lenzen's review against another edition
5.0
Prioritizing Quick Launch Over Safety: A Chilling Reality
Although the recently departed Daniel Ellsberg is best known for his role in leaking the Pentagon Papers, his lesser-known yet arguably more significant contribution was in exposing the precarious mechanics of the United States's nuclear arsenal and nuclear war planning. This forms the backbone of The Doomsday Machine: far and away, the scariest book I have ever read. Packed with shocking revelations from cover to cover, it confronts readers with the chilling reality that nuclear war, particularly in the unsettling wake of the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, is a far likelier possibility than most would dare to imagine.
The Risk of Accidental Launch
The book's central theme revolves around the alarming lack of safeguards in the nuclear arsenal against accidental launch. Given how easy it would have been to trigger a launch, I was forced to conclude that nuclear planners deliberately decided to nearly always err in favor of a "quick launch" versus preventing an accidental launch. Indeed, some safety measures seemed so trivial to circumvent that they must have been deliberately designed that way. Ellsberg documents how it would undoubtedly have been possible for rogue commanders to trigger a nuclear war without Presidential authorization.
Further Alarming Revelations: Politics and the Use of Nuclear Weapons
Other alarming revelations in the book are how, for a considerable period, American planners evaluating strategies for attacking the Soviet Union counted deaths among Western European allies with a weighting of zero. Additionally, Ellsberg writes that every President up to the time of his writing had credibly threatened to use nuclear weapons against other countries. In response to "these weapons have not been used," Ellsberg reports the retort was "yes, they have been used, as designed, many times" as the highest of high-stakes bargaining chips.
The Cuban Missile Crisis: An Insider's View
Ellsberg's coverage of the Cuban missile crisis shed much new light on the situation:
Apparently, at the time of the downing of the U2 spy plane, Moscow realized it had lost critical control of Russian troops in Cuba and was worried they would continue to shoot down more American planes. As such, Kruschev realized he needed out. Indeed, Ellsberg reveals that withdrawing NATO's nuclear weapons from Turkey was a bonus: not a pre-requisite.
Recounting an incident somewhat less well known than the downing of the U2 spy plane, Ellsberg details just how close we came in an incident involving a Russian submarine being depth charged by US warships. The probability Ellsberg heard estimated by planners at the time is genuinely jaw-dropping…
A Missed Opportunity: Discussion on the Why of Prioritizing Quick Launch Over Safety
The one shortcoming I found was that the book does not thoroughly discuss why "quick launch" seems to supersede "safety" in terms of priority. My speculation is that the lightness of the safeguards might be a calculated strategy to dissuade adversaries from believing they could depend on these protections to prevent a retaliatory strike, thus inadvertently increasing the likelihood of nuclear war. However, it would have been enlightening to hear more from someone with Ellsberg's insider perspective.
Contrasting Insights: Ellsberg Versus Freedman
In contrast to Lawrence Freedman's [b:The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy|1590178|The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy|Lawrence Freedman|https://i.gr-assets.com/images/S/compressed.photo.goodreads.com/books/1430736704l/1590178._SY75_.jpg|1583174], which I found more comprehensive, Ellsberg's book strikes a less clinical tone. Freedman's work meticulously outlines the development of nuclear strategy and acknowledges improved safeguards after the Cold War, when nuclear arsenals were no longer on high alert. His portrayal of nuclear planners paints a picture of individuals trapped in a seemingly impossible situation: caught between the need to prepare for every eventuality and fearing becoming victims of a first strike.
Ellsberg, on the other hand, hones in on the most confounding aspects of nuclear war planning. While Freedman adopts a more detached, analytical lens, Ellsberg personalizes the narrative, emphasizing the shocking absence of safeguards and the real potential for disaster. The two works together provide a rounded perspective. Still, Ellsberg's book, focusing on the precariousness of the nuclear launch system, offers a chillingly personal and immediate wake-up call to the dangers we continue to live with.
Continuing Threat: Is the Risk of Annihilation Still Present?
