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rifledoc1's review against another edition
4.0
I understand why this book is in the Intermediate Category of the USMC Commandant's Professional Reading List. The book demonstrates the importance of having good people in staff positions, and how their work can be just as important as those in command billets. Author Robert Coram also makes the case of LtGen Krulak's extreme moral courage in confronting LBJ over the conduct of the Vietnam War, but given LtGen Krulak's tendency to always speak his mind to his superiors I don't think that one incident was out something out of the ordinary for LtGen Krulak. Not to take anything away from LtGen Krulak though, the book make LtGen Krulak's enduring physical and moral corsage throughout his career clear. Overall, I believe Coram does a good job presenting both the good and the bad aspects of LtGen Krulak's professional and personal life, and I highly recommend it to anyone who wants to know more about one of the Marine Corps most important and influential unsung heroes, or how good staff work can have a big impact. (Audiobook "Read")
socraticgadfly's review against another edition
1.0
I had heard a bit about Krulak, and as part of continuing my education about the Vietnam War, when I saw this book at my library, decided to grab it.
And, ye gads it was horrible. It had errors and stereotypes even before we got to Krulak’s story starting.
1. ignores wilson the fake neutral ppg 4-5
2. German stereotypes of Hindenburg & Ludendorff, 7 (292, he extends this stupidity, which comes off like 18th-19th century Brits, in talking about the dour countenance of Mountbatten giving away his Germanic birth.)
3. Petain was really NOT devoid of imagination (and earlier probably saved the French Army after the disastrous Nivelle Offensive) 7
Some later errors are connected to this.
4. Wrong about Prussian/German genl staff causing loss of WWI / II. Wilson the fake neutral caused loss of WWI, augmented by Genl Staff and Kaiser resuming sub warfare, but ... an understandable gamble. Hitler caused loss of WWII (setting aside Genl Staff toadyism).
5. Goes in in this wrongness, 160FF, to claim that JCS 1478 was a secret plot to remove civilian control of the military as well as unify all armed forces under the American equivalent of a German General Staff. Flat –out lies.
In this, he exemplies exactly what Harry Truman said: “They have a propaganda machine that is almost equal to Stalin's.”
6. In reality, the “National Military Establishment” created by the National Defense Act of 1947, in its original form, still would have retained a civilian Secretary of Defense.
7. The new bill, in original form, might indeed have reduced CONGRESSIONAL oversight. But, that’s not the same as reducing CIVILIAN oversight. From the start, from what I know from my own reading, and what even Coram admits, a secretary of defense replacing/superseding the old Secy of War and Secy of Navy was part of the package. And, as a Cabinet secretary, of course subject to Congressional confirmation.
But wait! It gets worse.
Coram apparently things the US could have “won” Vietnam. He cites Lewis Sorley and Mark Moyar to this end. I looked at Sorley and Moyar on Amazon. “Revisionist history” is right and not in a good way. Sorley fellates the legend of Creighton Abrams, among other things. Moyar, by some of his screedish books about things like Obama’s drone warfare and “defense cuts,” appears to be a neocon wingnut. Plus, a lot of Vietnam vets say he’s full of shit. I say he’s full of shit if he claims with a straight face that Diem was an effective leader. Sorley was in Nam and retired a Light Colonel. I guess that, unlike Hackworth and others, it wasn’t for refusal to play military politics. He went on to work with CSIS, etc. He’s also refuted by better analysis of Abrams’ career in Nam, which says he changed little in actual operations from what Abrams did.
And, THAT is why, I guess, Coram wrote this book.
He’s full of shit, too, if he claims Vietnamese leaders were, “compared to other Asian leaders, men of relative probity.” Uncle Ho was MUCH more full of probity than Diem.
As for Brute’s ideas about Nam? He’s less than fully right on population dispersion; a fair amount of South Vietnamese lived in the central highlands. As for targeting the coast? South Vietnam’s coast is almost as long as California’s. Target it where?
