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georgewhatup's review against another edition
5.0
Sometimes a book could be written better but what it's saying is so good you'll forgive the structure.
I'll be slowly digesting the points made in this book for a while, and there's a good chance it will impact how I view any Conservatives in the future.
I think it could've been more cohesively structured throughout - highlighting the connections between each article and the primary thesis - but it's still so fresh I gotta give it five stars.
I'll be slowly digesting the points made in this book for a while, and there's a good chance it will impact how I view any Conservatives in the future.
I think it could've been more cohesively structured throughout - highlighting the connections between each article and the primary thesis - but it's still so fresh I gotta give it five stars.
lukeedbend's review against another edition
4.0
Originally a 3.5, but the Ayn Rand essay made this an easy/solid 4.
yellowtypophile's review against another edition
3.0
While focused on the right and very interesting, I wish the author had spent a little bit more time on the modern left. He thinks it is not powerful at the moment, not enough to challenge the right to be creative and vigorous, but what are his views on where it seems to be going? Does he think the left is on the cusp of blooming into something more---a new articulation and movement toward freedom---or is it condemned to essentially continue in a decades-long loss to the right that began with the end of the Cold War? Is the weakness of the right something that can be made use of, or is it simply a temporary reflection of the fatigue of the left which will disappear as soon as the left fully awakens?
Regardless, a new and intriguing way of looking at politics.
Regardless, a new and intriguing way of looking at politics.
torvosaur's review against another edition
5.0
This book was a phenomenal read, and after having a chance to leaf through the older edition, I can definitely say that the 2nd edition vastly improves upon the first.
The primary thesis of the book - that conservatism stems as a reaction to emancipatory movements, to protect hierarchy and speaks primarily to those who have experienced power or privilege and lost it - is argued very persuasively by the author. The first three chapters were really helpful in understanding the real sense of loss/victimhood that conservatives feel, and the affinity for war too. The ideological underpinnings of reactionary movements were explained very well. The chapter on Hayek and neoliberalism as well as Trump's rise were very prescient and informative - especially Trump's (relative) inefficacy despite the Republican hold over all the branches of the government. This book is definitely a must read to understand what philosophy consciously or unconsciously guides the conservative mind.
While that stands, I think the author simplifies the right a little too much, in so much as the lines between conservatism and fascism are not adequately explored. It sometimes feels like the author is cherry-picking statements to draw a coherent narrative, although admittedly I haven't read most of the conservatives that he speaks of, maybe I'll need to check myself for confirmation bias before doing that.
But it was a crisp and enjoyable read, and I have gained a lot of perspective about the psyche that conservatism speaks to. I hope there are works like these on liberals/socialists too, that'd make for interesting reading.
I will definitely return to this book after reading some of the conservatives mentioned in here, for a better understanding of the author's conclusion, but this all-in-all a very enjoyable read.
The primary thesis of the book - that conservatism stems as a reaction to emancipatory movements, to protect hierarchy and speaks primarily to those who have experienced power or privilege and lost it - is argued very persuasively by the author. The first three chapters were really helpful in understanding the real sense of loss/victimhood that conservatives feel, and the affinity for war too. The ideological underpinnings of reactionary movements were explained very well. The chapter on Hayek and neoliberalism as well as Trump's rise were very prescient and informative - especially Trump's (relative) inefficacy despite the Republican hold over all the branches of the government. This book is definitely a must read to understand what philosophy consciously or unconsciously guides the conservative mind.
While that stands, I think the author simplifies the right a little too much, in so much as the lines between conservatism and fascism are not adequately explored. It sometimes feels like the author is cherry-picking statements to draw a coherent narrative, although admittedly I haven't read most of the conservatives that he speaks of, maybe I'll need to check myself for confirmation bias before doing that.
But it was a crisp and enjoyable read, and I have gained a lot of perspective about the psyche that conservatism speaks to. I hope there are works like these on liberals/socialists too, that'd make for interesting reading.
I will definitely return to this book after reading some of the conservatives mentioned in here, for a better understanding of the author's conclusion, but this all-in-all a very enjoyable read.
lfagundes's review against another edition
3.0
A little dry in places, but enjoyable nonetheless.
In sum: Conservatives are all about making sure the people in power - i.e. people who look, think, and worship like they do - remain in power. Also, they truly seem to believe that some people are just 'better' than others, and therefore deserve more of the spoils and power of life.
FUCK CONSERVATIVES!
In sum: Conservatives are all about making sure the people in power - i.e. people who look, think, and worship like they do - remain in power. Also, they truly seem to believe that some people are just 'better' than others, and therefore deserve more of the spoils and power of life.
