composed's review against another edition
3.0
This is probably my first three star review of a book that I plan to read again. Much of the time, the writing style was humorous, and there were a few stand out sentences that pushed my brain in a direction it has never gone before.
However, the author’s attempts to be funny turn into multiple anti-fat comments, and outdated ideas about autistic people. Also, I will keep this book in mind—when I publish my own—about how to avoid sounding like an egotistical asshole.
I plan to read his other books first, and then loop back to this one if I’m still thinking about it. There are some genuinely interesting ideas, and I do find it worth reading books that open my mind even if they have some downsides.
However, the author’s attempts to be funny turn into multiple anti-fat comments, and outdated ideas about autistic people. Also, I will keep this book in mind—when I publish my own—about how to avoid sounding like an egotistical asshole.
I plan to read his other books first, and then loop back to this one if I’m still thinking about it. There are some genuinely interesting ideas, and I do find it worth reading books that open my mind even if they have some downsides.
elsayles's review
Narrator was awful - main topic was how unknowable everything is. Narrator emphasizes like a 6th grade know it all. Bad combination. Really really awful.
jwier85's review against another edition
2.0
The book includes some legitimate criticisms of statistical reasoning, but the author comes off as rather insufferable.
mschlat's review against another edition
3.0
One of the main arguments in Taleb's work is the difference between what he calls Mediocristan and Extremistan. Mediocristan is where you see variations that have some physical limitation (for example, height or weight). No one person has a height or weight that is magnitudes of difference from somewhere else. Extremistan is where you do see those types of differences (for example, net worth). In Mediocristan, you have a collection of statistical tools (e.g., standard deviation, hypothesis testing) that work well. Taleb is arguing, however, that those tools are totally inappropriate for variables in Extremistan and, in fact, are harmful because they radically underestimate the harm that extreme events can cause. To some extent, the book is a testimonial to power laws over Gaussian variation.
But, Taleb is arguing more than mathematics --- he's making a epistemological argument that we cannot foresee or forecast the truly rare events (Black Swans) that have disproportionate effects on our lives. Moreover, he is claiming that the vast majority of humans do not comprehend this limit on their knowledge (and thus act in ways that make them more vulnerable to extreme events).
It's an impassioned set of arguments, and Taleb appears to have the mathematical and philosophical chops to be able to support it. But having read it throughly, I'm still not sure I can endorse it as fully as he does. When someone comes around claiming that a radical rethink is needed, I tend to react more conservatively and skeptically.
As a read, it's sometimes sloggy, and I am guessing that some portions will have the most interest to the same academic professions Taleb denigrates. But, overall, it was a provoking work that gave me a better sense of limitations to knowledge.
But, Taleb is arguing more than mathematics --- he's making a epistemological argument that we cannot foresee or forecast the truly rare events (Black Swans) that have disproportionate effects on our lives. Moreover, he is claiming that the vast majority of humans do not comprehend this limit on their knowledge (and thus act in ways that make them more vulnerable to extreme events).
It's an impassioned set of arguments, and Taleb appears to have the mathematical and philosophical chops to be able to support it. But having read it throughly, I'm still not sure I can endorse it as fully as he does. When someone comes around claiming that a radical rethink is needed, I tend to react more conservatively and skeptically.
As a read, it's sometimes sloggy, and I am guessing that some portions will have the most interest to the same academic professions Taleb denigrates. But, overall, it was a provoking work that gave me a better sense of limitations to knowledge.
lukewhitestone's review
3.0
This book is definitely interesting when touching on its central thesis (which comes far too late in the book, on page 285!), and alternately entertaining and boring when straying from that thesis. The writing style (as others have noted) is... idiosyncratic. There are tons of anecdotes and brief meditations on manifestations of abstract phenomena. The main problem is: when NNT relates these stories, they are rarely elucidating.
I think I see what he's getting at. As a "skeptical empiricist", he eschews theories as much as possible, preferring to stay in the world of concrete observations. So his writing style is another manifestation of that.
But the book and his "skeptical empiricist" strategy suffer from the same flaw: it tries to argue against the importance of conceptualizations, abstractions, and theories while itself espousing one.
Taleb thesis is, as far as I can tell, is "Things are largely random; reality, in most domains, is fractal, scalable, and favors Pareto-style power laws over Gaussian-style normal distributions." This is a theory, is it not? I imagine our argument going something like:
Taleb: "I keep theorizing to a minimum."
Me: "And what makes you think that this theory cannot be dispensed with, unlike most others you decry?"
Taleb: "This theory is a *skeptical* one, based on singular observations which act as counterexamples. It's the only explanation for the failed theorizing of others."
Me: "But you're still collecting observations and assimilating them into a theory. Isn't that "Platonizing" as you would call it?"
