bstratton's review against another edition
I have no idea how to rate this book. It's infuriating, and essential and unique among political memoirs. I'm glad to have read it; not sure if I would say I enjoyed reading it.
ivybeans's review against another edition
4.0
Very interesting to get inside the heads of the leaders who were involved in the Vietnam debacle. You could see how these relatively good men muddled their way through a problem that should have taken more consideration than they gave it. However, it is not clear to me that the suggestion of establishing a War Cabinet would have resulted in a different or better result. I got the impression that leading the Vietnam war effort was like herding cats. Many contradictory viewpoints could not be reconciled. I am not sure that McNamara was being completely honest in his retrospective view of his participation in these decisions. He may have used a bit of artistic license to emphasize how he was right all along and make the military leaders look bad. But that is to be expected.
livsliterarynook's review against another edition
3.0
I became fascinated by Robert McNamara after watching the documentary The Fog of War, which I actually found really interesting. This was a moment where I got to place a proper face and personality to a figure I'd been studying and I really engaged with hearing his story and take on things. That doesn't mean to say I agree or believe everything he said. After all, I'm a historian and we tend to take things with a pinch of salt and a lot of cynicism.
However, his book was certainly much more in depth and detail than the documentary, for obvious reasons. It's hard to fit 300 pages of words into an hour documentary, well. But I still find McNamara to be a very complex character even at the end of this book. I know he polarises a lot of American society and the Vietnam War is certainly a topic that has caused a lot of outrage and upset over the years. People have criticised McNamara for attempting to use this book as a way of cleansing himself of all his fault. Admittedly, I do think he fails to take responsibility in his book for his actions. But realistically, I don't think it's now about addressing fault, and I think this is a man who did feel the weight of the burden he carried as Secretary of Defense.
Overall, this book was useful for my own research for study purposes, but also an interesting insight into the mind of what once was a very powerful man, and to see some of the impact of Vietnam War on those who were in office. He was a little too statistic heavy in his quantifications for my liking, but the narrative was mostly pretty readable.
However, his book was certainly much more in depth and detail than the documentary, for obvious reasons. It's hard to fit 300 pages of words into an hour documentary, well. But I still find McNamara to be a very complex character even at the end of this book. I know he polarises a lot of American society and the Vietnam War is certainly a topic that has caused a lot of outrage and upset over the years. People have criticised McNamara for attempting to use this book as a way of cleansing himself of all his fault. Admittedly, I do think he fails to take responsibility in his book for his actions. But realistically, I don't think it's now about addressing fault, and I think this is a man who did feel the weight of the burden he carried as Secretary of Defense.
Overall, this book was useful for my own research for study purposes, but also an interesting insight into the mind of what once was a very powerful man, and to see some of the impact of Vietnam War on those who were in office. He was a little too statistic heavy in his quantifications for my liking, but the narrative was mostly pretty readable.
melissam19's review against another edition
5.0
I love hsitory and I love the Kennedy era. A great read for American history lovers.
ericwelch's review against another edition
5.0
Addendum 9/9/09. As I follow the discussion over Afghanistan, I was reminded of a report cited by McNamara that was begun at the behest of CIA director Richard Helms. Super-secret it was done to examine contingencies to see what might happen if there were an unfavorable outcome in Vietnam. Over 30 CIA analysts were consulted. It was not to be an argument for ending the war, just responses to a hypothetical question. The memo was entitled "Implications of an Unfavorable Outcome in Vietnam." (The entire report makes fascinating reading and has been declassified. It’s available at:
http://www.vietnam.ttu.edu/star/images/041/04109127006.pdf
Basically, it made four observations:
A. Failure in Vietnam would be a major setback to reputation that would reduce influence as a world power
B. Net effects of failure would not be permanent and that over a short time the U.S. could regain its stature
C. “The worst potential damage would be of the self-inflicted kind – lead to loss of confidence in internal dissension which would limit our future ability to use our resources and power wisely and to full effect and lead to a loss of confidence by others in the American capacity for leadership.”
D. Destabilizing effects in immediate area of SE Asia, some realignments in neighboring countries
“The frustration of a world power, once it has committed vast resources and much prestige to a military enterprise must be in some degree damaging to the general security system it upholds. . . .If the analysis here advances the discussion at all, it is in the direction of suggesting that such risks are probably more limited and controllable than most previous argument has indicated.”
McNamara claims he never saw the memo until he wrote the book. Johnson may not have shown it to anyone.
A book worth mentioning is Harold Ford's CIA and Vietnam Policymakers: Three Episodes, 1962-1968 by Harold Ford, available from Google Books:
http://books.google.com/books?id=UkdGJDavyN0C&pg=PA110&lpg=PA110&dq=cia+report+top+johnson+vietnam+mcnamara&source=bl&ots=hhINrkI9a1&sig=kB-r3GissyTFEG-dg0EnB3oMq-8&hl=en&ei=5rCnSpH_GY_kNcnYzbEP&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=4#v=onepage&q=cia%20report%20top%20johnson%20vietnam%20mcnamara&f=false
Harold Ford’s book (at least excerpts I have read on Google books) indicates that CIA estimates were far more accurate than those coming publicly out of the White House.
