A review by lenzen
The Doomsday Machine: Confessions of a Nuclear War Planner by Daniel Ellsberg
5.0
Prioritizing Quick Launch Over Safety: A Chilling Reality
Although the recently departed Daniel Ellsberg is best known for his role in leaking the Pentagon Papers, his lesser-known yet arguably more significant contribution was in exposing the precarious mechanics of the United States's nuclear arsenal and nuclear war planning. This forms the backbone of The Doomsday Machine: far and away, the scariest book I have ever read. Packed with shocking revelations from cover to cover, it confronts readers with the chilling reality that nuclear war, particularly in the unsettling wake of the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, is a far likelier possibility than most would dare to imagine.
The Risk of Accidental Launch
The book's central theme revolves around the alarming lack of safeguards in the nuclear arsenal against accidental launch. Given how easy it would have been to trigger a launch, I was forced to conclude that nuclear planners deliberately decided to nearly always err in favor of a "quick launch" versus preventing an accidental launch. Indeed, some safety measures seemed so trivial to circumvent that they must have been deliberately designed that way. Ellsberg documents how it would undoubtedly have been possible for rogue commanders to trigger a nuclear war without Presidential authorization.
Further Alarming Revelations: Politics and the Use of Nuclear Weapons
Other alarming revelations in the book are how, for a considerable period, American planners evaluating strategies for attacking the Soviet Union counted deaths among Western European allies with a weighting of zero. Additionally, Ellsberg writes that every President up to the time of his writing had credibly threatened to use nuclear weapons against other countries. In response to "these weapons have not been used," Ellsberg reports the retort was "yes, they have been used, as designed, many times" as the highest of high-stakes bargaining chips.
The Cuban Missile Crisis: An Insider's View
Ellsberg's coverage of the Cuban missile crisis shed much new light on the situation:
Apparently, at the time of the downing of the U2 spy plane, Moscow realized it had lost critical control of Russian troops in Cuba and was worried they would continue to shoot down more American planes. As such, Kruschev realized he needed out. Indeed, Ellsberg reveals that withdrawing NATO's nuclear weapons from Turkey was a bonus: not a pre-requisite.
Recounting an incident somewhat less well known than the downing of the U2 spy plane, Ellsberg details just how close we came in an incident involving a Russian submarine being depth charged by US warships. The probability Ellsberg heard estimated by planners at the time is genuinely jaw-dropping…
A Missed Opportunity: Discussion on the Why of Prioritizing Quick Launch Over Safety
The one shortcoming I found was that the book does not thoroughly discuss why "quick launch" seems to supersede "safety" in terms of priority. My speculation is that the lightness of the safeguards might be a calculated strategy to dissuade adversaries from believing they could depend on these protections to prevent a retaliatory strike, thus inadvertently increasing the likelihood of nuclear war. However, it would have been enlightening to hear more from someone with Ellsberg's insider perspective.
Contrasting Insights: Ellsberg Versus Freedman
In contrast to Lawrence Freedman's [b:The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy|1590178|The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy|Lawrence Freedman|https://i.gr-assets.com/images/S/compressed.photo.goodreads.com/books/1430736704l/1590178._SY75_.jpg|1583174], which I found more comprehensive, Ellsberg's book strikes a less clinical tone. Freedman's work meticulously outlines the development of nuclear strategy and acknowledges improved safeguards after the Cold War, when nuclear arsenals were no longer on high alert. His portrayal of nuclear planners paints a picture of individuals trapped in a seemingly impossible situation: caught between the need to prepare for every eventuality and fearing becoming victims of a first strike.
Ellsberg, on the other hand, hones in on the most confounding aspects of nuclear war planning. While Freedman adopts a more detached, analytical lens, Ellsberg personalizes the narrative, emphasizing the shocking absence of safeguards and the real potential for disaster. The two works together provide a rounded perspective. Still, Ellsberg's book, focusing on the precariousness of the nuclear launch system, offers a chillingly personal and immediate wake-up call to the dangers we continue to live with.
Continuing Threat: Is the Risk of Annihilation Still Present?
The contrasting narratives presented by Ellsberg and Freedman may seem at odds, particularly concerning the present-day threat of nuclear war. With his focus on the lack of safeguards and the potential for disaster, Ellsberg suggests a persisting and immediate danger. Conversely, Freedman argues that the risk has lessened over time, especially after the end of the Cold War.
Neither book conclusively explains why there was an initial dearth of safeguards. Given this, I am left speculating that the risk of accidental nuclear war, although somewhat diminished, still exists. The risk persists if the absence of rigorous safeguards was initially deliberately intended to deter adversaries from launching a first strike in the belief that the safeguards could be subverted to prevent a retaliatory response.
Conclusion
If faced with selecting only one of Freedman's or Ellsberg's books, I would lean towards Ellsberg's The Doomsday Machine for its readability and stark, personal illumination of the inherent risks within our nuclear strategy. However, for readers seeking the most comprehensive understanding of nuclear strategy and its development, Freedman's [b:The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy|1590178|The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy|Lawrence Freedman|https://i.gr-assets.com/images/S/compressed.photo.goodreads.com/books/1430736704l/1590178._SY75_.jpg|1583174] will likely be more to their liking. The latter offers a broader and more analytical perspective that enriches the understanding of this complex topic.
