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zare_i's review against another edition
5.0
This was a wonderful find. To be honest I was not sure what to expect, considering that author is best known as spy novel author, but I definitely did not expect level of detailed information this book gives to the reader.
Author starts with the rise of Nazis and forces, together with paramilitary (Freikorps and SA) and political support they received (masterfully manipulated by Hitler who managed to mercilessly get rid of any and all political opposition, either through violence or through political machinations, by creating crisis and presenting himself as an only solution for them).
We are given picture of events taking place in the society that was crushed after WW1, governed by (unfortunately) incapable government that just could not cope with the economical difficulties and did nothing but provide fertile ground for the radical movement that will play the only card they know will bear fruit for them - ideological indoctrination.
While presenting rise of Nazis to power, author also points out that elements that will later be called Blitzkrieg showed up in merciless Freikorps and [what will later be known as] SA city fighting with the political enemies (especially German communists) - quick assaults by infantry armed with mechanization (trucks, light armored vehicles) and cannons, deployed on every hot spot to quickly overcome the opposition and then move to next front.
I like how role of German Army was clearly given in the first years of Nazis trying to establish themselves as a political force - Army was from start playing the role of kingmaker and unfortunately fell under the spell of master manipulator [who promised the return to martial glory] and willingly became the instrument of horrors to come during WW2. Rommel and his political views (I have to admit I was not aware of this before) prove that German military was fully supporting Hitler and started changing the position only when the tides started to turn and they saw they were heading towards the defeat. Propaganda launched at the end of WW2 (and lasting 'til this day) to clean this disgrace is something that will forever stain the West.
Author then moves to more military centered history and I have to admit he revealed quite a few details that marked the period of German military rise.
First, the idea that blitzkrieg was something new. Author shows how glorifying enemies successes and presenting it as something completely novel is nothing but a way to hide ones own incompetence. In essence what later became known as blitzkrieg was nothing else but a way of warfare that was specific for German armed forces for centuries - quick wars in order to prevent conflict on multiple fronts. Only thing that changed is that speed of forces increased but even this happened only to a degree.
Second, myth of German army as a heavily mechanized force. Bulk of German troops still used horses to move around even by the end of WW2. Elite units (actual mechanized infantry and SS armed troops) used majority of mechanization but rest of Army still used horses to move troops and heavy equipment around. This I agree was in great contrast to very advanced air warfare component of German army but nevertheless it was true. While war industry was enlarged by conquests in East and West of Europe total mechanization of the armed forces never took place.
Third, initiative in combat was something that allowed Germans to succeed. What separated German army from the rest of armies in Europe was high level of initiative given to both troops and officers. They were encouraged to adapt to the situation on the ground and execute the actions in the best way they can, without limitations from the upper echelons (commanders are there just to issue the objective but they do not proscribe the one and only way to achieve it). This proved to be the element to completely shock French and UK forces who were sticking to a rather inflexible (prepared) plans to fight the German army. I was truly surprised by inflexible French army command structure.
Fourth, confirmation that new technology creates awe from the opposition only in the first phases of conflict. Once tanks were identified for what they were (highly vulnerable to determined infantry) they moved from the apex predator to the role of just another weapon in the battlefield that can easily be hunted and destroyed. Same today is happening with UAVs and other "wonder" weapons that military analysts are so amazed with.
Fifth, you can wage war with this or that super weapon but without infantry all gains will very soon be lost. This is confirmed in recent wars too - without infantry to actually control the area no gain in the battlefield can be secured. This was truth before, and will remain truth for many years ahead. Only thing that can change is equipment for these very infantry troops. While tanks were a spearhead for many a German attack it was mechanized and standard infantry that went behind them and secured the area from flank and rear attacks.
Author provides a lot of details for each and every campaign fought - from Poland, Norway to France. It is visible that entire campaign (especially French one) were based off the existing plans from previous years (19th century and WW1) but adapted for new technology and means of warfare. Germans took the initiative and played to the weaknesses of their enemies by sowing fear and paralysis by quick penetration of armored columns. This psychological effect will paralyze the Allies (coupled with their rigid command structure) and enable thinly stretched German forces to cut them off unmolested instead of being targeted from flanks by every force capable of it.
Wherever Germans encountered resistance that was organized they were stopped and required larger infantry and artillery (thus much slower) forces to join the leading tank columns to move forward. Unfortunately there wasn't much of organized resistance at the time.
