spinnerroweok's review against another edition
4.0
Other than David Eisenhower's memoir of his grandfather, this book offers the best insight into Eisenhower the human being who was president. Thomas brings Ike to life and really shows his personality. This book primarily focuses on his presidency especially on foreign policy and his health. This is a must read to understand this president.
mpetruce's review against another edition
4.0
As more and more presidential files get declassified, the historical view of presidents change, sometimes for the better, sometimes for the worse. As this book points out, Eisenhower was a much better, or at least much more interesting, president than past history has given him credit for. I enjoyed Thomas' book about Robert Kennedy as well. His scholarship is neither blind worship, nor is it utterly damning. He reveals the facts and analyzes them fairly and honestly. The result in this book was a much more complex president than people thought, at least in the realm of foreign policy.
I would add that this book, and many like it, should be required reading for those who insist this period in U.S. history was a more gentle, simple, innocent time. It really was not. They may end up dismayed with what they discover.
I would add that this book, and many like it, should be required reading for those who insist this period in U.S. history was a more gentle, simple, innocent time. It really was not. They may end up dismayed with what they discover.
mdrfromga's review against another edition
5.0
"Ike's Bluff" was the first biography of President Eisenhower I've read. Not knowing much about him, I had formed the impression that his military background may not have carried over with him into the White House.
He seemed nice, but probably not the tactician and strategist other presidents had been. I found, to the contrary, that he was indeed a master strategist when the stakes (the looming prospect of global thermonuclear annihilation) couldn't have been higher. He cultivated the impression that he was sometimes confused or unsure of details, all the while he was seeing many moves ahead of his opponents. He certainly wasn't perfect. He gave his subordinates and the CIA too much reign. But on the whole, the way he maneuvered the United States out of harm's way should place him among the top tier of presidents.
He seemed nice, but probably not the tactician and strategist other presidents had been. I found, to the contrary, that he was indeed a master strategist when the stakes (the looming prospect of global thermonuclear annihilation) couldn't have been higher. He cultivated the impression that he was sometimes confused or unsure of details, all the while he was seeing many moves ahead of his opponents. He certainly wasn't perfect. He gave his subordinates and the CIA too much reign. But on the whole, the way he maneuvered the United States out of harm's way should place him among the top tier of presidents.
jimbowen0306's review against another edition
4.0
I'm not altogether sure that I'm willing to accept the premise of this book. It focuses on Eisenhower's foreign policy during his presidency, and argues that because Eisenhower was always willing to say he'd "massively retaliate" to any perceived aggression on the part of Russia, he was able to reduce the number of small wars in the world, and stop small wars becoming big wars.
I don't dispute that Thomas knows how to write a narrative that seems to support his argument. He seems to have done the research, interviewed the right people, and seems to make a cogent argument for what he said, but I was reminded of the logical fallacy episode of the West Wing ("Post hoc ergo propter hoc") was I read the book.
Thomas' argument seems to be "Well we didn't have any wars during Ike's presidency, so it must have all been down to Ike's management." I don't doubt that Ike might have played a role, but let's face it, it's equally as likely the Russian's couldn't go to war, because they were still recovering from the effects of a world war that destroyed much of their industrial base in the west of their country, with the result that they wouldn't be able to keep the supply lines maintained as well as they'd have liked... Couple this with the fact that the Russians are more likely to have seen the full horrors of World Wars first hand, and I'm left wondering if anyone had looked at it through Russian eyes, and framed the argument that the Russians used braggadocio to look mean, thereby preventing the Americans from doing something dumb when they had a numerical advantage in nuclear arms.
So all in all it's a good book, but I don't necessarily agree with it's premise. Especially given that Eisenhower might have had a real opportunity for détente in his second term, but blew it.
I don't dispute that Thomas knows how to write a narrative that seems to support his argument. He seems to have done the research, interviewed the right people, and seems to make a cogent argument for what he said, but I was reminded of the logical fallacy episode of the West Wing ("Post hoc ergo propter hoc") was I read the book.
Thomas' argument seems to be "Well we didn't have any wars during Ike's presidency, so it must have all been down to Ike's management." I don't doubt that Ike might have played a role, but let's face it, it's equally as likely the Russian's couldn't go to war, because they were still recovering from the effects of a world war that destroyed much of their industrial base in the west of their country, with the result that they wouldn't be able to keep the supply lines maintained as well as they'd have liked... Couple this with the fact that the Russians are more likely to have seen the full horrors of World Wars first hand, and I'm left wondering if anyone had looked at it through Russian eyes, and framed the argument that the Russians used braggadocio to look mean, thereby preventing the Americans from doing something dumb when they had a numerical advantage in nuclear arms.