Informative review at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/william-e-jackson-jr/harold-p-ford-on-robert-m_b_228340.html re Ford’s comments on McNamara’s book.
7/6/09 McNamara died today, thought I might review my earlier review.
Clearly, the policy wonks made many errors in their decision to pursue the war in Vietnam. Halberstam in The Best and the Brightest catalogs many of those arrogant positions and their failures to listen to southeast Asia experts. But there was also a visceral fear of Communism (not to mention a fear of right-wing McCarthyites who had ruined many a reputation for failure to be anti-Communist enough. That's why only Nixon could go to China. The military was sure that just a few more soldiers would win the war, just a few more bombing missions, etc. etc.
The book reveals a level of amateurism that is scary and that from the "best and the brightest," a phrase that when I hear it now gives me the willies. They failed to learn as much as they could about Vietnam
McNamara, by 1966, had already decided that the war could not be won.
Johnson knew that McNamara and RFK were friends and spoke frequently and by this time RFK was running for president and had come out against continued involvement in Vietnam. Already, McNamara and Dean Rusk both by this time were showing the strain physically. Diplomatic efforts continued to fail and in 1967, Buddhist uprising intensified and the fragility of the South Vietnamese government became obvious. The military situation while not great, was overshadowed by political problems. Johnson had even hinted in April of 1966 that he might be willing to withdraw troops from Vietnam and "make a stand in Thailand." (I'm not sure what the Thais would have thought of that, but no matter, other people's considerations don't seem to be taken into account when the U.S. is on the march.) "Looking back I deeply regret that I did not force a probing debate about whether it would ever be possible to forge a winning military effort on a foundation of political quicksand.. . . I believe it is clear today that military force especially, when wielded by an outside power, just cannot win in a country that cannot govern itself."
His colleagues saw things differently, and inaccurately says McNamara. Dean Rusk was already sure in 1966 that the situation was such that the North Vietnamese could not succeed. Ambassador Lodge was convinced the military war was going well (this was before Tet) and that the war would be lost only if the political will failed in the United States. McNamara reports that he laid out the reasons why the US could not succeed in the fall of 1966 after a trip to Vietnam. (McNamara was pilloried when the book came out by critics who faulted him for not going public with his dissent, or at least making a stronger effort to persuade the president of the lost cause. I think that's being a little harsh given the overwhelming support for the war from Johnson's other advisers.
I would hope that current administration officials would read this book, obviously the Bush folks did not, or maybe they didn't care. I would hope that we are not doomed to repeat the mistakes of the past. Just take a stroll along the Vietnam Memorial to realize the import of those decisions. An important book, if a cynic-maker.
Update 7/6/09[b:CIA and Vietnam Policymakers Three Episodes, 1962-1968|4106540|CIA and the Vietnam Policymakers Three Episodes, 1962-1968|Harold P. Ford|http://www.goodreads.com/images/nocover-60x80.jpg|6655903]
http://www.vietnam.ttu.edu/star/images/041/04109127006.pdf
Basically, it made four observations:
A. Failure in Vietnam would be a major setback to reputation that would reduce influence as a world power
B. Net effects of failure would not be permanent and that over a short time the U.S. could regain its stature
C. “The worst potential damage would be of the self-inflicted kind – lead to loss of confidence in internal dissension which would limit our future ability to use our resources and power wisely and to full effect and lead to a loss of confidence by others in the American capacity for leadership.”
D. Destabilizing effects in immediate area of SE Asia, some realignments in neighboring countries
“The frustration of a world power, once it has committed vast resources and much prestige to a military enterprise must be in some degree damaging to the general security system it upholds. . . .If the analysis here advances the discussion at all, it is in the direction of suggesting that such risks are probably more limited and controllable than most previous argument has indicated.”
McNamara claims he never saw the memo until he wrote the book. Johnson may not have shown it to anyone.
A book worth mentioning is Harold Ford's CIA and Vietnam Policymakers: Three Episodes, 1962-1968 by Harold Ford, available from Google Books:
http://books.google.com/books?id=UkdGJDavyN0C&pg=PA110&lpg=PA110&dq=cia+report+top+johnson+vietnam+mcnamara&source=bl&ots=hhINrkI9a1&sig=kB-r3GissyTFEG-dg0EnB3oMq-8&hl=en&ei=5rCnSpH_GY_kNcnYzbEP&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=4#v=onepage&q=cia%20report%20top%20johnson%20vietnam%20mcnamara&f=false
Harold Ford’s book (at least excerpts I have read on Google books) indicates that CIA estimates were far more accurate than those coming publicly out of the White House.
Informative review at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/william-e-jackson-jr/harold-p-ford-on-robert-m_b_228340.html re Ford’s comments on McNamara’s book.
7/6/09 McNamara died today, thought I might review my earlier review.
Clearly, the policy wonks made many errors in their decision to pursue the war in Vietnam. Halberstam in The Best and the Brightest catalogs many of those arrogant positions and their failures to listen to southeast Asia experts. But there was also a visceral fear of Communism (not to mention a fear of right-wing McCarthyites who had ruined many a reputation for failure to be anti-Communist enough. That's why only Nixon could go to China. The military was sure that just a few more soldiers would win the war, just a few more bombing missions, etc. etc.