As for some of the things he may have otherwise wanted? Later on, LBJ did step up bombing on Hanoi, but carefully selected, pseudo-precision targets. Nixon mined Haiphong. North Vietnam still won.
I was originally going to rate this book two stars, because of:
1. The truth it tells about Krulak, including how big a liar he often was.
2. The truth it tells about the author.
But by the time I got through the chapter on Vietnam, I couldn’t even do that.
Weirdly, though, Coram appears not to have been a Marine or even to have served in ANY branch of the armed services.
And, ye gads it was horrible. It had errors and stereotypes even before we got to Krulak’s story starting.
1. ignores wilson the fake neutral ppg 4-5
2. German stereotypes of Hindenburg & Ludendorff, 7 (292, he extends this stupidity, which comes off like 18th-19th century Brits, in talking about the dour countenance of Mountbatten giving away his Germanic birth.)
3. Petain was really NOT devoid of imagination (and earlier probably saved the French Army after the disastrous Nivelle Offensive) 7
Some later errors are connected to this.
4. Wrong about Prussian/German genl staff causing loss of WWI / II. Wilson the fake neutral caused loss of WWI, augmented by Genl Staff and Kaiser resuming sub warfare, but ... an understandable gamble. Hitler caused loss of WWII (setting aside Genl Staff toadyism).
5. Goes in in this wrongness, 160FF, to claim that JCS 1478 was a secret plot to remove civilian control of the military as well as unify all armed forces under the American equivalent of a German General Staff. Flat –out lies.
In this, he exemplies exactly what Harry Truman said: “They have a propaganda machine that is almost equal to Stalin's.”
6. In reality, the “National Military Establishment” created by the National Defense Act of 1947, in its original form, still would have retained a civilian Secretary of Defense.
7. The new bill, in original form, might indeed have reduced CONGRESSIONAL oversight. But, that’s not the same as reducing CIVILIAN oversight. From the start, from what I know from my own reading, and what even Coram admits, a secretary of defense replacing/superseding the old Secy of War and Secy of Navy was part of the package. And, as a Cabinet secretary, of course subject to Congressional confirmation.
But wait! It gets worse.
Coram apparently things the US could have “won” Vietnam. He cites Lewis Sorley and Mark Moyar to this end. I looked at Sorley and Moyar on Amazon. “Revisionist history” is right and not in a good way. Sorley fellates the legend of Creighton Abrams, among other things. Moyar, by some of his screedish books about things like Obama’s drone warfare and “defense cuts,” appears to be a neocon wingnut. Plus, a lot of Vietnam vets say he’s full of shit. I say he’s full of shit if he claims with a straight face that Diem was an effective leader. Sorley was in Nam and retired a Light Colonel. I guess that, unlike Hackworth and others, it wasn’t for refusal to play military politics. He went on to work with CSIS, etc. He’s also refuted by better analysis of Abrams’ career in Nam, which says he changed little in actual operations from what Abrams did.
And, THAT is why, I guess, Coram wrote this book.
He’s full of shit, too, if he claims Vietnamese leaders were, “compared to other Asian leaders, men of relative probity.” Uncle Ho was MUCH more full of probity than Diem.
As for Brute’s ideas about Nam? He’s less than fully right on population dispersion; a fair amount of South Vietnamese lived in the central highlands. As for targeting the coast? South Vietnam’s coast is almost as long as California’s. Target it where?
As for some of the things he may have otherwise wanted? Later on, LBJ did step up bombing on Hanoi, but carefully selected, pseudo-precision targets. Nixon mined Haiphong. North Vietnam still won.
I was originally going to rate this book two stars, because of:
1. The truth it tells about Krulak, including how big a liar he often was.
2. The truth it tells about the author.
But by the time I got through the chapter on Vietnam, I couldn’t even do that.
Weirdly, though, Coram appears not to have been a Marine or even to have served in ANY branch of the armed services.
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