A review by simonmee
Boyd: The Fighter Pilot Who Changed the Art of War by Robert Coram
4.0
"You can't have a normal career and do the good work."
Is it worth it?
Would you financially and emotionally impoverish your family, drive your career into a culvert, goad others into wreck their own careers just so you can be the guy to have some ideas that people like but don’t acknowledge that you came up with them?
John Boyd thought it was worth it. Or, based on this biography, he thought the job in front of him was worth it, very intensely worth it, until he didn’t want to deal with it anymore.
Boyd is about a fighter-jock turned underappreciated theorist on war, at least an equal to Clausewitz with Boyd's ideas on maneuver warfare and the OODA Loop. Yet, on a general level, I feel Boyd should be read as an example of the limitations of brilliance. Boyd’s accolades never matched his apparent achievements. The sacrifices he made were extremely heavy for a man who retired at colonel before making his wife and 5 children live off his pension rather than consultancy fees.
"Boyd's anger at what the Air Force did to the F-16 never abated.
I like Boyd because how it balances his brilliance with his flaws. But I do have quibbles. I’m not a military strategist. Or an engineer. Or a pilot. However, Boyd’s record in the job he devoted his life to, while interesting, seems a little weak:
F-15: Boyd ‘saved’ it but abandoned it when it went in the direction he didn’t like (arguably a better one).
F-16: Boyd ‘created’ it but abandoned it when it went in the direction he didn’t like (arguably a better one).
M2-Bradley: More to his Acolyte’s credit.
US Army: Boyd unsuccessfully advised them.
US Marines: Boyd somewhat more successfully advised them, leading to a glorious victory against construction workers in Grenada.
Dick Cheney: Used Boyd’s advice (I think, the book is actually very muddy on that when you parse out the details) during the Gulf War to, I think, win somewhat more quickly?
Most of the above aren’t necessarily the fault of the book, but I would be cautious in describing the brilliance of the Marines in exploiting Boyd's ideas on maneuver warfare in Grenada and the Gulf War. That is thin evidence against hilariously outclassed enemies. In support of the concept of maneuver warfare Coram writes Patton, the apparently brilliant exponent of it, would have won World War II far quicker if Eisenhower had just let him. Coram also praises the German 1918 Western Front offensives for the ways they broke the deadlock. Both those positions are, well, tenuous and suggests that Coram’s examples of Boyd’s ideas being applied might be overstated.
Nellis was Valhalla-in-the-desert
Boyd is a bit of fun, whether its being a tiger, because To be called a tiger meant you were a pure fighter pilot and that you would not hesitate to tell a bird colonel to get fucked or how Boyd got to kick a thinly disguised Kelly Johnson out of his office for attempted bribery. It is always good to learn about facts about other places, such as how Coram knows that Thai women are extraordinarily beautiful.
Boyd is also about the “value” of hard work and being called in at 10pm to listen to your boss talk shit before getting an urgent letter out at 4am, just because. Boyd worked hard, worked others hard:
Technicians in the Pentagon graphics shop hated to see Boyd come in the door. He made them stop whatever they were doing and take care of his needs
…and worked the system to his advantage on multiple occasions. I believe the book is praising Boyd’s work ethic throughout (subject to the damage he did to his family), but it’s interesting to look at all those midnight hours and wonder – did it really make things better?
Boyd throughout is the outsider crusading against the system, particularly the Pentagon’s procurement methods (the Zumwalt and F-35 suggest they haven’t improved since). Was it worth it? Boyd seems ambiguous about that, which I like, because sometimes the answer shouldn’t be clear.
Is it worth it?
Would you financially and emotionally impoverish your family, drive your career into a culvert, goad others into wreck their own careers just so you can be the guy to have some ideas that people like but don’t acknowledge that you came up with them?
John Boyd thought it was worth it. Or, based on this biography, he thought the job in front of him was worth it, very intensely worth it, until he didn’t want to deal with it anymore.
Boyd is about a fighter-jock turned underappreciated theorist on war, at least an equal to Clausewitz with Boyd's ideas on maneuver warfare and the OODA Loop. Yet, on a general level, I feel Boyd should be read as an example of the limitations of brilliance. Boyd’s accolades never matched his apparent achievements. The sacrifices he made were extremely heavy for a man who retired at colonel before making his wife and 5 children live off his pension rather than consultancy fees.
"Boyd's anger at what the Air Force did to the F-16 never abated.
I like Boyd because how it balances his brilliance with his flaws. But I do have quibbles. I’m not a military strategist. Or an engineer. Or a pilot. However, Boyd’s record in the job he devoted his life to, while interesting, seems a little weak:
F-15: Boyd ‘saved’ it but abandoned it when it went in the direction he didn’t like (arguably a better one).
F-16: Boyd ‘created’ it but abandoned it when it went in the direction he didn’t like (arguably a better one).
M2-Bradley: More to his Acolyte’s credit.
US Army: Boyd unsuccessfully advised them.
US Marines: Boyd somewhat more successfully advised them, leading to a glorious victory against construction workers in Grenada.
Dick Cheney: Used Boyd’s advice (I think, the book is actually very muddy on that when you parse out the details) during the Gulf War to, I think, win somewhat more quickly?
Most of the above aren’t necessarily the fault of the book, but I would be cautious in describing the brilliance of the Marines in exploiting Boyd's ideas on maneuver warfare in Grenada and the Gulf War. That is thin evidence against hilariously outclassed enemies. In support of the concept of maneuver warfare Coram writes Patton, the apparently brilliant exponent of it, would have won World War II far quicker if Eisenhower had just let him. Coram also praises the German 1918 Western Front offensives for the ways they broke the deadlock. Both those positions are, well, tenuous and suggests that Coram’s examples of Boyd’s ideas being applied might be overstated.
Nellis was Valhalla-in-the-desert
Boyd is a bit of fun, whether its being a tiger, because To be called a tiger meant you were a pure fighter pilot and that you would not hesitate to tell a bird colonel to get fucked or how Boyd got to kick a thinly disguised Kelly Johnson out of his office for attempted bribery. It is always good to learn about facts about other places, such as how Coram knows that Thai women are extraordinarily beautiful.
Boyd is also about the “value” of hard work and being called in at 10pm to listen to your boss talk shit before getting an urgent letter out at 4am, just because. Boyd worked hard, worked others hard:
Technicians in the Pentagon graphics shop hated to see Boyd come in the door. He made them stop whatever they were doing and take care of his needs
…and worked the system to his advantage on multiple occasions. I believe the book is praising Boyd’s work ethic throughout (subject to the damage he did to his family), but it’s interesting to look at all those midnight hours and wonder – did it really make things better?
Boyd throughout is the outsider crusading against the system, particularly the Pentagon’s procurement methods (the Zumwalt and F-35 suggest they haven’t improved since). Was it worth it? Boyd seems ambiguous about that, which I like, because sometimes the answer shouldn’t be clear.