The contrasting narratives presented by Ellsberg and Freedman may seem at odds, particularly concerning the present-day threat of nuclear war. With his focus on the lack of safeguards and the potential for disaster, Ellsberg suggests a persisting and immediate danger. Conversely, Freedman argues that the risk has lessened over time, especially after the end of the Cold War.
Neither book conclusively explains why there was an initial dearth of safeguards. Given this, I am left speculating that the risk of accidental nuclear war, although somewhat diminished, still exists. The risk persists if the absence of rigorous safeguards was initially deliberately intended to deter adversaries from launching a first strike in the belief that the safeguards could be subverted to prevent a retaliatory response.
Conclusion
If faced with selecting only one of Freedman's or Ellsberg's books, I would lean towards Ellsberg's The Doomsday Machine for its readability and stark, personal illumination of the inherent risks within our nuclear strategy. However, for readers seeking the most comprehensive understanding of nuclear strategy and its development, Freedman's [b:The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy|1590178|The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy|Lawrence Freedman|https://i.gr-assets.com/images/S/compressed.photo.goodreads.com/books/1430736704l/1590178._SY75_.jpg|1583174] will likely be more to their liking. The latter offers a broader and more analytical perspective that enriches the understanding of this complex topic.
In an era where nuclear threats are far from extinct, the insights provided by both Ellsberg and Freedman are invaluable tools for those striving to understand the complexity and dangers of nuclear war planning.
Although the recently departed Daniel Ellsberg is best known for his role in leaking the Pentagon Papers, his lesser-known yet arguably more significant contribution was in exposing the precarious mechanics of the United States's nuclear arsenal and nuclear war planning. This forms the backbone of The Doomsday Machine: far and away, the scariest book I have ever read. Packed with shocking revelations from cover to cover, it confronts readers with the chilling reality that nuclear war, particularly in the unsettling wake of the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, is a far likelier possibility than most would dare to imagine.
The Risk of Accidental Launch
The book's central theme revolves around the alarming lack of safeguards in the nuclear arsenal against accidental launch. Given how easy it would have been to trigger a launch, I was forced to conclude that nuclear planners deliberately decided to nearly always err in favor of a "quick launch" versus preventing an accidental launch. Indeed, some safety measures seemed so trivial to circumvent that they must have been deliberately designed that way. Ellsberg documents how it would undoubtedly have been possible for rogue commanders to trigger a nuclear war without Presidential authorization.
Further Alarming Revelations: Politics and the Use of Nuclear Weapons
Other alarming revelations in the book are how, for a considerable period, American planners evaluating strategies for attacking the Soviet Union counted deaths among Western European allies with a weighting of zero. Additionally, Ellsberg writes that every President up to the time of his writing had credibly threatened to use nuclear weapons against other countries. In response to "these weapons have not been used," Ellsberg reports the retort was "yes, they have been used, as designed, many times" as the highest of high-stakes bargaining chips.
The Cuban Missile Crisis: An Insider's View
Ellsberg's coverage of the Cuban missile crisis shed much new light on the situation:
Apparently, at the time of the downing of the U2 spy plane, Moscow realized it had lost critical control of Russian troops in Cuba and was worried they would continue to shoot down more American planes. As such, Kruschev realized he needed out. Indeed, Ellsberg reveals that withdrawing NATO's nuclear weapons from Turkey was a bonus: not a pre-requisite.
Recounting an incident somewhat less well known than the downing of the U2 spy plane, Ellsberg details just how close we came in an incident involving a Russian submarine being depth charged by US warships. The probability Ellsberg heard estimated by planners at the time is genuinely jaw-dropping…
A Missed Opportunity: Discussion on the Why of Prioritizing Quick Launch Over Safety
The one shortcoming I found was that the book does not thoroughly discuss why "quick launch" seems to supersede "safety" in terms of priority. My speculation is that the lightness of the safeguards might be a calculated strategy to dissuade adversaries from believing they could depend on these protections to prevent a retaliatory strike, thus inadvertently increasing the likelihood of nuclear war. However, it would have been enlightening to hear more from someone with Ellsberg's insider perspective.