What truly surprised me in this book is level of details given to the issues of organizing large armor and mechanized forces entering the theater of operations. Even slight change in order was causing havoc on roads and approaches and caused delays when it comes to deploying infantry, armor and support services for the respective divisions. Considering snickering (although I understand it, it is propaganda after all) views of use of mechanized forces in latest war in Europe by the so many experts today, one can only understand that West has forgotten everything when it comes to waging war in large towns and cities (as author shows these were areas where tank attrition for Germans were horrendous, from Poland onwards) or in general heavily wooded and populated areas.
While at the beginning I was surprised by author ending the book about blitzkrieg after Dunkirk I understand his point of view. Up to cut off of Allied forces and forcing the Dunkirk evacuation German actions were what you might call blitzkrieg, lightning fast (reckless and total gamble though, bt again war is always a gamble) advance of armored columns that literary shocked French and UK forces and force them to go from paralysis to withdrawal instead of holding ground. After Dunkirk though front line expanded and with it German speed of advance naturally decreased to become more of a standard army advance and mop up of rest of the French resistance. Also every other theater of operations after France was [again] not blitzkrieg but again standard army advance with higher tempo (due to mechanization and air force leading the way). Once encountering the determined enemy (Russians/Soviets) with production base and covering mind boggling vastness of front, Germans just could not apply blitzkrieg at all and war entered the traditional warfare phase - attrition and destruction of manpower and equipment.
Excellent book with lots of details on WW1 experimental forces (J.C.Fullers project 1919 that was written off as war ended) followed by inter-war development of various mechanized and mobile force concepts tried out in UK and German initial approaches to organization of new forces following WW1 experiences and contemporary works (again by J.C Fuller and Liddell Hart) (and again having great luck of having someone as Guderian to amalgamate all the different tactical and technical approaches into workable new-force model).
As I said incredibly detailed book, describing pros and cons of both Allies and Germans, mistakes they made and how they solved some of the very difficult tasks (Dunkirk evacuation being one of the most complex evacuations I came across in history). As an additional plus, book gives comparison between units and equipment at disposal of every party in the opening years of WW2. I have to admit that now I understand even less the French army considering the mass of equipment they had at their disposal but actually never managed to apply it against the Germans.
Highly recommended book.
Author starts with the rise of Nazis and forces, together with paramilitary (Freikorps and SA) and political support they received (masterfully manipulated by Hitler who managed to mercilessly get rid of any and all political opposition, either through violence or through political machinations, by creating crisis and presenting himself as an only solution for them).
We are given picture of events taking place in the society that was crushed after WW1, governed by (unfortunately) incapable government that just could not cope with the economical difficulties and did nothing but provide fertile ground for the radical movement that will play the only card they know will bear fruit for them - ideological indoctrination.
While presenting rise of Nazis to power, author also points out that elements that will later be called Blitzkrieg showed up in merciless Freikorps and [what will later be known as] SA city fighting with the political enemies (especially German communists) - quick assaults by infantry armed with mechanization (trucks, light armored vehicles) and cannons, deployed on every hot spot to quickly overcome the opposition and then move to next front.
I like how role of German Army was clearly given in the first years of Nazis trying to establish themselves as a political force - Army was from start playing the role of kingmaker and unfortunately fell under the spell of master manipulator [who promised the return to martial glory] and willingly became the instrument of horrors to come during WW2. Rommel and his political views (I have to admit I was not aware of this before) prove that German military was fully supporting Hitler and started changing the position only when the tides started to turn and they saw they were heading towards the defeat. Propaganda launched at the end of WW2 (and lasting 'til this day) to clean this disgrace is something that will forever stain the West.
Author then moves to more military centered history and I have to admit he revealed quite a few details that marked the period of German military rise.
First, the idea that blitzkrieg was something new. Author shows how glorifying enemies successes and presenting it as something completely novel is nothing but a way to hide ones own incompetence. In essence what later became known as blitzkrieg was nothing else but a way of warfare that was specific for German armed forces for centuries - quick wars in order to prevent conflict on multiple fronts. Only thing that changed is that speed of forces increased but even this happened only to a degree.
Second, myth of German army as a heavily mechanized force. Bulk of German troops still used horses to move around even by the end of WW2. Elite units (actual mechanized infantry and SS armed troops) used majority of mechanization but rest of Army still used horses to move troops and heavy equipment around. This I agree was in great contrast to very advanced air warfare component of German army but nevertheless it was true. While war industry was enlarged by conquests in East and West of Europe total mechanization of the armed forces never took place.
