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A review by lukescalone
Ages of Discord: A Structural-Demographic Analysis of American History by Peter Turchin
2.0
Not so keen on this one. It has a logic to it, but--as a historian--I'm incredibly skeptical of cliometrics. I'm thankful that Turchin doesn't presume to predict the future with them, but instead uses them as an interpretive tool. That said, his choice to look at real wages, overproduction of elites, and state finances make a lot of sense as predictors of instability. Here's how defines the three variables:
- Real wages: They're just that, average real wages.
- Elites: Mostly based around financial capital, especially the number of people in the top X% of society and how they compete for resources.
- State finances: Essentially state debt per capita
In writing his argument, Turchin argues that human history is defined by "secular cycles," which mostly fit into self-contained nation-states (this is something that I'm skeptical of, the work is a bit too "national," but legal limits on who can enter and who can leave mutes this criticism a bit). Secular cycles are essentially stability-instability cycles. The center point of a secular cycle is when tensions are the highest. In the first secular cycle (1780-1930), this was during the Civil War and its immediate aftermath. In the second secular cycle (1930-2080?), it's pretty much right now, or within the next 10-15 years. Turchin argues that tensions and, especially, political violence can be determined by demographic pressures, especially as a result of class. That's not to say Turchin is a Marxist--he's not, his theory of history is not one of the proletariat overthrowing the bourgeoisie. However, when population pressures drop, an "age of good feelings" emerges--for Turchin, the two "ages of good feelings" are the 1810s-20s and the 1940s-50s (with the exception of the war).
My two major criticisms is that, first, I think Turchin puts a bit too much emphasis on the role of material interests. He fits closely in the Charles Beard school of American history in that he sees economy as the defining factor in American society. Perhaps, but I think much more needs to be said about culture. Secondly, I don't really understand the choices that he made in quantifying his three variables. I don't have the book with me right now so I can't mention the exact equations he uses, but they seemed remarkably imprecise to me, to the point of being (nearly) pseudoscience. I don't want to insult Turchin in saying this, I see and appreciate what he's trying to do, but I don't find it to be useful.
Something that could have made the book interesting would be to add a predictive element, but I'm glad that he didn't, because I wouldn't trust it at all whatsoever. Nevertheless, his trends do line up with changes in American politics and society, as I see it, although he understates the importance of race, gender, and war/empire in examining his trends.
I wouldn't recommend this book to any historians, but it might be interested in those with more than passing interest in cliometrics.
- Real wages: They're just that, average real wages.
- Elites: Mostly based around financial capital, especially the number of people in the top X% of society and how they compete for resources.
- State finances: Essentially state debt per capita
In writing his argument, Turchin argues that human history is defined by "secular cycles," which mostly fit into self-contained nation-states (this is something that I'm skeptical of, the work is a bit too "national," but legal limits on who can enter and who can leave mutes this criticism a bit). Secular cycles are essentially stability-instability cycles. The center point of a secular cycle is when tensions are the highest. In the first secular cycle (1780-1930), this was during the Civil War and its immediate aftermath. In the second secular cycle (1930-2080?), it's pretty much right now, or within the next 10-15 years. Turchin argues that tensions and, especially, political violence can be determined by demographic pressures, especially as a result of class. That's not to say Turchin is a Marxist--he's not, his theory of history is not one of the proletariat overthrowing the bourgeoisie. However, when population pressures drop, an "age of good feelings" emerges--for Turchin, the two "ages of good feelings" are the 1810s-20s and the 1940s-50s (with the exception of the war).
My two major criticisms is that, first, I think Turchin puts a bit too much emphasis on the role of material interests. He fits closely in the Charles Beard school of American history in that he sees economy as the defining factor in American society. Perhaps, but I think much more needs to be said about culture. Secondly, I don't really understand the choices that he made in quantifying his three variables. I don't have the book with me right now so I can't mention the exact equations he uses, but they seemed remarkably imprecise to me, to the point of being (nearly) pseudoscience. I don't want to insult Turchin in saying this, I see and appreciate what he's trying to do, but I don't find it to be useful.
Something that could have made the book interesting would be to add a predictive element, but I'm glad that he didn't, because I wouldn't trust it at all whatsoever. Nevertheless, his trends do line up with changes in American politics and society, as I see it, although he understates the importance of race, gender, and war/empire in examining his trends.
I wouldn't recommend this book to any historians, but it might be interested in those with more than passing interest in cliometrics.