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southernsoldier35's review against another edition
adventurous
challenging
informative
inspiring
medium-paced
4.0
An excellent overview of the conflict, mostly from the French perspective, with detailed discussions on not just the campaign, and the various battles, and skirmishes, but also an in depth look at the doctrine, tactics, and military culture of the two armies.
The Prussian Army was on the cusp of its transition to a more scientific methodology of war fighting, and their blood soaked victory over France showcased the need for a more rigid approach to doctrine, and tactics, while still retaining the flexibility, and initiative friendly culture that is the hallmark of Western warfare. The French, on the other hand, learned many of the wrong lessons via their humbling in this war.
For the French, whose operational, and tactical, passivity contributed mightily to their downfall, they over-conpensated in the following generation. What grew out of the defeat born in large part by a recumbent military indolence, gave way to a fierce aggressiveness that became very much a mania.
The 'Cult of the Offensive' was born from the ashes of defeat in 1870. A cult that would reap a terrible harvest on the fields of battle, once again, in France, especially in the years 1914, and 1915.
Much more to say about this book, but that would involve me writing one for myself, so I'll end it with this thought. The current Russo-Ukraine War has rekindled my own passionate interest in the very serious, intellectual, and technical, study of warfare. And the Franco-Prussian War still has many lessons to be gleaned from that will be of use to modern War fighters, strategists, and analysts. And few single volume works are as worthy a place in the collection of a serious military history and military analyst student as this one.
Highly recommended.
The Prussian Army was on the cusp of its transition to a more scientific methodology of war fighting, and their blood soaked victory over France showcased the need for a more rigid approach to doctrine, and tactics, while still retaining the flexibility, and initiative friendly culture that is the hallmark of Western warfare. The French, on the other hand, learned many of the wrong lessons via their humbling in this war.
For the French, whose operational, and tactical, passivity contributed mightily to their downfall, they over-conpensated in the following generation. What grew out of the defeat born in large part by a recumbent military indolence, gave way to a fierce aggressiveness that became very much a mania.
The 'Cult of the Offensive' was born from the ashes of defeat in 1870. A cult that would reap a terrible harvest on the fields of battle, once again, in France, especially in the years 1914, and 1915.
Much more to say about this book, but that would involve me writing one for myself, so I'll end it with this thought. The current Russo-Ukraine War has rekindled my own passionate interest in the very serious, intellectual, and technical, study of warfare. And the Franco-Prussian War still has many lessons to be gleaned from that will be of use to modern War fighters, strategists, and analysts. And few single volume works are as worthy a place in the collection of a serious military history and military analyst student as this one.
Highly recommended.
oleksandr's review against another edition
4.0
This is a non-fic about one of the ‘forgotten wars’ of the 19th century, the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871. While it is mainly a military history, there are a lot of vignettes and more general history.
The pre-history: on one side Prussia with Bismarck, growing world power, winner of 1866 war with Austria. On the other – France, which holds to its Napoleonic past (from, the structure of army to his nephew as the current emperor) and assumes that it is able to press others to do what France wants. Bismarck fires up French by a series of provocations (which France is eager to follow) to declare the war on Prussia (thus losing potential favorable international opinion).
France’s army was smaller and older, with professional solders, mostly uneducated. It has two wunderwaffen – Chassepot rifle, which shot further and more precise then Prussian needle rifle; and Mitrailleuse – early modern machine gun, which doesn’t swivel, so its volleys were more spectacular than effective sweeping fire. Prussian had their wunderwaffen as well Krupp’s steel tube guns with a great range. Their army was larger, conscripted and more educated, which is a great boon in the industrial era.
The armies also had quite almost opposite approaches to the war: Germans attacked again and again, each attempt quickly gaining support of the neighboring units, fallen officers quickly replaced but educated NCOs; French based everything on their old glory, long-range rifle and static defense, the latter pulverized by Krupp’s guns. Another problem is a constant bickering among French high command, were everyone wanted honors but not the responsibility, so they march their troops to exhaustion only to leave them under enemy fire.
To a large extent this war, more than any other led to the WWI as we know it – French elan tactics, fight for Alsace and Lorraine, raise of Germany with resulting fear of it, assumption that a future war should be short, so its ok to throw millions of solders into this meatgrinder, and so on.
A great history book for everyone interested in the period.
The pre-history: on one side Prussia with Bismarck, growing world power, winner of 1866 war with Austria. On the other – France, which holds to its Napoleonic past (from, the structure of army to his nephew as the current emperor) and assumes that it is able to press others to do what France wants. Bismarck fires up French by a series of provocations (which France is eager to follow) to declare the war on Prussia (thus losing potential favorable international opinion).
