interpreted as giving memetics a connection to Peircian semiotics, although he is explicitly opposed to memetic theory of the day, and never mentions semiotics. This seems like an alternative starting point that someone like Sara Cannizzaro could have referred to to develop her notion of meme. But likewise, she didn't reference Sperber from what I remember.
It is also interesting to compare this with Bruno Latour. Sperber has different objectives than Latour, but the practical outcomes of earlier arguments in the book seem to situate well with Actor-Network Theory despite two different goals in explanation. Latour is interested in action where Sperber is interested in limitations of naturalizing and explaining cognition.
My main critique is that, while Sperber's writing can be commendably approachable and accessible, it often seems to lean on very simplistic arguments which are easy to disagree with. That is, it does not seem very hard to come up with counter-examples to the logic he applies. This might be due to the fact that his simple writing style would be interrupted by more pedantic developments of arguments, and less because they are wrong. I'm just left with questions at times on whether I should agree or not. For example he argues in respect to other disciplines "Anthropology is free of ontological constraints," without much explanation. I'm not sure I agree with that, for anthropology or in respect to other disciplines. Certainly many disciplines are ontologically constrained, but many are not. He often makes assumptions like this throughout the book which at times can be critical to the argument, and I think it cheapens his argument.
As a final note with respect to my interest in this work, while Sperber is opposed to memetics as it was explained by Dawkins and Dennett at the time, Sperber could be said to have forwarded an alternative memetic theory. In a way, I'm tempted to say this is moving towards justifying a more semiotic system of memetics. Memetics has been critiqued in the past (such as by Terrance Deacon) for simply being a lesser developed discussion of Peircian or Saussurian signs. Sperber could be interpreted as giving memetics a connection to Peircian semiotics, although he is explicitly opposed to memetic theory of the day, and never mentions semiotics. This seems like an alternative starting point that someone like Sara Cannizzaro could have referred to to develop her notion of meme. But likewise, she didn't reference Sperber from what I remember.
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