FUCK CONSERVATIVES!
redbecca's review against another edition
4.0
Robin makes a provocative and unexpected argument that will challenge the conventional wisdom that conservatives and the far right (even fascists) are qualitatively different. He even shows intellectual links between the libertarian right, particularly Ayn Rand, and fascism. The essays were mostly originally published as book reviews, but they are well linked together and comment on consistent themes in conservative thought. In addition to drawing on a depth of knowledge in political theory, this is a very well written book with a number of very quotable bon mots. One of my favorites brings together a number of the book's central ideas. Regarding de Tocqueville he writes, "His drift from the moderation of the July Monarchy to the revanchism of 1848 demonstrates how easily and inexorably the Burkean conservative will swing from the beautiful to the sublime, how the music of prudence and moderation gives way to the march of violence and vitriol."
partypete's review against another edition
3.0
Misleading in that it really isn’t all that comprehensive.
blackoxford's review against another edition
5.0
Cultural Criticism Is a Tricky Business
Corey Robin’s essay on contemporary conservatism was published in 2011, five years before Pankaj Mishra’s The Age of Anger (See: https://www.goodreads.com/review/show/1869718756?book_show_action=false&from_review_page=1) and Mark Lilla’s The Shipwrecked Mind (See: https://www.goodreads.com/review/show/2271985320?type=review#rating_151005717). The Reactionary Mind covers much of the same ground at a time when the contours of that ground were less clear than they have become. And, unlike the later books, it was written more for academic consumption than a popular or general literary audience. It is also a better book, quite an achievement given the merits of Mishra’s and Lilla’s obvious skills as writers and social observers.
Unlike Mishra and Lilla, Robin’s analysis starts not with a judgment of a prevailing sentiment of the times - nostalgia for Lilla; ressentiment for Mishra - but with a timeless philosophical and sociological issue: power. For Robin, the perennial source of reactionary conservatism is the concern of those in power to maintain that power. He neatly encapsulates his entire thesis in a single phrase: “Conservatism is about power besieged and power protected.”
According to Robin’s line of argument, there is nothing new about today’s political situation - particularly, neither nostalgia nor ressentinent - which makes our current reactionary politics different except the identities of those who feel threatened by the extension of emancipatory freedom, and by implication, equality. The most intense critics of the ancien regime, whatever that happens to be, are present conservatives. He cites Burke and Maistre at length to make his point that conservative sentiment neither yearns for past glory nor resents the power lost through incompetence. That conservative fear should now be directed toward immigrants and atheists is not qualitatively different from that shown by the less recent immigrants and atheists of the 19th century towards their newly arriving God-fearing neighbors. What goes around comes around.
Robin shows up the analytic flaw in both Mishra and Lilla: post hoc ergo propter hoc. Nostalgia and anger may well be emotional symptoms of our times. But are they causes or effects? Do they provoke the sort of social and political reactions one can observe around the world or are they simply correlates of a more fundamental phenomenon? Robin contends that the conservative creed is “Submission [by the inferior classes] is their first duty, agency the prerogative of the elite.” Lilla’s commentary on Michel Houellebecq’s 2015 novel Submission [i.e. Islam] is in fact a literal confirmation of this thesis. Islamic fundamentalism hardly differs from its Christian evangelical counterparts. All have the same intention to re-establish absolute authority in society, and this means God. Whether God is a nostalgic fiction or a wrathful enforcer is not an essential difference.
The issue of nostalgic, fearful chickens vs. submissive, un-emancipated eggs is not a trivial one. For example, it appears that much of the reactionary momentum in the world is generated not by the rich and powerful but by the threatened lower middle class who feel they no longer can count on the dreams of infinite advance they once had. Is the evident populism of their politics the result of manipulation by the same elite who orchestrated their current condition or a spontaneous eruption of ‘we’re fed up and we’re not going to take it anymore.’? The situation seems similar to that of the South African Boers after the British conquest. The subjugators had become subjugated, their real power already eliminated. Yet their feelings of righteous indignation and cultural threat create both nostalgia and anger for power past and lost. Emotion was the residue but residue with motive force.
Robin’s analysis is intellectually fruitful in a number of ways. First, it gets behind the reactionary rhetoric:
Robin also recognises that ultimately reactionary conservatism is an aesthetic judgment not an ideological belief. For the conservative, the world is threatened with brutality, ugliness, and lack of order by the inclusion of those who are presently or until recently excluded from cultural influence. These latter are barbarians, not essentially because of race or ethnicity or economic status but because their very presence undermines the appearance of power in society - law, authority, entitlement. Their factual impact is of little concern; they make the system look bad. Immigrants, for example, may contribute far more economically than they cost to assimilate. But this is irrelevant. What matters is that they are aesthetically disruptive - on the streets, in the news, and especially in the conservative psyche.
