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karp76's review against another edition
5.0
William Shakespeare wrote, "War gives the right to the conquerors to impose any condition they please upon the vanquished." And from this point, Kagan begins his study. He argues that the free state of existence of humanity/world/states is not peace, not harmony yet war:
"That apart from education the chief course advised to maintain peace is restraint: the avoidance of actions that will destroy peace that is the natural order of things. The evidence provided by the experience of human beings living in organized societies for more than five millennia suggests otherwise. Statistically, war has been more common than peace, and extended periods of peace have been rare in a world divided into multiple states. The cases we have examined indicate good will, unilateral disarmament, the avoidance of alliances, teaching and preaching of the evils of war by those states who, generally, satisfied with the state of the world, seek to preserve peace, are of no avail. What seems to work best, even though imperfectly, is the possession by those states who wish to preserve peace of the preponderant power and of the will to accept the burdens and responsibilities required to achieve that purpose."
It is the dilemma of war and peace. The struggle of the humanity to abide the better angels of nature.
This is an excellent and exemplary read. A fine wine, not to be devoured but savored and mulled, perhaps only tasted, spit out and another sip needed. Before we retire, on last passage to consider. A moving one, a poignant one. Kagan writing on how British contemporaries hailed PM Chamberlain's achievement of appeasement by getting Hitler to promise not to invade Czechoslovakia or any other part of Europe:
"If the motives alleged were the only ones at work we should nonetheless need to point out that Munich was also the triumph of an unrealistic muddle-headedness that based its idea of justice on a gross misreading of history and its notion of safety on the promises of a demonic and ruthless leader of a brutal totalitarian regime whose writings, speeches, and actions over a decade and a half showed the he [Hitler] had no intention of keeping them [promises not to invade]. It is also hard to find nobility in a policy that sought peace at the expense of a small and weak nation (Czechoslovakia) that had put its trust in the nations who threw it to the very ferocious wolves to preserve, so they thought, their own safety."
"That apart from education the chief course advised to maintain peace is restraint: the avoidance of actions that will destroy peace that is the natural order of things. The evidence provided by the experience of human beings living in organized societies for more than five millennia suggests otherwise. Statistically, war has been more common than peace, and extended periods of peace have been rare in a world divided into multiple states. The cases we have examined indicate good will, unilateral disarmament, the avoidance of alliances, teaching and preaching of the evils of war by those states who, generally, satisfied with the state of the world, seek to preserve peace, are of no avail. What seems to work best, even though imperfectly, is the possession by those states who wish to preserve peace of the preponderant power and of the will to accept the burdens and responsibilities required to achieve that purpose."
It is the dilemma of war and peace. The struggle of the humanity to abide the better angels of nature.
This is an excellent and exemplary read. A fine wine, not to be devoured but savored and mulled, perhaps only tasted, spit out and another sip needed. Before we retire, on last passage to consider. A moving one, a poignant one. Kagan writing on how British contemporaries hailed PM Chamberlain's achievement of appeasement by getting Hitler to promise not to invade Czechoslovakia or any other part of Europe:
"If the motives alleged were the only ones at work we should nonetheless need to point out that Munich was also the triumph of an unrealistic muddle-headedness that based its idea of justice on a gross misreading of history and its notion of safety on the promises of a demonic and ruthless leader of a brutal totalitarian regime whose writings, speeches, and actions over a decade and a half showed the he [Hitler] had no intention of keeping them [promises not to invade]. It is also hard to find nobility in a policy that sought peace at the expense of a small and weak nation (Czechoslovakia) that had put its trust in the nations who threw it to the very ferocious wolves to preserve, so they thought, their own safety."
lucas12345's review against another edition
challenging
informative
reflective
medium-paced
4.0
All about war and peace. Reads like cases studies rather than a history.
nerdofdoom's review against another edition
1.0
Kagan is trying to justify Bush era preemptive strike policy and aggressive foreign wars by using and comparing historical examples of failed peaces. This would more accurately say "...and the preservation of the status-quo", because the authors idea of "peace" is first strike wars against those who threaten it.
