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A review by carise
Critique of Pure Reason by Immanuel Kant
3.0
“As we are constantly obliged to make inferences, we grow so accustomed to it that in the end we no longer notice this distinction, and often, as in the case of the so-called deception of the senses, mistake what we have only inferred for something perceived immediately” (291).
This was part of my endeavour to read through some key works in enlightenment philosophy. I certainly didn’t understand everything Kant was saying, but I’ll give my thoughts on my first read.
One of Kant’s central arguments is that, contrary to Hume’s fork, there are synthetic propositions which can be made a priori. One of the best examples would be “everything which happens has a cause”. Kant argues that this proposition isn’t known by reason or even the senses; rather, it is what makes “the unity of experience possible” (294). In other words, it’s a necessary proposition in order for us to experience the world at all.
I find this (along with most of the work), at best, interesting. I think that Kant makes a number of assumptions that are rooted in ancient thought, particularly that space and time are a priori concepts. It seems as though he gets there from the reasoning that space and time can be conceived of without drawing from the sensory experience of a particular place or moment. In fact, this is how Kant justifies most of his a priori concepts. However, I have to agree with Philip Sheldrake on this matter: “We come to know in terms of the particular knowledge of specific places before we know space as a whole or in the abstract” (7). I see no other means by which we come to know space and time other than by a flimsy inference from places and sequences. They are merely abstractions derived from our experience of the material world. This is probably why Kant’s criticisms of Hume didn’t stick for me.
I do, however, find that causality as a synthetic a priori proposition poses some interesting questions. For example, if causality is merely a concept we have that enables us to order our sensory experiences, and if too space and time are concepts not derived from experience, then what does that mean for inferences like the existence of a first cause? Kant addresses this question by comparing the theses and antitheses of some cosmological ideas (422). I do find some of the reasons favouring the theses are fallacious. Namely, that the antithesis “robs us” of supports like religion; or, that the antithesis opens further questions while the thesis quells our discomfort with a lack of a foundation. In fact, most of Kant’s support of theism seems to come from a moral standpoint (which he expands on at the very end), rather than any use of logic. He seems personally uncomfortable with the societal implications of the non-existence of a god, which reflects his bourgeois thinking.
A noteworthy criticism Kant makes against the infinite regress argument for a beginning, is that the lack of a transcendent foundation does not result in an infinite regress necessarily—only an indeterminately continued regress (454). He gets there by simply deconstructing the false dichotomy: “either x is infinite or x is finite”. Rather, “either x is infinite or x is not infinite”, under which an indeterminately continued regress would be included in the latter. In my own view, I find this conclusion (or lack of one) precludes any ability for us to locate a nature to any cause or being in this regress, given its own indeterminacy.
I’ve heard a lot of reviews of this book emphasize how difficult it is, and the need to consult secondary sources. While this would help, and having read Hume first is pretty important, I would advise prospective readers to just give it a go. It was less daunting than I thought it would be, and regardless of my own limitations, I learned a lot.
This was part of my endeavour to read through some key works in enlightenment philosophy. I certainly didn’t understand everything Kant was saying, but I’ll give my thoughts on my first read.
One of Kant’s central arguments is that, contrary to Hume’s fork, there are synthetic propositions which can be made a priori. One of the best examples would be “everything which happens has a cause”. Kant argues that this proposition isn’t known by reason or even the senses; rather, it is what makes “the unity of experience possible” (294). In other words, it’s a necessary proposition in order for us to experience the world at all.
I find this (along with most of the work), at best, interesting. I think that Kant makes a number of assumptions that are rooted in ancient thought, particularly that space and time are a priori concepts. It seems as though he gets there from the reasoning that space and time can be conceived of without drawing from the sensory experience of a particular place or moment. In fact, this is how Kant justifies most of his a priori concepts. However, I have to agree with Philip Sheldrake on this matter: “We come to know in terms of the particular knowledge of specific places before we know space as a whole or in the abstract” (7). I see no other means by which we come to know space and time other than by a flimsy inference from places and sequences. They are merely abstractions derived from our experience of the material world. This is probably why Kant’s criticisms of Hume didn’t stick for me.
I do, however, find that causality as a synthetic a priori proposition poses some interesting questions. For example, if causality is merely a concept we have that enables us to order our sensory experiences, and if too space and time are concepts not derived from experience, then what does that mean for inferences like the existence of a first cause? Kant addresses this question by comparing the theses and antitheses of some cosmological ideas (422). I do find some of the reasons favouring the theses are fallacious. Namely, that the antithesis “robs us” of supports like religion; or, that the antithesis opens further questions while the thesis quells our discomfort with a lack of a foundation. In fact, most of Kant’s support of theism seems to come from a moral standpoint (which he expands on at the very end), rather than any use of logic. He seems personally uncomfortable with the societal implications of the non-existence of a god, which reflects his bourgeois thinking.
A noteworthy criticism Kant makes against the infinite regress argument for a beginning, is that the lack of a transcendent foundation does not result in an infinite regress necessarily—only an indeterminately continued regress (454). He gets there by simply deconstructing the false dichotomy: “either x is infinite or x is finite”. Rather, “either x is infinite or x is not infinite”, under which an indeterminately continued regress would be included in the latter. In my own view, I find this conclusion (or lack of one) precludes any ability for us to locate a nature to any cause or being in this regress, given its own indeterminacy.
I’ve heard a lot of reviews of this book emphasize how difficult it is, and the need to consult secondary sources. While this would help, and having read Hume first is pretty important, I would advise prospective readers to just give it a go. It was less daunting than I thought it would be, and regardless of my own limitations, I learned a lot.