schumacher's review against another edition
2.0
Reasoning that comes off as cloying and pedantic, frequent seeming misrepresentations of the position Ryle argues against (although it's very hard to tell, since he doesn't give explicit references to books he thinks get things wrong), terminological distinctions which don't match up with my everyday understandings of words (which explicitly clashes with Ryle's supposed plain English style), a literary style which comes off as someone who loves Wittgenstein but isn't nearly as clever... Doesn't matter how many of his conclusions I agree with or feel kinship with, this book is a flop stylistically.
untravel's review against another edition
2.0
A deeply flawed work. It starts from a worthwhile point (the problem of other minds is a pseudo-problem) but then immediately stumbles into a faulty conclusion (therefore 'minds' don't really exist as discrete entities). From this error, Ryle sews together an elaborate patchwork quilt on all the things that need to be true in order for his initial premise to be true. It doesn't work out so well.
The result is an argument to the effect that Ryle thinks that I don't think the way I think I think. And if that sounds absurd, it's because it is. At every turn he is forced to butcher and mangle the English language to fit his theory. None of the words the English language uses to refer to mental phenomena really mean what we think they mean, Ryle explains. At length.
What struck me about this, is that while I've heard he is often grouped with other 'ordinary language' philosophers, he's doing something quite different. Rather than using an analysis of ordinary language to 'fix' philosophical problems, he tries to use his theory to 'fix' ordinary language. In this, he has more in common with the formal logic aficionados (who also wanted to solve problems by 'fixing' language) than someone like Austin. It didn't work out so well for them, and it doesn't work here.
The result is an argument to the effect that Ryle thinks that I don't think the way I think I think. And if that sounds absurd, it's because it is. At every turn he is forced to butcher and mangle the English language to fit his theory. None of the words the English language uses to refer to mental phenomena really mean what we think they mean, Ryle explains. At length.
What struck me about this, is that while I've heard he is often grouped with other 'ordinary language' philosophers, he's doing something quite different. Rather than using an analysis of ordinary language to 'fix' philosophical problems, he tries to use his theory to 'fix' ordinary language. In this, he has more in common with the formal logic aficionados (who also wanted to solve problems by 'fixing' language) than someone like Austin. It didn't work out so well for them, and it doesn't work here.
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