Contrasting Insights: Ellsberg Versus Freedman
In contrast to Lawrence Freedman's [b:The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy|1590178|The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy|Lawrence Freedman|https://i.gr-assets.com/images/S/compressed.photo.goodreads.com/books/1430736704l/1590178._SY75_.jpg|1583174], which I found more comprehensive, Ellsberg's book strikes a less clinical tone. Freedman's work meticulously outlines the development of nuclear strategy and acknowledges improved safeguards after the Cold War, when nuclear arsenals were no longer on high alert. His portrayal of nuclear planners paints a picture of individuals trapped in a seemingly impossible situation: caught between the need to prepare for every eventuality and fearing becoming victims of a first strike.
Ellsberg, on the other hand, hones in on the most confounding aspects of nuclear war planning. While Freedman adopts a more detached, analytical lens, Ellsberg personalizes the narrative, emphasizing the shocking absence of safeguards and the real potential for disaster. The two works together provide a rounded perspective. Still, Ellsberg's book, focusing on the precariousness of the nuclear launch system, offers a chillingly personal and immediate wake-up call to the dangers we continue to live with.
Continuing Threat: Is the Risk of Annihilation Still Present?
The contrasting narratives presented by Ellsberg and Freedman may seem at odds, particularly concerning the present-day threat of nuclear war. With his focus on the lack of safeguards and the potential for disaster, Ellsberg suggests a persisting and immediate danger. Conversely, Freedman argues that the risk has lessened over time, especially after the end of the Cold War.
Neither book conclusively explains why there was an initial dearth of safeguards. Given this, I am left speculating that the risk of accidental nuclear war, although somewhat diminished, still exists. The risk persists if the absence of rigorous safeguards was initially deliberately intended to deter adversaries from launching a first strike in the belief that the safeguards could be subverted to prevent a retaliatory response.
Conclusion
If faced with selecting only one of Freedman's or Ellsberg's books, I would lean towards Ellsberg's The Doomsday Machine for its readability and stark, personal illumination of the inherent risks within our nuclear strategy. However, for readers seeking the most comprehensive understanding of nuclear strategy and its development, Freedman's [b:The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy|1590178|The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy|Lawrence Freedman|https://i.gr-assets.com/images/S/compressed.photo.goodreads.com/books/1430736704l/1590178._SY75_.jpg|1583174] will likely be more to their liking. The latter offers a broader and more analytical perspective that enriches the understanding of this complex topic.
In an era where nuclear threats are far from extinct, the insights provided by both Ellsberg and Freedman are invaluable tools for those striving to understand the complexity and dangers of nuclear war planning.
allisonisreading's review against another edition
dark
informative
tense
medium-paced
5.0
Content Warnings
Moderate: War and Genocide
nelsta's review
2.0
What began as a fascinating study of nuclear command and control quickly devolved into a re-hashing of history aimed at maligning the United States and its nuclear policies. While I recognized that Ellsberg would not be praising the US in this book (given the title and his prior experiences), I was disappointed to find many of his criticisms reductionist and based on immoral actions of the United States during WWII.
The second half of the book begins with a simplistic and single-faceted history of the 8th Air Force and Pacific Air Forces during WWII. Ellsberg’s intention seems to be to prove that the United States lost its moral footing during WWII and never returned. He cherry picks arguments and ignores context, eventually arriving at the conclusion that the President wasn’t bothered by the atomic bombings solely because we had been killing civilians throughout the war.
While I, like most Americans, am horrified at the actions taken by the Axis and the Allies during WWII, I believe Ellsberg’s assertions are more a product of the 21st century than his experiences in the mid-20th century.
This book was so promising, but ultimately let me down. I give it two stars because the first half of the book was sufficiently interesting to give me cause to stop and think. The second half is revisionist, reductionist history with little other aim than to besmirch American foreign policy.
The second half of the book begins with a simplistic and single-faceted history of the 8th Air Force and Pacific Air Forces during WWII. Ellsberg’s intention seems to be to prove that the United States lost its moral footing during WWII and never returned. He cherry picks arguments and ignores context, eventually arriving at the conclusion that the President wasn’t bothered by the atomic bombings solely because we had been killing civilians throughout the war.