The one thing that really bothers me the most is that the examples he uses (the Punic wars, WW1, WW2)are all certainly illustrative of the consequences of leaving a tenacious enemy half defeated, but have little bearing on what it means to become involved in warfare in this modern age. Look at Afghanistan and Iraq to see that it is not a matter of crushing an enemy completely to secure victory, this simply can not be done in a insurgent style war. Anyone who reads the U.S. Army's Counterinsurgency Field manual, or reads any of the modern theorists on insurgent warfare (which is really all that is happening anymore) can see for themselves that destruction of the enemy by force is an unrealistic approach to this kind of warfare and that military success will never look the same again as it did even sixty years ago. It's not enough to completely destroy the enemy and remove his ability to make war because the enemy is not an army, and he makes war in the shadows with nothing but scraps.
Kagan and his children are notorious insiders. His son Frederick Kagan is credited with conceiving of the famous "surge" in Iraq, his son Robert Kagan is a notorious neo-conservative who was directly involved in the bush era insanity (see his books). The U.S. went into Iraq with a "let's just smash 'em up and go home" attitude, and IT DIDN'T WORK. How soon after Bush declared victory did it become clear that there was no victory to be had then, or ever? immediately. these guys want nothing more than a conventional war like their fathers had, with the pitched field battles like their fathers fought, but they can not have them. We will all pay the price for this desire of these few militant men in high places who want so badly the glory of days long past.
The one thing that really bothers me the most is that the examples he uses (the Punic wars, WW1, WW2)are all certainly illustrative of the consequences of leaving a tenacious enemy half defeated, but have little bearing on what it means to become involved in warfare in this modern age. Look at Afghanistan and Iraq to see that it is not a matter of crushing an enemy completely to secure victory, this simply can not be done in a insurgent style war. Anyone who reads the U.S. Army's Counterinsurgency Field manual, or reads any of the modern theorists on insurgent warfare (which is really all that is happening anymore) can see for themselves that destruction of the enemy by force is an unrealistic approach to this kind of warfare and that military success will never look the same again as it did even sixty years ago. It's not enough to completely destroy the enemy and remove his ability to make war because the enemy is not an army, and he makes war in the shadows with nothing but scraps.
Kagan and his children are notorious insiders. His son Frederick Kagan is credited with conceiving of the famous "surge" in Iraq, his son Robert Kagan is a notorious neo-conservative who was directly involved in the bush era insanity (see his books). The U.S. went into Iraq with a "let's just smash 'em up and go home" attitude, and IT DIDN'T WORK. How soon after Bush declared victory did it become clear that there was no victory to be had then, or ever? immediately. these guys want nothing more than a conventional war like their fathers had, with the pitched field battles like their fathers fought, but they can not have them. We will all pay the price for this desire of these few militant men in high places who want so badly the glory of days long past.
spacestationtrustfund's review
1.0
I read this book a while ago and absolutely HATED it. Like, we're talking LOATHED it. But I cannot for the life of me remember why... probably because it's simultaneously verbose and simplistic.
itsmeevandavies's review
challenging
informative
medium-paced
4.0
This is an extremely revealing book. Your mileage may vary as to its entertainment value, it lean pretty far towards the academic side of the spectrum in its prose styling, but if your really want to understand war and peace and the reasons why one becomes the other, this book will give you a well-reasoned and comprehensive understanding of the topic. By examining the lead up to the Peloponnesian War, the Punic War, the World Wars, and the Cuban missile crisis, Donald Kagan, himself a Yale professor of history, extracts a number of shockingly relevant and challenging insights. If you’ve ever wondered, for instance, why the U.S. government spends such an incomprehensible amount of money on its military despite not having been engaged in a major conflict since the 1940s, this book has the answer. It might not change you opinion about world events, but it will help you understand them in a more nuanced way. The only reason it’s not a 5 is, again, the writing can be a little slow, but if you can get through that, this book is very well worth your time.
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