So all in all it's a good book, but I don't necessarily agree with it's premise. Especially given that Eisenhower might have had a real opportunity for détente in his second term, but blew it.
bobf2d33's review against another edition
4.0
An easy read focusing on Eisenhower's approach to the Cold War. Well written.
gregbrown's review against another edition
2.0
Bleh. Author clearly wants you to admire and like Eisenhower but the book's contents are either unconvincing or damning.
For unconvincing, take the book's central argument: Eisenhower was actually just bluffing every time he pondered or threatened to use nuclear weapons, bluffing so hard that even his own aides believed he would use them. This is Thomas' inference from Ike being a devoted poker and then bridge player, which is pretty bizarre. Ike was repeatedly saying in internal meetings that they should treat nukes as they would any conventional weapon, and asking about the possibilities of using some in crises. He was just bluffing his own staff?
For damning, take Eisenhower's method of public communication: deliberately bland and sometimes confusing to avoid revealing any actual information. When it worked, Ike was able to deftly avoid topics... but when it didn't, it made him look disastrously out of touch. And oftentimes the very topics they wanted to avoid were avoided for not so good reasons! Or take his pretty lax treatment of personnel, keeping not only Allan Dulles around but also his brother John Foster Dulles. Ike kept John Foster around to play the bad cop to his good cop routine, but that just places JF's extremism even more his fault.
And even if you're willing to forgive Eisenhower for pushing the CIA's reign of terror as cheaper than a larger conventional army, the book itself is kinda repetitive. Again and again we hear about his temper. So many anecdotes about his temper. And his health is terrible all the time too.
Anyways, a good breezy overview of Eisenhower's foreign policy, but not a particularly insightful one. Or at least, not brimming with the sort of insights it thinks it's giving.
For unconvincing, take the book's central argument: Eisenhower was actually just bluffing every time he pondered or threatened to use nuclear weapons, bluffing so hard that even his own aides believed he would use them. This is Thomas' inference from Ike being a devoted poker and then bridge player, which is pretty bizarre. Ike was repeatedly saying in internal meetings that they should treat nukes as they would any conventional weapon, and asking about the possibilities of using some in crises. He was just bluffing his own staff?
For damning, take Eisenhower's method of public communication: deliberately bland and sometimes confusing to avoid revealing any actual information. When it worked, Ike was able to deftly avoid topics... but when it didn't, it made him look disastrously out of touch. And oftentimes the very topics they wanted to avoid were avoided for not so good reasons! Or take his pretty lax treatment of personnel, keeping not only Allan Dulles around but also his brother John Foster Dulles. Ike kept John Foster around to play the bad cop to his good cop routine, but that just places JF's extremism even more his fault.
And even if you're willing to forgive Eisenhower for pushing the CIA's reign of terror as cheaper than a larger conventional army, the book itself is kinda repetitive. Again and again we hear about his temper. So many anecdotes about his temper. And his health is terrible all the time too.
Anyways, a good breezy overview of Eisenhower's foreign policy, but not a particularly insightful one. Or at least, not brimming with the sort of insights it thinks it's giving.
aloyokon's review against another edition
4.0
I actually had some knowledge of Ike's presidency before I read this book, but I never realized the extent to which he schemed, gambled, strategized, and bluffed to keep the peace in the early days of the Cold War. Although I would not count him as the greatest president of all time, I believe that Eisenhower's ability to prevent nuclear annihilation of the world makes him a successful executive leader in my book.
(I am pissed off over his tepid action on civil rights and failure to rein in the CIA though).
So kudos to Ike, and kudos to Evan Thomas for this page-turner!
(I am pissed off over his tepid action on civil rights and failure to rein in the CIA though).
So kudos to Ike, and kudos to Evan Thomas for this page-turner!
ksammons's review against another edition
4.0
Before reading this book, I had very little knowledge of President (or General as he preferred) Eisenhower. I remember a framed Parade magazine that hung in my dad's bedroom when I was a kid, on which Eisenhower looks serious and brave in full military regalia. I was afraid of the picture, as I always felt like Eisenhower was watching me with disapproval. Now I know that he probably was.
