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A review by rebeccacider
How the Mind Works by Steven Pinker
4.0
Very interesting, well-written, and comprehensive. I appreciated the overview of both computational and evolutionary psychology in one tome of a book; computational psychology is pretty much awesome, and though I must confess that I skipped some of the technical examples in an effort to prevent my brain from breaking, Pinker's writing was for the most part clear and explanatory. I learned a lot!
I would be interested to find out whether any of the specific evolutionary theories have become passe over the last ten years, since a great deal of new research must have come out since then. A second edition would be great if necessary.
I still have reservations about the conclusion of the book. Basically, Pinker says that the computational view of the mind means that consciousness - the ability of the mind to actually experience stimulus and thought, like the taste of a strawberry or the redness of red - has no apparent function. People could go through the complex computational steps of mental activity without experiencing any of it. There is no way to prove that the person sitting next to you is not a "philosophical zombie," who acts like they think and feel but is really just a mechanical thing.
Not only does this mean I have no solid proof that all of you aren't just automatons, but no can explain why we experience things to begin with! Very perverse philosophers have attempted to argue that experience is an illusion, but of course this makes very little sense. Pinker is forced to conclude that our brains are just not smart enough to solve a peculiar problem like the nature of consciousness and self, along with some other potential philosophical problems like the possibility of absolute morality or the ability of language to refer to real things (don't understand the problem with this last one myself.)
I'm not saying that I can prove Pinker is absolutely wrong in this conclusion, but it is deeply unsatisfying. Our minds are, apparently, the product of a lawful universe. Logic is able to tackle, if not solve, every other problem with which we have been presented, from pulsars to microorganisms. The only exception is strange, peripheral problem of where the universe came from to begin with. Why should our minds be another such exception? If we can't explain our minds as a logical evolutionary adaptation, doesn't that call into question evolutionary psychology as a theory? How could human awareness not be the product of evolution (the ultimate logical process)?
Pinker tries to compare our failure to understand the mind to an autistic person's failure to understand the existence of other minds or a dog's colorblindness. But the problem with an autistic person, as I understand it, is not that they can't have the existence of other minds explained to them, but that they don't intuitively act as if they exist. Similarly, if the dog were more intelligent, they could obviously believe in and understand what color is, they just can't imagine what it is to see it. If we were blind to the nature of how sentience interacts with the rest of the universe, we should not realize that we have this blindness until it is explained to us. As it is, we are aware of a blindness and can't think of how to see what we know we know must be out there to be seen.
Finally, if Pinker is right that science has failed us regarding the problem of human consciousness, it's rather questionable for him to argue that religious or mystical explanations are out of the question, because if that were so, it wouldn't be an unsolvable problem after all. Either the logical forces of the universe to which we are all accustomed are responsible for consciousness, or Something Else is. Pinker is right; it would be presumptuous and unscientific to call the Something Else God or Divine Energies or what have you. But we cannot discount these hypotheses outright, and the notion that our consciousnesses apparently work apart from the causation that is evolution at least means that the universe is a much stranger place than we have been led to believe. Really I would rather believe that my mind is the result of scientifically knowable causes, I like science, but if I am to believe Pinker, then another, very weird solution is out there.
Very interesting read, but the ultimate difficulties brought up by the theories are much more frustrating than the elegant solutions they provide! Mostly I just don't like giving up on a scientific solution to a problem; it seems wrong.
I would be interested to find out whether any of the specific evolutionary theories have become passe over the last ten years, since a great deal of new research must have come out since then. A second edition would be great if necessary.
I still have reservations about the conclusion of the book. Basically, Pinker says that the computational view of the mind means that consciousness - the ability of the mind to actually experience stimulus and thought, like the taste of a strawberry or the redness of red - has no apparent function. People could go through the complex computational steps of mental activity without experiencing any of it. There is no way to prove that the person sitting next to you is not a "philosophical zombie," who acts like they think and feel but is really just a mechanical thing.
Not only does this mean I have no solid proof that all of you aren't just automatons, but no can explain why we experience things to begin with! Very perverse philosophers have attempted to argue that experience is an illusion, but of course this makes very little sense. Pinker is forced to conclude that our brains are just not smart enough to solve a peculiar problem like the nature of consciousness and self, along with some other potential philosophical problems like the possibility of absolute morality or the ability of language to refer to real things (don't understand the problem with this last one myself.)
I'm not saying that I can prove Pinker is absolutely wrong in this conclusion, but it is deeply unsatisfying. Our minds are, apparently, the product of a lawful universe. Logic is able to tackle, if not solve, every other problem with which we have been presented, from pulsars to microorganisms. The only exception is strange, peripheral problem of where the universe came from to begin with. Why should our minds be another such exception? If we can't explain our minds as a logical evolutionary adaptation, doesn't that call into question evolutionary psychology as a theory? How could human awareness not be the product of evolution (the ultimate logical process)?
Pinker tries to compare our failure to understand the mind to an autistic person's failure to understand the existence of other minds or a dog's colorblindness. But the problem with an autistic person, as I understand it, is not that they can't have the existence of other minds explained to them, but that they don't intuitively act as if they exist. Similarly, if the dog were more intelligent, they could obviously believe in and understand what color is, they just can't imagine what it is to see it. If we were blind to the nature of how sentience interacts with the rest of the universe, we should not realize that we have this blindness until it is explained to us. As it is, we are aware of a blindness and can't think of how to see what we know we know must be out there to be seen.
Finally, if Pinker is right that science has failed us regarding the problem of human consciousness, it's rather questionable for him to argue that religious or mystical explanations are out of the question, because if that were so, it wouldn't be an unsolvable problem after all. Either the logical forces of the universe to which we are all accustomed are responsible for consciousness, or Something Else is. Pinker is right; it would be presumptuous and unscientific to call the Something Else God or Divine Energies or what have you. But we cannot discount these hypotheses outright, and the notion that our consciousnesses apparently work apart from the causation that is evolution at least means that the universe is a much stranger place than we have been led to believe. Really I would rather believe that my mind is the result of scientifically knowable causes, I like science, but if I am to believe Pinker, then another, very weird solution is out there.
Very interesting read, but the ultimate difficulties brought up by the theories are much more frustrating than the elegant solutions they provide! Mostly I just don't like giving up on a scientific solution to a problem; it seems wrong.