The book reveals a level of amateurism that is scary and that from the "best and the brightest," a phrase that when I hear it now gives me the willies. They failed to learn as much as they could about Vietnam
McNamara, by 1966, had already decided that the war could not be won.
Johnson knew that McNamara and RFK were friends and spoke frequently and by this time RFK was running for president and had come out against continued involvement in Vietnam. Already, McNamara and Dean Rusk both by this time were showing the strain physically. Diplomatic efforts continued to fail and in 1967, Buddhist uprising intensified and the fragility of the South Vietnamese government became obvious. The military situation while not great, was overshadowed by political problems. Johnson had even hinted in April of 1966 that he might be willing to withdraw troops from Vietnam and "make a stand in Thailand." (I'm not sure what the Thais would have thought of that, but no matter, other people's considerations don't seem to be taken into account when the U.S. is on the march.) "Looking back I deeply regret that I did not force a probing debate about whether it would ever be possible to forge a winning military effort on a foundation of political quicksand.. . . I believe it is clear today that military force especially, when wielded by an outside power, just cannot win in a country that cannot govern itself."
His colleagues saw things differently, and inaccurately says McNamara. Dean Rusk was already sure in 1966 that the situation was such that the North Vietnamese could not succeed. Ambassador Lodge was convinced the military war was going well (this was before Tet) and that the war would be lost only if the political will failed in the United States. McNamara reports that he laid out the reasons why the US could not succeed in the fall of 1966 after a trip to Vietnam. (McNamara was pilloried when the book came out by critics who faulted him for not going public with his dissent, or at least making a stronger effort to persuade the president of the lost cause. I think that's being a little harsh given the overwhelming support for the war from Johnson's other advisers.
I would hope that current administration officials would read this book, obviously the Bush folks did not, or maybe they didn't care. I would hope that we are not doomed to repeat the mistakes of the past. Just take a stroll along the Vietnam Memorial to realize the import of those decisions. An important book, if a cynic-maker.
Update 7/6/09[b:CIA and Vietnam Policymakers Three Episodes, 1962-1968|4106540|CIA and the Vietnam Policymakers Three Episodes, 1962-1968|Harold P. Ford|http://www.goodreads.com/images/nocover-60x80.jpg|6655903]
josephb8694's review
3.0
My son read the book in college many years ago and I inherited it when we were cleaning out a house we were selling. I recently pulled it off a shelf of books to read and, very quickly, realized how lucky I was to not have allowed it to go to the trash. Even though it was written in the 90's and deals with the 1960's Vietnam period, it couldn't have been more relevant to explaining why it's so difficult coming up with a strategy for solving the challenges of radical Islamists.
The Kennedy/Johnson State and Defense departments had alternative strategies, accurate information was conflicting and hard to come by, South Vietnam government was falling apart and the US military was trying to learn for the first time to fight a guerrilla war. I found many parallels (and warnings) to our challenges figuring out how to fight the ISIL extremists.
I recommend the book for those who want to read today what history books to be written 50 years from now about how we handled today's struggle.
The Kennedy/Johnson State and Defense departments had alternative strategies, accurate information was conflicting and hard to come by, South Vietnam government was falling apart and the US military was trying to learn for the first time to fight a guerrilla war. I found many parallels (and warnings) to our challenges figuring out how to fight the ISIL extremists.
I recommend the book for those who want to read today what history books to be written 50 years from now about how we handled today's struggle.
wolvereader's review
4.0
An extremely interesting perspective on the Vietnam War. In Retrospect is a policy history - battles are barely mentioned, and generals are only discussed as they influenced the shape and tenor of the war. This book provides an insider view of the start and escalation (though not the end) of the war by one of the wars own architects.
McNamara's tone is interesting--at times quite self-critical, at times defensive, and at times passing the blame for aggressive policies and delusional national security policies. He does quote from a large number of memos and papers, however, and overall the book feels more like someone trying to understand how things got so far out of control far more than it feels like someone trying to whitewash their own past.
Well worth a read for people interested in American history of the 1960s, or for anyone interested in the Vietnam war.
One note on the audiobook: the narration by Joseph Campanella was mainly fine, but he kept calling Ia Drang "La Drang". I know that lowercase Ls look like capital Is in sans-serifed fonts, but I would have hoped someone would have caught the mistake. It drove me nuts!
McNamara's tone is interesting--at times quite self-critical, at times defensive, and at times passing the blame for aggressive policies and delusional national security policies. He does quote from a large number of memos and papers, however, and overall the book feels more like someone trying to understand how things got so far out of control far more than it feels like someone trying to whitewash their own past.
Well worth a read for people interested in American history of the 1960s, or for anyone interested in the Vietnam war.
One note on the audiobook: the narration by Joseph Campanella was mainly fine, but he kept calling Ia Drang "La Drang". I know that lowercase Ls look like capital Is in sans-serifed fonts, but I would have hoped someone would have caught the mistake. It drove me nuts!
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