While I, like most Americans, am horrified at the actions taken by the Axis and the Allies during WWII, I believe Ellsberg’s assertions are more a product of the 21st century than his experiences in the mid-20th century.
This book was so promising, but ultimately let me down. I give it two stars because the first half of the book was sufficiently interesting to give me cause to stop and think. The second half is revisionist, reductionist history with little other aim than to besmirch American foreign policy.
heytheredilara's review against another edition
4.0
This book is very important in understanding how the nuclear weapons have been used and is still in use today since Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
So many times throughout the book i had to check for myself that these are not just crazy claims but reality. Scarier than any fiction work that is out there.
So many times throughout the book i had to check for myself that these are not just crazy claims but reality. Scarier than any fiction work that is out there.
simonmee's review against another edition
2.0
Sometime I read a book that isn't wrong on its main points, but kinda keeps niggling you on the details. The Doomsday Machine is one of those books.
Nuclear War is bad, ok
The Doomsday Machine is about the precipice of nuclear annihilation that we have stood upon since the Cold War. While Russia and other countries are mentioned, the main focus is the American command and control system, which Ellsberg had consulted on since about the 1950s.
There are some interesting anecdotes that carry wider points. Ellsberg watched scramble drills in Japan for nuclear bombers, but they would never actually launch (due to the risk of crashing and accidentally exploding their weapons), nor practice the abort and return to home drills that were fail-safes against unauthorised bombings (if a pilot had not received a positive in-flight order to engage the target after launching, they were to return to base). As Ellsberg points out, if there was an emergency launch with atomic bombs on board:
They would believe the war was on, or was imminent, because the commanders who had launched them without precedent would appear to have thought so.
...which could colour those pilots' decision-making while waiting for a positive inflight “engage” order.
There are further layers of detail on this point, things that are intuitive but not apparently obvious. Ellsberg’s experiences are the best parts of the book, such as learning how speeches can conveying different meaning to their intended parties (and the timing of those speeches can have an impact).
The problem is that book as a whole suffers from being a little on the late side. Eric Schlosser’s [b:Command and Control|6452798|Command and Control Nuclear Weapons, the Damascus Accident, and the Illusion of Safety|Eric Schlosser|https://i.gr-assets.com/images/S/compressed.photo.goodreads.com/books/1366560404l/6452798._SY75_.jpg|6643004] (which Ellsberg cites) was earlier and, on the balance, better. Doomsday Machine is interesting but most of the “confessions” were already out there. We kind of know nuclear systems rest on dangerous (“doomsday”) machinery.
The severe limitations of sheer intellect
Ellsberg splits his book between his own experiences, and the mental framework that led to targeting urban cities with nuclear weapons as part of "total war", running right through to World War 2 and the early Cold War.
I don’t want to argue that the strategic bombing of German and Japanese cities were a good thing. I'm probably in general agreement with Ellsberg. The problem is that he is loose about the history of “total war”. For him, an early example of the blurring of distinctions between combatant and non-combatant is the burning of Atlanta in 1864:
And the innovation that he introduced - which was observed from Europe as an act of barbarism and is so remembered in the South to this day - was to allow his troops to attack the city of Atlanta as a whole, destroying most of its stores and burning the city.
I’ve got a couple of problems with this:
- I get that Ellsberg is writing for an American audience and “memories” of Atlanta are a cultural touchstone, but the notably brutal Indian Mutiny ran from 1857, the burning of the Summer Palace in China was in 1860 and… …well look up any reputable text on Imperialism or even “Manifest Destiny”. It’s embarrassing for Ellsberg to treat Atlanta as a notable escalation.
- Even allowing for an American audience, the stripping of events from their context flirts dangerously with “Lost Cause” mythology. He’s writing sympathetically about an insurrection that enslaved during the Gettysburg campaign African Americans living in the Union. The Confederate States both before, during and after the Civil War, committed “barbarism” on non-combatant African Americans. Atlanta was not an “innovation” even in an American context.