Eisenhower is a fascinating man, and his spirit is wonderfully captured in this book. I found myself worrying about him during his various health scares and rooting for him when the press attacked him or he was entertaining Soviet leaders at the White House. This is a wonderful profile of a very complicated and serious man. And, because of the subject matter, I believe it is especially poignant to read this book in modern times. With the constant threat of nuclear war hanging over Ike's head, he successfully navigated the US through a portion of the Cold War, and adapted to the ever-changing scientific developments of weapons and technology. Eisenhower proved to be a shrewd leader, despite the press often labeling him as a friendly, senile grandfather of a president.
Eisenhower is a fascinating man, and his spirit is wonderfully captured in this book. I found myself worrying about him during his various health scares and rooting for him when the press attacked him or he was entertaining Soviet leaders at the White House. This is a wonderful profile of a very complicated and serious man. And, because of the subject matter, I believe it is especially poignant to read this book in modern times. With the constant threat of nuclear war hanging over Ike's head, he successfully navigated the US through a portion of the Cold War, and adapted to the ever-changing scientific developments of weapons and technology. Eisenhower proved to be a shrewd leader, despite the press often labeling him as a friendly, senile grandfather of a president.
jimbowen0306's review against another edition
4.0
I'm not altogether sure that I'm willing to accept the premise of this book. It focuses on Eisenhower's foreign policy during his presidency, and argues that because Eisenhower was always willing to say he'd "massively retaliate" to any perceived aggression on the part of Russia, he was able to reduce the number of small wars in the world, and stop small wars becoming big wars.
I don't dispute that Thomas knows how to write a narrative that seems to support his argument. He seems to have done the research, interviewed the right people, and seems to make a cogent argument for what he said, but I was reminded of the logical fallacy episode of the West Wing ("Post hoc ergo propter hoc") was I read the book.
Thomas' argument seems to be "Well we didn't have any wars during Ike's presidency, so it must have all been down to Ike's management." I don't doubt that Ike might have played a role, but let's face it, it's equally as likely the Russian's couldn't go to war, because they were still recovering from the effects of a world war that destroyed much of their industrial base in the west of their country, with the result that they wouldn't be able to keep the supply lines maintained as well as they'd have liked... Couple this with the fact that the Russians are more likely to have seen the full horrors of World Wars first hand, and I'm left wondering if anyone had looked at it through Russian eyes, and framed the argument that the Russians used braggadocio to look mean, thereby preventing the Americans from doing something dumb when they had a numerical advantage in nuclear arms.
So all in all it's a good book, but I don't necessarily agree with it's premise. Especially given that Eisenhower might have had a real opportunity for détente in his second term, but blew it.
I don't dispute that Thomas knows how to write a narrative that seems to support his argument. He seems to have done the research, interviewed the right people, and seems to make a cogent argument for what he said, but I was reminded of the logical fallacy episode of the West Wing ("Post hoc ergo propter hoc") was I read the book.
Thomas' argument seems to be "Well we didn't have any wars during Ike's presidency, so it must have all been down to Ike's management." I don't doubt that Ike might have played a role, but let's face it, it's equally as likely the Russian's couldn't go to war, because they were still recovering from the effects of a world war that destroyed much of their industrial base in the west of their country, with the result that they wouldn't be able to keep the supply lines maintained as well as they'd have liked... Couple this with the fact that the Russians are more likely to have seen the full horrors of World Wars first hand, and I'm left wondering if anyone had looked at it through Russian eyes, and framed the argument that the Russians used braggadocio to look mean, thereby preventing the Americans from doing something dumb when they had a numerical advantage in nuclear arms.
So all in all it's a good book, but I don't necessarily agree with it's premise. Especially given that Eisenhower might have had a real opportunity for détente in his second term, but blew it.
ljkinkad's review against another edition
4.0
Good insight into Eisenhower’s personality and his approach to war in a nuclear age. His “bluff” was that he would use nuclear weapons in any conflict, no matter the size. And he portrayed that to everyone, even closest friends, advisors, and Mamie. He was convinced that his position would only work if absolutely everyone was convinced he would use nuclear weapons in any conflict. Eisenhower was concerned that any conflict could escalate into nuclear so it was best to avoid any conflict and the best way to do that was to threaten use of nuclear. It worked. His close advisors still debated after his death whether he would have used nuclear. The book also demonstrates that Eisenhower was not befuddled grandfather that he portrayed. He was really quite cunning and on top of strategy (until probably the last 6 months of his presidency after 2 strokes when he kind of withdrew).
He was a big golfer - 3-4 times a week. He loved to play poker and bridge with a group of former military friends that remained close throughout.
He was a big golfer - 3-4 times a week. He loved to play poker and bridge with a group of former military friends that remained close throughout.