The situation is further complicated by the symbolic significance of power to those that do not have it but admire it. Robin cites Edmund Burke: “When Burke [says] ... that the ‘great object’ of the [French] Revolution is to ‘root out that thing called the Aristocrat or Nobleman or Gentleman’ he is not simply referring to the power of the nobility, he is also referring to the distinction that power brings to the world.” This might imply the possibility of one day holding the power one sees. But, more likely given the obvious probabilities of life, it means something much more attainable - giving power to those who should have it, conservative politicians surely, but also the police, the military, authoritarian religious leaders and the very wealthy in society who have proven their worth. These elites are trustworthy surrogates not enemies of the already oppressed.
Robin quotes an essay by the ultra-conservative Liberty Fund: “To obey a real superior... is one of the most important of all virtues - a virtue absolutely essential to the attainment of any thing great and lasting.” The love of a certain order is enough to grant the monopoly of power to others in order to achieve it. Hierarchy is order. And as Dr Johnson said, “Order cannot be had except by subordination.” Coercion is the product of one’s sense of beauty. How remarkable is that for an interesting conclusion?
Yet another aesthetic paradox is noted by Robin: the conservative aesthetic is one of ‘maintaining excellence.’ This is the creed of those upwardly mobile middle class people who have been successful in the meritocratic process of test-taking, degree-acquisition, and corporate advancement. These people are the current holders of power, at least the power visible to most of us in government, business, and academia. They have emerged by and large from the parts of society which have benefitted most from racial and social emancipation - second and third generation immigrants, working class children given access to higher education, racial minorities given enough opportunity to demonstrate they know how to play the game well.
These people are therefore ‘natural’ liberals, but only so long as the basis of their power is recognised as legitimate and enduring. They are in a sense conservative liberals for whom the meritocratic structure is as sacred as that of historical nobility or bonded serfdom and slavery. So today’s reactionaries are a species of anti-anti-liberal who feel themselves in need of emancipation.
Robin is a tad less elegantly suave than Lilla; he is not as consummately cosmopolitan as Mishra. But he is a more thorough and careful thinker. I have no doubt that among the three I would take Robin’s book to the desert island.
Corey Robin’s essay on contemporary conservatism was published in 2011, five years before Pankaj Mishra’s The Age of Anger (See: https://www.goodreads.com/review/show/1869718756?book_show_action=false&from_review_page=1) and Mark Lilla’s The Shipwrecked Mind (See: https://www.goodreads.com/review/show/2271985320?type=review#rating_151005717). The Reactionary Mind covers much of the same ground at a time when the contours of that ground were less clear than they have become. And, unlike the later books, it was written more for academic consumption than a popular or general literary audience. It is also a better book, quite an achievement given the merits of Mishra’s and Lilla’s obvious skills as writers and social observers.
Unlike Mishra and Lilla, Robin’s analysis starts not with a judgment of a prevailing sentiment of the times - nostalgia for Lilla; ressentiment for Mishra - but with a timeless philosophical and sociological issue: power. For Robin, the perennial source of reactionary conservatism is the concern of those in power to maintain that power. He neatly encapsulates his entire thesis in a single phrase: “Conservatism is about power besieged and power protected.”
According to Robin’s line of argument, there is nothing new about today’s political situation - particularly, neither nostalgia nor ressentinent - which makes our current reactionary politics different except the identities of those who feel threatened by the extension of emancipatory freedom, and by implication, equality. The most intense critics of the ancien regime, whatever that happens to be, are present conservatives. He cites Burke and Maistre at length to make his point that conservative sentiment neither yearns for past glory nor resents the power lost through incompetence. That conservative fear should now be directed toward immigrants and atheists is not qualitatively different from that shown by the less recent immigrants and atheists of the 19th century towards their newly arriving God-fearing neighbors. What goes around comes around.
Robin shows up the analytic flaw in both Mishra and Lilla: post hoc ergo propter hoc. Nostalgia and anger may well be emotional symptoms of our times. But are they causes or effects? Do they provoke the sort of social and political reactions one can observe around the world or are they simply correlates of a more fundamental phenomenon? Robin contends that the conservative creed is “Submission [by the inferior classes] is their first duty, agency the prerogative of the elite.” Lilla’s commentary on Michel Houellebecq’s 2015 novel Submission [i.e. Islam] is in fact a literal confirmation of this thesis. Islamic fundamentalism hardly differs from its Christian evangelical counterparts. All have the same intention to re-establish absolute authority in society, and this means God. Whether God is a nostalgic fiction or a wrathful enforcer is not an essential difference.