Ellsberg then writes that the strategy of large-scale military attack on the economy and social order of an opponent didn’t really occur in World War 1. Ellsberg’s argument appears to be that the military stalemate made attractive the theories of total war via bombing undefended cities. I don’t believe Ellsberg’s totally off on the motivators, but he removes context in such a way that makes acts of bombing a city more of an escalation that it was in practice. The British imposed a punishing naval blockade in World War 1 and the Germans committed (fitfully) to unrestricted submarine warfare.
As for World War 2, the German bombings of Warsaw and Rotterdam are explicable to Ellsberg as being cities under siege (not sure how Atlanta isn’t covered by that exception) whereas the Blitz was a reaction to mistakes on both sides. There’s no mention of the German Palm Sunday bombing of Belgrade in April 1941 or the bombings of refugee columns, neither of which fall under either of those qualifiers.
Ellsberg might be strictly correct with:
But deliberate bombing of urban populations as the principal way of fighting a war by a major industrial power can be said to have started on February 14, 1942, with a specific British directive.
…but he makes a lot (and I do mean a lot) of “strictly correct” statements in his book where the qualifiers can substantially change the impact. Ellsberg essentially ignores the atrocities of Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan. My comments may read as “whatabouterism” but my main point is this – Ellsberg creates a pattern of escalation that isn’t as clear as he makes out in the narrative and leans abit heavily on Anglo-Americans being the agents of change.
There’s also a section about high level figures in the US military opposing the atomic bombing of Japan. It’s the old “seven of the eight five star generals/admirals opposed it” canard that doesn’t really mean much. Kinda crazy none of those seven five star generals stopped it at the time.
An alternative interpretation to bombing cities is this: Faced with an existential threat and a limited toolbox of responses, Britain and the United States were willing to bomb cities, whether conventionally or by nuclear weapons. Other than that, the general trend post World War 2 has been towards minimising collateral damage, even against non-Western powers. You can fill up several volumes of exceptions but it is still a very different story that Ellsberg makes out, that being of an American force desperate to pull the trigger on total war.
So, there are some interesting anecdotes, mostly stale revelations, and a bit of wonky, or at least incomplete history. It’s not terrible, it’s just a bit limited.
Nuclear War is bad, ok
The Doomsday Machine is about the precipice of nuclear annihilation that we have stood upon since the Cold War. While Russia and other countries are mentioned, the main focus is the American command and control system, which Ellsberg had consulted on since about the 1950s.
There are some interesting anecdotes that carry wider points. Ellsberg watched scramble drills in Japan for nuclear bombers, but they would never actually launch (due to the risk of crashing and accidentally exploding their weapons), nor practice the abort and return to home drills that were fail-safes against unauthorised bombings (if a pilot had not received a positive in-flight order to engage the target after launching, they were to return to base). As Ellsberg points out, if there was an emergency launch with atomic bombs on board:
They would believe the war was on, or was imminent, because the commanders who had launched them without precedent would appear to have thought so.
...which could colour those pilots' decision-making while waiting for a positive inflight “engage” order.
There are further layers of detail on this point, things that are intuitive but not apparently obvious. Ellsberg’s experiences are the best parts of the book, such as learning how speeches can conveying different meaning to their intended parties (and the timing of those speeches can have an impact).
The problem is that book as a whole suffers from being a little on the late side. Eric Schlosser’s [b:Command and Control|6452798|Command and Control Nuclear Weapons, the Damascus Accident, and the Illusion of Safety|Eric Schlosser|https://i.gr-assets.com/images/S/compressed.photo.goodreads.com/books/1366560404l/6452798._SY75_.jpg|6643004] (which Ellsberg cites) was earlier and, on the balance, better. Doomsday Machine is interesting but most of the “confessions” were already out there. We kind of know nuclear systems rest on dangerous (“doomsday”) machinery.
The severe limitations of sheer intellect
Ellsberg splits his book between his own experiences, and the mental framework that led to targeting urban cities with nuclear weapons as part of "total war", running right through to World War 2 and the early Cold War.