Taleb: *I don't know what his response to this would be*
There seems to be some Motte-And-Bailey style fallacies going on here. (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Motte-and-bailey_fallacy). Yes, there are some clear flaws with the way most forecasting is done, especially when it comes to highly impactful but rare events. His key concepts of the "Ludic Fallacy" and "Platonizing" are insightful and useful contributions to thinking about these problems (more on them below). However, it seems far too strong to claim this as a problem with theorizing. Then when challenged on this, he says, "Oh, no. *Some* theorizing is okay. It's just *overtheorizing* I have a problem with..." but that just seems to complicate the issue and doesn't really help explain the problem at all.
I think Taleb is thinking about this on the wrong axis. Yes, concepts beget theories, and theories can be flawed, blinding us to the cliff we're about to walk over. But the problem is not "making unnecessary theories" it's "making *incorrect* theories". This mistake of his causes him to call into question all expertise based off of mathematics. As if the theory of gravitation is somehow weaker because it has a precise mathematical underpinning, or that housing price predictions are mistaken by dint of using mathematical modeling. Like... what? Taleb can always say, "It just takes one wrong prediction to totally wipe you out. I'd rather side with the taxicab driver who is less sure of himself." And to that I say, "Fine. You side with the taxicab driver, I'll take the physicists and economists."
So even though there's this problem with *The Black Swan* lurking on every page, I think Taleb hits the nail on the head with two main concepts: The Ludic Fallacy (mistakenly assuming that real-life probabilities map on to the well-understood odds of games) and Platonicity (the practice of mapping real life objects to mental models/concepts and oversimplifying them in the process).
The Ludic Fallacy is fascinating and its examples are colorful and numerous. I particularly like the one of the casino who thought of every possible downside of the Sigfried and Roy show and thinking they were insuring themselves against all contingencies (including the tiger leaping into the audience) except for the case where the tiger turned against its own master, incapacitating him and wiping out the show and all its revenue. Remember, this is a Las Vegas casino, where they watch and record the actions of all patrons at all times. In retrospect the tiger thing is obvious (a classic hallmark of "Black Swans") but you probably would have been called crazy if you brought up this possibility to management prior to the event. I mean, the tiger hadn't mauled its owner for decades...
Platonicity is similar, except its more of a mindset/conceptualization problem rather than a single logical flaw. People who "Platonize" the world, thinking in terms of simplified objects are more likely to succumb to the Ludic Fallacy.
If the book had focused on these two aspects, I feel it would have been more insightful and enthralling. As it is, the book is too disjointed for me to recommend whole-heartedly, and too much work is left to the reader to connect the dots (forming a, you know, theory of the author's intent). I liked it, but much of it felt like a missed opportunity. I much prefer *The Signal and the Noise* by Nate Silver, which does a much better job separating the qualities of good predictions from those of the bad.
Somewhat fittingly, Taleb ends his appendix with a story about stoic philosophy and the suicide of Seneca the Younger (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Seneca_the_Younger). In the probably apocryphal story, Seneca--thanks to his completely serene outlook and understanding of the ephemeral nature of life--is able to kill himself in a sanguine manner "as if he had prepared for it every day of his life." The inclusion of this story is meant to illustrate Taleb's acceptance of that which we cannot control and/or predict, and his refusal to even want to wade into the realm of "Black Swans". In Taleb's view, they are unpredictable (in a tractability sense, even if theoretically the universe is deterministic) and are to be appreciated. Paramount is that we mustn't fool ourselves into thinking we can do anything about them.
What defeatist drivel! We should not accept the status quo, we should (as he admits is possible to a degree) attempt to turn black swans into gray swans. Do our best in spite of the seemingly insurmountable odds against us. Taleb has some valuable lessons in this regard, but if the heart of his philosophy is an acceptance to the point of metaphorical death that which we cannot do, then I want no part of it.
I sound harsh on this because the core of the idea here seems very wrong. But overall I did like the book and it did spur some deep thought. I'm glad I read it but it just has too many flaws for me to totally forgive.
2.5 stars.
I think I see what he's getting at. As a "skeptical empiricist", he eschews theories as much as possible, preferring to stay in the world of concrete observations. So his writing style is another manifestation of that.
But the book and his "skeptical empiricist" strategy suffer from the same flaw: it tries to argue against the importance of conceptualizations, abstractions, and theories while itself espousing one.
Taleb thesis is, as far as I can tell, is "Things are largely random; reality, in most domains, is fractal, scalable, and favors Pareto-style power laws over Gaussian-style normal distributions." This is a theory, is it not? I imagine our argument going something like:
Taleb: "I keep theorizing to a minimum."
Me: "And what makes you think that this theory cannot be dispensed with, unlike most others you decry?"