The issue of nostalgic, fearful chickens vs. submissive, un-emancipated eggs is not a trivial one. For example, it appears that much of the reactionary momentum in the world is generated not by the rich and powerful but by the threatened lower middle class who feel they no longer can count on the dreams of infinite advance they once had. Is the evident populism of their politics the result of manipulation by the same elite who orchestrated their current condition or a spontaneous eruption of ‘we’re fed up and we’re not going to take it anymore.’? The situation seems similar to that of the South African Boers after the British conquest. The subjugators had become subjugated, their real power already eliminated. Yet their feelings of righteous indignation and cultural threat create both nostalgia and anger for power past and lost. Emotion was the residue but residue with motive force.
Robin’s analysis is intellectually fruitful in a number of ways. First, it gets behind the reactionary rhetoric:
“Conservatism, then, is not a commitment to limited government and liberty - or a wariness of change, or a belief in evolutionary reform, or a politics of virtue... Neither is a conservative a makeshift fusion of capitalists, Christians and warriors, for that fusion is impelled by a more elemental force - the opposition to the liberation of men and women from the fetters of their superiors, particularly in the private sphere.”This last phrase, ‘the private sphere,’ is important. The current reactionary is aware that the legal, public war is lost. What’s left is populist guerrilla fighting outside of the normal channels of legislation and law enforcement. Hence the importance of the Twitter-sphere for Donald Trump, who recognised both the problem and the solution. There a good case to be made that Robin predicted Trump.
Robin also recognises that ultimately reactionary conservatism is an aesthetic judgment not an ideological belief. For the conservative, the world is threatened with brutality, ugliness, and lack of order by the inclusion of those who are presently or until recently excluded from cultural influence. These latter are barbarians, not essentially because of race or ethnicity or economic status but because their very presence undermines the appearance of power in society - law, authority, entitlement. Their factual impact is of little concern; they make the system look bad. Immigrants, for example, may contribute far more economically than they cost to assimilate. But this is irrelevant. What matters is that they are aesthetically disruptive - on the streets, in the news, and especially in the conservative psyche.
The situation is further complicated by the symbolic significance of power to those that do not have it but admire it. Robin cites Edmund Burke: “When Burke [says] ... that the ‘great object’ of the [French] Revolution is to ‘root out that thing called the Aristocrat or Nobleman or Gentleman’ he is not simply referring to the power of the nobility, he is also referring to the distinction that power brings to the world.” This might imply the possibility of one day holding the power one sees. But, more likely given the obvious probabilities of life, it means something much more attainable - giving power to those who should have it, conservative politicians surely, but also the police, the military, authoritarian religious leaders and the very wealthy in society who have proven their worth. These elites are trustworthy surrogates not enemies of the already oppressed.
Robin quotes an essay by the ultra-conservative Liberty Fund: “To obey a real superior... is one of the most important of all virtues - a virtue absolutely essential to the attainment of any thing great and lasting.” The love of a certain order is enough to grant the monopoly of power to others in order to achieve it. Hierarchy is order. And as Dr Johnson said, “Order cannot be had except by subordination.” Coercion is the product of one’s sense of beauty. How remarkable is that for an interesting conclusion?
Yet another aesthetic paradox is noted by Robin: the conservative aesthetic is one of ‘maintaining excellence.’ This is the creed of those upwardly mobile middle class people who have been successful in the meritocratic process of test-taking, degree-acquisition, and corporate advancement. These people are the current holders of power, at least the power visible to most of us in government, business, and academia. They have emerged by and large from the parts of society which have benefitted most from racial and social emancipation - second and third generation immigrants, working class children given access to higher education, racial minorities given enough opportunity to demonstrate they know how to play the game well.
These people are therefore ‘natural’ liberals, but only so long as the basis of their power is recognised as legitimate and enduring. They are in a sense conservative liberals for whom the meritocratic structure is as sacred as that of historical nobility or bonded serfdom and slavery. So today’s reactionaries are a species of anti-anti-liberal who feel themselves in need of emancipation.
Robin is a tad less elegantly suave than Lilla; he is not as consummately cosmopolitan as Mishra. But he is a more thorough and careful thinker. I have no doubt that among the three I would take Robin’s book to the desert island.
swiftieclown1997's review against another edition
3.0
3.5/5⭐
I truly am unable to care about anything related to Burke at this point, but the more ~general~ sections were very solid and the part on Ayn Rand went hard (read: informative but also funny bc the author bullies Rand -- as he should)
I truly am unable to care about anything related to Burke at this point, but the more ~general~ sections were very solid and the part on Ayn Rand went hard (read: informative but also funny bc the author bullies Rand -- as he should)
christhedoll's review against another edition
4.0
I heard the author interviewed on some podcast. Interesting book. It just says 'this is the conservative mind'.