I don’t want to argue that the strategic bombing of German and Japanese cities were a good thing. I'm probably in general agreement with Ellsberg. The problem is that he is loose about the history of “total war”. For him, an early example of the blurring of distinctions between combatant and non-combatant is the burning of Atlanta in 1864:
And the innovation that he introduced - which was observed from Europe as an act of barbarism and is so remembered in the South to this day - was to allow his troops to attack the city of Atlanta as a whole, destroying most of its stores and burning the city.
I’ve got a couple of problems with this:
- I get that Ellsberg is writing for an American audience and “memories” of Atlanta are a cultural touchstone, but the notably brutal Indian Mutiny ran from 1857, the burning of the Summer Palace in China was in 1860 and… …well look up any reputable text on Imperialism or even “Manifest Destiny”. It’s embarrassing for Ellsberg to treat Atlanta as a notable escalation.
- Even allowing for an American audience, the stripping of events from their context flirts dangerously with “Lost Cause” mythology. He’s writing sympathetically about an insurrection that enslaved during the Gettysburg campaign African Americans living in the Union. The Confederate States both before, during and after the Civil War, committed “barbarism” on non-combatant African Americans. Atlanta was not an “innovation” even in an American context.
Ellsberg then writes that the strategy of large-scale military attack on the economy and social order of an opponent didn’t really occur in World War 1. Ellsberg’s argument appears to be that the military stalemate made attractive the theories of total war via bombing undefended cities. I don’t believe Ellsberg’s totally off on the motivators, but he removes context in such a way that makes acts of bombing a city more of an escalation that it was in practice. The British imposed a punishing naval blockade in World War 1 and the Germans committed (fitfully) to unrestricted submarine warfare.
As for World War 2, the German bombings of Warsaw and Rotterdam are explicable to Ellsberg as being cities under siege (not sure how Atlanta isn’t covered by that exception) whereas the Blitz was a reaction to mistakes on both sides. There’s no mention of the German Palm Sunday bombing of Belgrade in April 1941 or the bombings of refugee columns, neither of which fall under either of those qualifiers.
Ellsberg might be strictly correct with:
But deliberate bombing of urban populations as the principal way of fighting a war by a major industrial power can be said to have started on February 14, 1942, with a specific British directive.
…but he makes a lot (and I do mean a lot) of “strictly correct” statements in his book where the qualifiers can substantially change the impact. Ellsberg essentially ignores the atrocities of Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan. My comments may read as “whatabouterism” but my main point is this – Ellsberg creates a pattern of escalation that isn’t as clear as he makes out in the narrative and leans abit heavily on Anglo-Americans being the agents of change.
There’s also a section about high level figures in the US military opposing the atomic bombing of Japan. It’s the old “seven of the eight five star generals/admirals opposed it” canard that doesn’t really mean much. Kinda crazy none of those seven five star generals stopped it at the time.
An alternative interpretation to bombing cities is this: Faced with an existential threat and a limited toolbox of responses, Britain and the United States were willing to bomb cities, whether conventionally or by nuclear weapons. Other than that, the general trend post World War 2 has been towards minimising collateral damage, even against non-Western powers. You can fill up several volumes of exceptions but it is still a very different story that Ellsberg makes out, that being of an American force desperate to pull the trigger on total war.
So, there are some interesting anecdotes, mostly stale revelations, and a bit of wonky, or at least incomplete history. It’s not terrible, it’s just a bit limited.
thomcat's review against another edition
3.0
Frightening revelations and some repetition, this book tries to accomplish a few different things. It achieves one well, and is somewhat convincing that we the people aren't powerless.
Economist Daniel Ellsberg, famous for the Pentagon papers, has collected a lifetimes worth of research and thoughts into the risks of Nuclear War, both strategic and tactical. This is the best part of the volume, and it reveals a lot, including just how many people could actually launch nuclear weapons (hint - it's a LOT more than just the president). Because of the doomsday systems in place, most of these launches would trigger automatic responses, ending in nuclear winter or omnicide (great, if depressing, term).
Per the many-worlds hypothesis, are we just the lucky ones who have survived thus far?
