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A review by nirvanahy
ISIS: A History by Fawaz A. Gerges
the first is that ISIS can be seen as an extension of AQI, which was itself a creature of the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq and its aftermath. By destroying state institutions, the invasion reinforced popular divisions along ethnic and religious rather than national lines, creating an environment that was particularly favorable for the implantation and expansion of groups such as AQI and ISIS. Second, the fragmentation of the post Sadam Hussein political establishment and its incapacity to articulate policies that emphasized the country's national identity further nourished inter-communal distrust, thus deepening and widening and Sunni-Shia divide. Thirdly, the breakdown of state institutions in Syria and the country's descent into a full flown war is a significant factor in the revitalization of ISIS. Finally, ISIS could not have consolidated the gains it made with the Syrian war without the derailment of the Arab Spring uprisings and the consequent spreading fires in neighboring Arab countries.
The US-led invation and occupation of Iraq in 2003, cobined with the subsequent social turmoil and prolonged and costly armed resistance, led to the dismantling of state institutions and the establishment of a political system based on muhasasa, or the distribution of the spoils of power along communal, ethnic, and tribal lines.
ISIS thrives among poor, disenfranchised Sunni communities, including those in the Fallujah, Tikrit and Anbar regions in Iraq; the al-Raqqa province and Deir al-Zour in Syria; Akkar, Tripoli, and the Bekka Valley in Lebanon; and Maan and Zarqa in Jordan. The lower-class background of ISIS's combatants explains why the organization justifies its actions as a defense of the poor and disfranchised as well as why it targets areas with natural and raw resources.
The 2003 US led invasion and occupation of Iraq caused a rupture in an already fractured Iraqi society. America's destruction of Iraqi institutions, particularly its dismantling of the army and the Baathist ruling party, unleashed a fierce power struggle, mainly along sectarian lines, creating fissures in society.
US was aware of Maliki's rising authoritarianism but continued to publicly support him. The document describes Maliki as paranoid and outlines how his decisions and policies produced increasing centralization of power in the hands of an inner circle of Shia Islamist at the expense of the formal chain of command. It even goes as far as to warn that Maliki was following in the footsteps of Hussin.
Of all the factors fueling ISIS's resurgence, the inability of the coalition and the Iraqi political establishment to put forward an inclusive national project and rebuild the political landscape tops the list. Rather than moving away from the political authoritarianism and cult of personality that epitomized the Hussin years, the political class that inherited the spoils failed to end factionalism and social fragmentation. Even those Iraqis who cooperated with the US forces and the Iraqi government against AQI were aligned along sectarian lines.
The rule elite didn't take a series measure to fill the vacuum left by de-Bathification, particularly in terms of redefining the identity of the new Iraq. Within this vacuum of ideas and social chaos, which intensified because of the dismantling of Iraq's security institutions and armed resistance, there hardly existed a nationalist vision to replace the old regime's, no unifying symbol that would galvanize Iraqis as a whole.
Initially, the large-scale popular uprising in Syria was socially and politically driven, originating in rural areas -like Dara'a - that were hit hard by years of drought and a decade of neo-liberal policies that siphoned resources away from the pressed agrarian sector toward the tertiary sector.
From the late 1980s until the outbreak of the revolutionary uprising in 2011, the Syrian regime forged capital networks that allied business elites from the country's large cities with state officials, thus transforming the country, in a twenty-year period, from a state-controlled to a capitalist economy characterized by cronyism.
sectarianism is the fuel that has powered the ISIS surge. Fundamentally, ISIS utilizes identity as the driving force for the movement and its expansion, expressed through a narrow-minded and intolerant Salafi-jihadist ideology.
This entails addressing legitimate Sunni grievances through the reconstruction of the state based on the rule of law, citizenship, and inclusiveness, not sect, ethnicity and tribe.
The US-led invation and occupation of Iraq in 2003, cobined with the subsequent social turmoil and prolonged and costly armed resistance, led to the dismantling of state institutions and the establishment of a political system based on muhasasa, or the distribution of the spoils of power along communal, ethnic, and tribal lines.
ISIS thrives among poor, disenfranchised Sunni communities, including those in the Fallujah, Tikrit and Anbar regions in Iraq; the al-Raqqa province and Deir al-Zour in Syria; Akkar, Tripoli, and the Bekka Valley in Lebanon; and Maan and Zarqa in Jordan. The lower-class background of ISIS's combatants explains why the organization justifies its actions as a defense of the poor and disfranchised as well as why it targets areas with natural and raw resources.
The 2003 US led invasion and occupation of Iraq caused a rupture in an already fractured Iraqi society. America's destruction of Iraqi institutions, particularly its dismantling of the army and the Baathist ruling party, unleashed a fierce power struggle, mainly along sectarian lines, creating fissures in society.
US was aware of Maliki's rising authoritarianism but continued to publicly support him. The document describes Maliki as paranoid and outlines how his decisions and policies produced increasing centralization of power in the hands of an inner circle of Shia Islamist at the expense of the formal chain of command. It even goes as far as to warn that Maliki was following in the footsteps of Hussin.
Of all the factors fueling ISIS's resurgence, the inability of the coalition and the Iraqi political establishment to put forward an inclusive national project and rebuild the political landscape tops the list. Rather than moving away from the political authoritarianism and cult of personality that epitomized the Hussin years, the political class that inherited the spoils failed to end factionalism and social fragmentation. Even those Iraqis who cooperated with the US forces and the Iraqi government against AQI were aligned along sectarian lines.
The rule elite didn't take a series measure to fill the vacuum left by de-Bathification, particularly in terms of redefining the identity of the new Iraq. Within this vacuum of ideas and social chaos, which intensified because of the dismantling of Iraq's security institutions and armed resistance, there hardly existed a nationalist vision to replace the old regime's, no unifying symbol that would galvanize Iraqis as a whole.
Initially, the large-scale popular uprising in Syria was socially and politically driven, originating in rural areas -like Dara'a - that were hit hard by years of drought and a decade of neo-liberal policies that siphoned resources away from the pressed agrarian sector toward the tertiary sector.
From the late 1980s until the outbreak of the revolutionary uprising in 2011, the Syrian regime forged capital networks that allied business elites from the country's large cities with state officials, thus transforming the country, in a twenty-year period, from a state-controlled to a capitalist economy characterized by cronyism.
sectarianism is the fuel that has powered the ISIS surge. Fundamentally, ISIS utilizes identity as the driving force for the movement and its expansion, expressed through a narrow-minded and intolerant Salafi-jihadist ideology.
This entails addressing legitimate Sunni grievances through the reconstruction of the state based on the rule of law, citizenship, and inclusiveness, not sect, ethnicity and tribe.