Third, initiative in combat was something that allowed Germans to succeed. What separated German army from the rest of armies in Europe was high level of initiative given to both troops and officers. They were encouraged to adapt to the situation on the ground and execute the actions in the best way they can, without limitations from the upper echelons (commanders are there just to issue the objective but they do not proscribe the one and only way to achieve it). This proved to be the element to completely shock French and UK forces who were sticking to a rather inflexible (prepared) plans to fight the German army. I was truly surprised by inflexible French army command structure.
Fourth, confirmation that new technology creates awe from the opposition only in the first phases of conflict. Once tanks were identified for what they were (highly vulnerable to determined infantry) they moved from the apex predator to the role of just another weapon in the battlefield that can easily be hunted and destroyed. Same today is happening with UAVs and other "wonder" weapons that military analysts are so amazed with.
Fifth, you can wage war with this or that super weapon but without infantry all gains will very soon be lost. This is confirmed in recent wars too - without infantry to actually control the area no gain in the battlefield can be secured. This was truth before, and will remain truth for many years ahead. Only thing that can change is equipment for these very infantry troops. While tanks were a spearhead for many a German attack it was mechanized and standard infantry that went behind them and secured the area from flank and rear attacks.
Author provides a lot of details for each and every campaign fought - from Poland, Norway to France. It is visible that entire campaign (especially French one) were based off the existing plans from previous years (19th century and WW1) but adapted for new technology and means of warfare. Germans took the initiative and played to the weaknesses of their enemies by sowing fear and paralysis by quick penetration of armored columns. This psychological effect will paralyze the Allies (coupled with their rigid command structure) and enable thinly stretched German forces to cut them off unmolested instead of being targeted from flanks by every force capable of it.
Wherever Germans encountered resistance that was organized they were stopped and required larger infantry and artillery (thus much slower) forces to join the leading tank columns to move forward. Unfortunately there wasn't much of organized resistance at the time.
What truly surprised me in this book is level of details given to the issues of organizing large armor and mechanized forces entering the theater of operations. Even slight change in order was causing havoc on roads and approaches and caused delays when it comes to deploying infantry, armor and support services for the respective divisions. Considering snickering (although I understand it, it is propaganda after all) views of use of mechanized forces in latest war in Europe by the so many experts today, one can only understand that West has forgotten everything when it comes to waging war in large towns and cities (as author shows these were areas where tank attrition for Germans were horrendous, from Poland onwards) or in general heavily wooded and populated areas.
While at the beginning I was surprised by author ending the book about blitzkrieg after Dunkirk I understand his point of view. Up to cut off of Allied forces and forcing the Dunkirk evacuation German actions were what you might call blitzkrieg, lightning fast (reckless and total gamble though, bt again war is always a gamble) advance of armored columns that literary shocked French and UK forces and force them to go from paralysis to withdrawal instead of holding ground. After Dunkirk though front line expanded and with it German speed of advance naturally decreased to become more of a standard army advance and mop up of rest of the French resistance. Also every other theater of operations after France was [again] not blitzkrieg but again standard army advance with higher tempo (due to mechanization and air force leading the way). Once encountering the determined enemy (Russians/Soviets) with production base and covering mind boggling vastness of front, Germans just could not apply blitzkrieg at all and war entered the traditional warfare phase - attrition and destruction of manpower and equipment.
Excellent book with lots of details on WW1 experimental forces (J.C.Fullers project 1919 that was written off as war ended) followed by inter-war development of various mechanized and mobile force concepts tried out in UK and German initial approaches to organization of new forces following WW1 experiences and contemporary works (again by J.C Fuller and Liddell Hart) (and again having great luck of having someone as Guderian to amalgamate all the different tactical and technical approaches into workable new-force model).
As I said incredibly detailed book, describing pros and cons of both Allies and Germans, mistakes they made and how they solved some of the very difficult tasks (Dunkirk evacuation being one of the most complex evacuations I came across in history). As an additional plus, book gives comparison between units and equipment at disposal of every party in the opening years of WW2. I have to admit that now I understand even less the French army considering the mass of equipment they had at their disposal but actually never managed to apply it against the Germans.
Highly recommended book.
pedanther's review against another edition
challenging
informative
medium-paced
3.75
Content Warnings
Moderate: Death, Genocide, Gun violence, Hate crime, Homophobia, Violence, Xenophobia, Police brutality, Antisemitism, Murder, and War
Minor: Ableism, Adult/minor relationship, Child death, Mental illness, Suicide, Fire/Fire injury, and Pandemic/Epidemic
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