Other portions of the book include the transition from attacking military targets to bombing civilian centers, the de-facto target of nuclear weapons. The history here is muddled, and has been presented better in other books. I think a more concise one-chapter summary would have been better. The best part of this section is where Ellsberg points out that the atom bomb actually did less damage than the campaign of firebombing in place up to that point - but using less planes.
He concludes the book calling for disarmament, calling for commitments to no first strike, and others. What would have been more impactful (and may in actuality be the case, though still classified) is that we could easily replace the nuclear weapons with missiles that could destroy the weapons and weapon systems - reverting to the original goal, and leaving cities and innocent populations out of jeopardy. He does point out how difficult it would be to change the direction of our current military-industrial complex, and that probably applies equally well to other countries - especially those that lack the newest technology. He also shows where people have effected change related to nuclear topics - all hope is not lost.
Aside from the muddled history, there were sentences and small paragraphs that were duplicates. It almost feels like this was a series of articles collected into a book, and if so, it needed a lot more editing. The best result would have focused on what the author knows best, including details on the Cuban Missile Crisis and the risks and flaws in the system used in the 60s and 70s. In the end, this was a book that was equal parts enlightening, depressing, and frustrating. 3 stars (out of 5).
Economist Daniel Ellsberg, famous for the Pentagon papers, has collected a lifetimes worth of research and thoughts into the risks of Nuclear War, both strategic and tactical. This is the best part of the volume, and it reveals a lot, including just how many people could actually launch nuclear weapons (hint - it's a LOT more than just the president). Because of the doomsday systems in place, most of these launches would trigger automatic responses, ending in nuclear winter or omnicide (great, if depressing, term).
Per the many-worlds hypothesis, are we just the lucky ones who have survived thus far?
Other portions of the book include the transition from attacking military targets to bombing civilian centers, the de-facto target of nuclear weapons. The history here is muddled, and has been presented better in other books. I think a more concise one-chapter summary would have been better. The best part of this section is where Ellsberg points out that the atom bomb actually did less damage than the campaign of firebombing in place up to that point - but using less planes.
He concludes the book calling for disarmament, calling for commitments to no first strike, and others. What would have been more impactful (and may in actuality be the case, though still classified) is that we could easily replace the nuclear weapons with missiles that could destroy the weapons and weapon systems - reverting to the original goal, and leaving cities and innocent populations out of jeopardy. He does point out how difficult it would be to change the direction of our current military-industrial complex, and that probably applies equally well to other countries - especially those that lack the newest technology. He also shows where people have effected change related to nuclear topics - all hope is not lost.
Aside from the muddled history, there were sentences and small paragraphs that were duplicates. It almost feels like this was a series of articles collected into a book, and if so, it needed a lot more editing. The best result would have focused on what the author knows best, including details on the Cuban Missile Crisis and the risks and flaws in the system used in the 60s and 70s. In the end, this was a book that was equal parts enlightening, depressing, and frustrating. 3 stars (out of 5).
lexmechanic's review against another edition
5.0
Nuclear weapons are important. They're the Sword of Damocles hanging over our civilization. Their utility and possible paths to disarmament can (and should) be debated. Meanwhile, everyone should The Doomsday Machine by Dan Ellsberd (of the Pentagon Papers fame). The book challenges and dismantles many crucial concepts the general public has about the safety, security and practicality of the largest nuclear arsenals.
In short, the current situation is just three steps away from ending humanity without any room for hope or survival. Even U.S. presidents have been either lied to or had key information withheld from them. There's shockingly little finesse in ANY application of nuclear weapons by the global superpowers. It means that if antything goes really wrong in international politics, things can get out of hand instantly.
The book is worth a read just to put some Hollywood myths to rest. There won't be any last-minute reprieves or self-destruct buttons.
In short, the current situation is just three steps away from ending humanity without any room for hope or survival. Even U.S. presidents have been either lied to or had key information withheld from them. There's shockingly little finesse in ANY application of nuclear weapons by the global superpowers. It means that if antything goes really wrong in international politics, things can get out of hand instantly.
The book is worth a read just to put some Hollywood myths to rest. There won't be any last-minute reprieves or self-destruct buttons.