France’s army was smaller and older, with professional solders, mostly uneducated. It has two wunderwaffen – Chassepot rifle, which shot further and more precise then Prussian needle rifle; and Mitrailleuse – early modern machine gun, which doesn’t swivel, so its volleys were more spectacular than effective sweeping fire. Prussian had their wunderwaffen as well Krupp’s steel tube guns with a great range. Their army was larger, conscripted and more educated, which is a great boon in the industrial era.
The armies also had quite almost opposite approaches to the war: Germans attacked again and again, each attempt quickly gaining support of the neighboring units, fallen officers quickly replaced but educated NCOs; French based everything on their old glory, long-range rifle and static defense, the latter pulverized by Krupp’s guns. Another problem is a constant bickering among French high command, were everyone wanted honors but not the responsibility, so they march their troops to exhaustion only to leave them under enemy fire.
To a large extent this war, more than any other led to the WWI as we know it – French elan tactics, fight for Alsace and Lorraine, raise of Germany with resulting fear of it, assumption that a future war should be short, so its ok to throw millions of solders into this meatgrinder, and so on.
A great history book for everyone interested in the period.
markk's review
5.0
Of all of the wars fought in Europe between 1815 and 1914, none was more important in terms of its impact than the Franco-Prussian War. The culmination of Otto von Bismarck's strategy for unifying the German states into a single country, it saw the displacement of France as the dominant Continental power and the formation of a new nation that would dominate events in Europe for the next three-quarters of a century.
Such an epochal conflict is well deserving of study, yet for Geoffrey Wawro to write this book is in some respects an act of bravery. For decades Michael Howard's [b:The Franco-Prussian War|25863|The Franco-Prussian War The German Invasion of France, 1870-1871|Michael Eliot Howard|https://images.gr-assets.com/books/1348574883s/25863.jpg|26583] has been the go-to source for readers seeking an English-language history of the conflict, and little has changed since its publication in 1961 to undermine its value. Yet Wawro's book is a worthy addition to the literature on the war, thanks to the directness of his analysis and the clarity of his prose. He provides readers with a superb introduction to the conflict, starting with an analysis of its political background and the strengths and weaknesses of the two armies before detailing the major campaigns of the war. From his analysis emerges a tale of two powers, one rotted yet still possessing formidable strengths, the other dynamic but suffering from its own set of flaws. Wawro makes it clear that while the Prussians enjoyed several advantages the outcome was far from ordained, with the flaws of French leadership being a decisive factor in its defeat.
Wawro's book illuminates the depth of France's humiliation in their defeat. In doing so, he helps to underscore the long-term significance of the war, as France would emerge from it determined to undo its loss. Though this may not have made the conflict that took place four decades later inevitable, the seeds for it were clearly sown in 1870-1. To understand why is just one reason why this book is necessary reading for every student of modern European history, as well as anyone seeking an accessible overview of this pivotal clash of powers.
Such an epochal conflict is well deserving of study, yet for Geoffrey Wawro to write this book is in some respects an act of bravery. For decades Michael Howard's [b:The Franco-Prussian War|25863|The Franco-Prussian War The German Invasion of France, 1870-1871|Michael Eliot Howard|https://images.gr-assets.com/books/1348574883s/25863.jpg|26583] has been the go-to source for readers seeking an English-language history of the conflict, and little has changed since its publication in 1961 to undermine its value. Yet Wawro's book is a worthy addition to the literature on the war, thanks to the directness of his analysis and the clarity of his prose. He provides readers with a superb introduction to the conflict, starting with an analysis of its political background and the strengths and weaknesses of the two armies before detailing the major campaigns of the war. From his analysis emerges a tale of two powers, one rotted yet still possessing formidable strengths, the other dynamic but suffering from its own set of flaws. Wawro makes it clear that while the Prussians enjoyed several advantages the outcome was far from ordained, with the flaws of French leadership being a decisive factor in its defeat.
Wawro's book illuminates the depth of France's humiliation in their defeat. In doing so, he helps to underscore the long-term significance of the war, as France would emerge from it determined to undo its loss. Though this may not have made the conflict that took place four decades later inevitable, the seeds for it were clearly sown in 1870-1. To understand why is just one reason why this book is necessary reading for every student of modern European history, as well as anyone seeking an accessible overview of this pivotal clash of powers.
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