In an era where nuclear threats are far from extinct, the insights provided by both Ellsberg and Freedman are invaluable tools for those striving to understand the complexity and dangers of nuclear war planning.
Although the recently departed Daniel Ellsberg is best known for his role in leaking the Pentagon Papers, his lesser-known yet arguably more significant contribution was in exposing the precarious mechanics of the United States's nuclear arsenal and nuclear war planning. This forms the backbone of The Doomsday Machine: far and away, the scariest book I have ever read. Packed with shocking revelations from cover to cover, it confronts readers with the chilling reality that nuclear war, particularly in the unsettling wake of the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, is a far likelier possibility than most would dare to imagine.
The Risk of Accidental Launch
The book's central theme revolves around the alarming lack of safeguards in the nuclear arsenal against accidental launch. Given how easy it would have been to trigger a launch, I was forced to conclude that nuclear planners deliberately decided to nearly always err in favor of a "quick launch" versus preventing an accidental launch. Indeed, some safety measures seemed so trivial to circumvent that they must have been deliberately designed that way. Ellsberg documents how it would undoubtedly have been possible for rogue commanders to trigger a nuclear war without Presidential authorization.
Further Alarming Revelations: Politics and the Use of Nuclear Weapons
Other alarming revelations in the book are how, for a considerable period, American planners evaluating strategies for attacking the Soviet Union counted deaths among Western European allies with a weighting of zero. Additionally, Ellsberg writes that every President up to the time of his writing had credibly threatened to use nuclear weapons against other countries. In response to "these weapons have not been used," Ellsberg reports the retort was "yes, they have been used, as designed, many times" as the highest of high-stakes bargaining chips.
The Cuban Missile Crisis: An Insider's View
Ellsberg's coverage of the Cuban missile crisis shed much new light on the situation:
Apparently, at the time of the downing of the U2 spy plane, Moscow realized it had lost critical control of Russian troops in Cuba and was worried they would continue to shoot down more American planes. As such, Kruschev realized he needed out. Indeed, Ellsberg reveals that withdrawing NATO's nuclear weapons from Turkey was a bonus: not a pre-requisite.
Recounting an incident somewhat less well known than the downing of the U2 spy plane, Ellsberg details just how close we came in an incident involving a Russian submarine being depth charged by US warships. The probability Ellsberg heard estimated by planners at the time is genuinely jaw-dropping…
A Missed Opportunity: Discussion on the Why of Prioritizing Quick Launch Over Safety
The one shortcoming I found was that the book does not thoroughly discuss why "quick launch" seems to supersede "safety" in terms of priority. My speculation is that the lightness of the safeguards might be a calculated strategy to dissuade adversaries from believing they could depend on these protections to prevent a retaliatory strike, thus inadvertently increasing the likelihood of nuclear war. However, it would have been enlightening to hear more from someone with Ellsberg's insider perspective.
Contrasting Insights: Ellsberg Versus Freedman
In contrast to Lawrence Freedman's [b:The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy|1590178|The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy|Lawrence Freedman|https://i.gr-assets.com/images/S/compressed.photo.goodreads.com/books/1430736704l/1590178._SY75_.jpg|1583174], which I found more comprehensive, Ellsberg's book strikes a less clinical tone. Freedman's work meticulously outlines the development of nuclear strategy and acknowledges improved safeguards after the Cold War, when nuclear arsenals were no longer on high alert. His portrayal of nuclear planners paints a picture of individuals trapped in a seemingly impossible situation: caught between the need to prepare for every eventuality and fearing becoming victims of a first strike.
Ellsberg, on the other hand, hones in on the most confounding aspects of nuclear war planning. While Freedman adopts a more detached, analytical lens, Ellsberg personalizes the narrative, emphasizing the shocking absence of safeguards and the real potential for disaster. The two works together provide a rounded perspective. Still, Ellsberg's book, focusing on the precariousness of the nuclear launch system, offers a chillingly personal and immediate wake-up call to the dangers we continue to live with.
Continuing Threat: Is the Risk of Annihilation Still Present?
The contrasting narratives presented by Ellsberg and Freedman may seem at odds, particularly concerning the present-day threat of nuclear war. With his focus on the lack of safeguards and the potential for disaster, Ellsberg suggests a persisting and immediate danger. Conversely, Freedman argues that the risk has lessened over time, especially after the end of the Cold War.
Neither book conclusively explains why there was an initial dearth of safeguards. Given this, I am left speculating that the risk of accidental nuclear war, although somewhat diminished, still exists. The risk persists if the absence of rigorous safeguards was initially deliberately intended to deter adversaries from launching a first strike in the belief that the safeguards could be subverted to prevent a retaliatory response.
Conclusion
If faced with selecting only one of Freedman's or Ellsberg's books, I would lean towards Ellsberg's The Doomsday Machine for its readability and stark, personal illumination of the inherent risks within our nuclear strategy. However, for readers seeking the most comprehensive understanding of nuclear strategy and its development, Freedman's [b:The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy|1590178|The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy|Lawrence Freedman|https://i.gr-assets.com/images/S/compressed.photo.goodreads.com/books/1430736704l/1590178._SY75_.jpg|1583174] will likely be more to their liking. The latter offers a broader and more analytical perspective that enriches the understanding of this complex topic.
In an era where nuclear threats are far from extinct, the insights provided by both Ellsberg and Freedman are invaluable tools for those striving to understand the complexity and dangers of nuclear war planning.