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A review by djwardell
The Second World War by John Keegan
5.0
Keegan's knowledge of military subjects and insights are always exceptional. In this book he avoids most of the political discussions and social issues which distract historians of this period and focuses upon command, generalship, and tactics. This makes the book rare among reasonably accessible histories of the war.
Keegan readily admits his own viewpoints and prejudices, which are among the book's flaws:
More attention to the European war in the west than a book of this scope would warrant; even though there are extensive discussions of several eastern campaigns one is left with the feeling that their implications are not fully expounded.
A focus upon the decisions and actions of major British commanders probably raises their overall roles too much, while ignoring other major commanders diminishes their contributions and makes the narrative less coherent.
The discussion of the war in the Pacific is shorter that it should be, and over-simplified in some details. Keegan's unflattering assessment of some of MacArthur's decisions and actions diminishes his accomplishments throughout the conflict--which should have otherwise provided some of the best high-level material for his consideration.
Some hastily generalizations probably don't materially affect the conclusions, but makes the reader wonder why closer attention to detail had to be disregarded. For example, the simplistic rationale for Hitler's assumption of the role of army Commander-in-Chief is inaccurate and has the effect of diminishing the roles of incompetence and pure chance in the development of the conflict. The causes of the war in the Pacific are also simplified along the economic and political lines familiar to historians of the last 50 years, whereas the roles of government inertia and incompetence on both sides are not explained. Readers will also find the conclusion to the war in both theaters to be inadequately described.
Keegan has clearly read William L. Shirer, and refers to his work. He doesn't seem to believe Shirer's (contemporary) accounts of some major war events, such as the several attempts to overthrow Hitler, as he assesses motives and process differently.
Keegan does not seem to have read William Casey's 1988 book, "The Secret War Against Hitler," which provides valuable, first-hand insights on intelligence matters relevant to Keegan's narrative. For instance, Keegan repeatedly diminishes the role of local resistance cites contemporary attitudes about their value as misguided. Casey is clear that no one who mattered at the time had any illusions about how marginal (and unreliable) most resistance groups were.
Such flaws are not reasons to overlook this truly masterful and insightful book. Don't forget to read the extensive bibliography (and commentary on sources) at the end, which provides invaluable insights into Keegan's thinking.
Keegan readily admits his own viewpoints and prejudices, which are among the book's flaws:
More attention to the European war in the west than a book of this scope would warrant; even though there are extensive discussions of several eastern campaigns one is left with the feeling that their implications are not fully expounded.
A focus upon the decisions and actions of major British commanders probably raises their overall roles too much, while ignoring other major commanders diminishes their contributions and makes the narrative less coherent.
The discussion of the war in the Pacific is shorter that it should be, and over-simplified in some details. Keegan's unflattering assessment of some of MacArthur's decisions and actions diminishes his accomplishments throughout the conflict--which should have otherwise provided some of the best high-level material for his consideration.
Some hastily generalizations probably don't materially affect the conclusions, but makes the reader wonder why closer attention to detail had to be disregarded. For example, the simplistic rationale for Hitler's assumption of the role of army Commander-in-Chief is inaccurate and has the effect of diminishing the roles of incompetence and pure chance in the development of the conflict. The causes of the war in the Pacific are also simplified along the economic and political lines familiar to historians of the last 50 years, whereas the roles of government inertia and incompetence on both sides are not explained. Readers will also find the conclusion to the war in both theaters to be inadequately described.
Keegan has clearly read William L. Shirer, and refers to his work. He doesn't seem to believe Shirer's (contemporary) accounts of some major war events, such as the several attempts to overthrow Hitler, as he assesses motives and process differently.
Keegan does not seem to have read William Casey's 1988 book, "The Secret War Against Hitler," which provides valuable, first-hand insights on intelligence matters relevant to Keegan's narrative. For instance, Keegan repeatedly diminishes the role of local resistance cites contemporary attitudes about their value as misguided. Casey is clear that no one who mattered at the time had any illusions about how marginal (and unreliable) most resistance groups were.
Such flaws are not reasons to overlook this truly masterful and insightful book. Don't forget to read the extensive bibliography (and commentary on sources) at the end, which provides invaluable insights into Keegan's thinking.