Taleb: "This theory is a *skeptical* one, based on singular observations which act as counterexamples. It's the only explanation for the failed theorizing of others."
Me: "But you're still collecting observations and assimilating them into a theory. Isn't that "Platonizing" as you would call it?"
Taleb: *I don't know what his response to this would be*
There seems to be some Motte-And-Bailey style fallacies going on here. (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Motte-and-bailey_fallacy). Yes, there are some clear flaws with the way most forecasting is done, especially when it comes to highly impactful but rare events. His key concepts of the "Ludic Fallacy" and "Platonizing" are insightful and useful contributions to thinking about these problems (more on them below). However, it seems far too strong to claim this as a problem with theorizing. Then when challenged on this, he says, "Oh, no. *Some* theorizing is okay. It's just *overtheorizing* I have a problem with..." but that just seems to complicate the issue and doesn't really help explain the problem at all.
I think Taleb is thinking about this on the wrong axis. Yes, concepts beget theories, and theories can be flawed, blinding us to the cliff we're about to walk over. But the problem is not "making unnecessary theories" it's "making *incorrect* theories". This mistake of his causes him to call into question all expertise based off of mathematics. As if the theory of gravitation is somehow weaker because it has a precise mathematical underpinning, or that housing price predictions are mistaken by dint of using mathematical modeling. Like... what? Taleb can always say, "It just takes one wrong prediction to totally wipe you out. I'd rather side with the taxicab driver who is less sure of himself." And to that I say, "Fine. You side with the taxicab driver, I'll take the physicists and economists."
So even though there's this problem with *The Black Swan* lurking on every page, I think Taleb hits the nail on the head with two main concepts: The Ludic Fallacy (mistakenly assuming that real-life probabilities map on to the well-understood odds of games) and Platonicity (the practice of mapping real life objects to mental models/concepts and oversimplifying them in the process).
The Ludic Fallacy is fascinating and its examples are colorful and numerous. I particularly like the one of the casino who thought of every possible downside of the Sigfried and Roy show and thinking they were insuring themselves against all contingencies (including the tiger leaping into the audience) except for the case where the tiger turned against its own master, incapacitating him and wiping out the show and all its revenue. Remember, this is a Las Vegas casino, where they watch and record the actions of all patrons at all times. In retrospect the tiger thing is obvious (a classic hallmark of "Black Swans") but you probably would have been called crazy if you brought up this possibility to management prior to the event. I mean, the tiger hadn't mauled its owner for decades...
Platonicity is similar, except its more of a mindset/conceptualization problem rather than a single logical flaw. People who "Platonize" the world, thinking in terms of simplified objects are more likely to succumb to the Ludic Fallacy.
If the book had focused on these two aspects, I feel it would have been more insightful and enthralling. As it is, the book is too disjointed for me to recommend whole-heartedly, and too much work is left to the reader to connect the dots (forming a, you know, theory of the author's intent). I liked it, but much of it felt like a missed opportunity. I much prefer *The Signal and the Noise* by Nate Silver, which does a much better job separating the qualities of good predictions from those of the bad.
Somewhat fittingly, Taleb ends his appendix with a story about stoic philosophy and the suicide of Seneca the Younger (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Seneca_the_Younger). In the probably apocryphal story, Seneca--thanks to his completely serene outlook and understanding of the ephemeral nature of life--is able to kill himself in a sanguine manner "as if he had prepared for it every day of his life." The inclusion of this story is meant to illustrate Taleb's acceptance of that which we cannot control and/or predict, and his refusal to even want to wade into the realm of "Black Swans". In Taleb's view, they are unpredictable (in a tractability sense, even if theoretically the universe is deterministic) and are to be appreciated. Paramount is that we mustn't fool ourselves into thinking we can do anything about them.
What defeatist drivel! We should not accept the status quo, we should (as he admits is possible to a degree) attempt to turn black swans into gray swans. Do our best in spite of the seemingly insurmountable odds against us. Taleb has some valuable lessons in this regard, but if the heart of his philosophy is an acceptance to the point of metaphorical death that which we cannot do, then I want no part of it.
I sound harsh on this because the core of the idea here seems very wrong. But overall I did like the book and it did spur some deep thought. I'm glad I read it but it just has too many flaws for me to totally forgive.
2.5 stars.
ofwitchbrew's review
5.0
This book should be labeled as the legitimate Lebanese history book. It's absolutely incredible.
eldobo's review against another edition
4.0
Deliberating between 4 and 5 stars on this book. Particularly surprising to me in this book about risk, was Chapter 8 (Giacomo Casanova's Unfailing Luck: The Problem of Silent Evidence), which ended up summarizing my views of religion better than I could have.