sekerez's review against another edition
5.0
"Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind" is almost as challenging to read as it is brilliant, but the last pages make up for all the effort by providing one of the most complete and innovative theories of human cognition in the history of Analytic philosophy. It is without a doubt one of the best works of philosophy that I have encountered.
But first a note on Sellars's style. While I do believe, like other reviewers, that Sellars's prose in undoubtedly difficult, I think it is by no means bad. It is a strange style, borne out of the conciseness of his contemporaries, the oddity of some of the most recent Teutonic thinkers he caters to (Carnap, Wittgenstein) and the heaviness of the elder Germans whose shoulders he rests on (Kant and Hegel). But, despite having to read most sentences more than once, I can't say it's a bad style. It's weighty, yet not verbose; concise and not dull; strange yet never sloppy. I'm quite sure that, with enough patience, careful reading of his sentences will always clarify, not contradict, his argument (which is something you can't say for all philosophers, i.e. All the philosophers mentioned previously + more readable ones like Russell (see "On Denoting")). So, while getting through the text is an inevitably difficult endeavor, I cannot discourage anyone from doing so and "reading the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy" instead.
Admittedly, the essay's structure isn't perfect, and the path leading to the enlightening end is all but windy. Sellars accumulates related observations, arguments, and distinctions, to then drop them to start a seemingly unrelated new strand. At times, it can be hard to understand what the essay is about at all; sometimes it seems about sense-data, sometimes about empiricism at large, sometimes about a more general concept of the "Myth of the Given"; it is seemingly purely about epistemology in the beginning, but also about language, history of philosophy, and science (and where is the "Philosophy of Mind" aspect tauted in the title?); many times it can be hard to discern what Sellars's viewpoint even is and whether he is expounding a theory to defend it or to tear it down. While individual passages do qualify for stimulating philosophical nuggets in themselves, as a reading experience it can be quite disorienting.
But Sellars manages to tie everything together into his epic ending, recounting the "Myth of Jones". Part of me doesn't want to spoil it too much, since it came as such a pleasant surprise to me. Suffice to say, it presents an alternative account of perception and mentalistic phenomena, where to say "I have an impression of red" is not a) indubitable b) epistemologically foundational and c) partly private / dismissive of common-sense mentalistic phenomena as traditional logical empiricists / Ryle (and, to an extent, philosophers in the modern period leading up to, and perhaps including, Kant). Instead, Sellars offers an alternative view through the narration of the story of Jones, which draws on all the considerations made previously and the domains they are a part of. It is a spectacular exception in analytic philosophy, one shunning careful considerations of minor scope and favoring a true account of "man- (person-) in-the-world".
The effect is a haunting one. To be fair, I don't know if the "Myth of Jones" is an accurate replacement for the "Myth of the Given". But I am excited by Sellars's willingness not only to dismiss a past theory for its insufficiencies, but also to provide a substantive alternative, in an attempt which I feel few other giants of analytic philosophy (I'm looking at you, Kripke and Quine) have tried in their greatest statements. And I'm also shocked by his employment of many of the same categories and ideas of his fellow analytic philosophers (ordinary language, logic, a general preference for nominalism, a disregard for actual history) to undermine the very claims that made theories of analytic philosophy popular in the first place. It almost makes me wonder if, had Sellars been present at the inception of logical empiricism as opposed to Ayer, the history of analytic philosophy would have unfolded differently, perhaps avoiding some of its original sins.
I will say, however, that Sellars is unkind to those untrained in previous analytic philosophy, or for that matter, all philosophy. Read your Carnap, your Ayer, your Wittgenstein. Read your Descartes, your Locke, your Hume. Your Kant. Read Sellars.
But first a note on Sellars's style. While I do believe, like other reviewers, that Sellars's prose in undoubtedly difficult, I think it is by no means bad. It is a strange style, borne out of the conciseness of his contemporaries, the oddity of some of the most recent Teutonic thinkers he caters to (Carnap, Wittgenstein) and the heaviness of the elder Germans whose shoulders he rests on (Kant and Hegel). But, despite having to read most sentences more than once, I can't say it's a bad style. It's weighty, yet not verbose; concise and not dull; strange yet never sloppy. I'm quite sure that, with enough patience, careful reading of his sentences will always clarify, not contradict, his argument (which is something you can't say for all philosophers, i.e. All the philosophers mentioned previously + more readable ones like Russell (see "On Denoting")). So, while getting through the text is an inevitably difficult endeavor, I cannot discourage anyone from doing so and "reading the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy" instead.
Admittedly, the essay's structure isn't perfect, and the path leading to the enlightening end is all but windy. Sellars accumulates related observations, arguments, and distinctions, to then drop them to start a seemingly unrelated new strand. At times, it can be hard to understand what the essay is about at all; sometimes it seems about sense-data, sometimes about empiricism at large, sometimes about a more general concept of the "Myth of the Given"; it is seemingly purely about epistemology in the beginning, but also about language, history of philosophy, and science (and where is the "Philosophy of Mind" aspect tauted in the title?); many times it can be hard to discern what Sellars's viewpoint even is and whether he is expounding a theory to defend it or to tear it down. While individual passages do qualify for stimulating philosophical nuggets in themselves, as a reading experience it can be quite disorienting.
But Sellars manages to tie everything together into his epic ending, recounting the "Myth of Jones". Part of me doesn't want to spoil it too much, since it came as such a pleasant surprise to me. Suffice to say, it presents an alternative account of perception and mentalistic phenomena, where to say "I have an impression of red" is not a) indubitable b) epistemologically foundational and c) partly private / dismissive of common-sense mentalistic phenomena as traditional logical empiricists / Ryle (and, to an extent, philosophers in the modern period leading up to, and perhaps including, Kant). Instead, Sellars offers an alternative view through the narration of the story of Jones, which draws on all the considerations made previously and the domains they are a part of. It is a spectacular exception in analytic philosophy, one shunning careful considerations of minor scope and favoring a true account of "man- (person-) in-the-world".
The effect is a haunting one. To be fair, I don't know if the "Myth of Jones" is an accurate replacement for the "Myth of the Given". But I am excited by Sellars's willingness not only to dismiss a past theory for its insufficiencies, but also to provide a substantive alternative, in an attempt which I feel few other giants of analytic philosophy (I'm looking at you, Kripke and Quine) have tried in their greatest statements. And I'm also shocked by his employment of many of the same categories and ideas of his fellow analytic philosophers (ordinary language, logic, a general preference for nominalism, a disregard for actual history) to undermine the very claims that made theories of analytic philosophy popular in the first place. It almost makes me wonder if, had Sellars been present at the inception of logical empiricism as opposed to Ayer, the history of analytic philosophy would have unfolded differently, perhaps avoiding some of its original sins.
I will say, however, that Sellars is unkind to those untrained in previous analytic philosophy, or for that matter, all philosophy. Read your Carnap, your Ayer, your Wittgenstein. Read your Descartes, your Locke, your Hume. Your Kant. Read Sellars.
jeremiah's review
This little article shows the reader what's still possible for the analytic style of philosophy. In this convoluted quarrel is poetry.
haylflayl's review
2.0
Very scattered with rushed and unclear arguments. Not something I would recommend.
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