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hannahrhian's review against another edition
challenging
informative
slow-paced
3.75
Extremely well researched but a very info heavy listen. I’m not sure how much I actually managed to absorb and retain. Easier to listen in small chunks
archytas's review against another edition
informative
reflective
medium-paced
3.5
"At the zenith of its power in 2001, the membership of bin Laden’s Al Qaeda was around one thousand fighters. In contrast, Baghdadi had a mini-army of between thirty thousand and one hundred thousand members controlling a de facto state roughly the size of the United Kingdom. By becoming the major beneficiary of the breakdown of state institutions in the Fertile Crescent, IS, together with like-minded Al Qaeda factions, was able to hijack people’s calls for freedom, justice, and dignity and turn popular as well as intellectual opinions against the Arab Spring uprisings."
This wasn't the easiest read: not so much the subject matter - Gerges avoids any gratutious descriptions of violence - but because the book has a semi-thematic, semi-chronological organising structure, which I found difficult to follow, and because it is a little ranty at times. I mean, you can forgive anyone being a bit ranty about ISIS, don't get me wrong. This is fundamentally (heh) a depressing story of two nations degenerating into repression and violence.
The book was substantially written before 2017, and then recently updated since the military defeats of ISIS. The new material is primarily in the introduction and the lengthy epilogue, and there are some strange inconsistencies as a result (Abu Bakr al Baghdadi's tense jumps around). But Gerges' analysis holds up, so mostly it works.
This analysis is largely that ISIS' distinguishing features were its willingness to use violence against Muslims, it's oppositional focus on the Shi'a, its attempts to form a Caliphate - even without state power - and the use of flamboyant cruelty, such as beheadings. It's success was a combination of these things - the idealism of the Caliphate mixed with a ruthless willingness to murder/eliminate all internal opponents or ideological alternatives - combined with a focus on recruiting working and destitute Sunni peoples. He argues that many in Syria and Mosul supported ISIS simply because they fixed power and water, and established civil services when these had been long abandoned. This wasn't necessarily what I expected from accounts I've read of survivors from Raqqa and other occupied cities, which have indicated that terror was ever present living under ISIS, but experiences change over time, so this may have been more so in the early days.
Or the other issue may be that most of what I have read is written by women, and women are remarkably absent from this narrative. Gerges rarely - quite possibly never - mentions gender. But the reality is that ISIS fighters, who make up the bulk of the supporters he discusses, were overwhelmingly male, and the women who joined ISIS had very different experiences. This felt like a big gap in the book, and I would suggest that readers think of supplementing this with Azedah Moaveni's Guest House for Young Widows, for example.
But despite those complaints, this is a thorough look at ISIS and the personalities who created and maintained it, and is particularly strong in examining the relationship between Al Qaeda and ISIS.
This wasn't the easiest read: not so much the subject matter - Gerges avoids any gratutious descriptions of violence - but because the book has a semi-thematic, semi-chronological organising structure, which I found difficult to follow, and because it is a little ranty at times. I mean, you can forgive anyone being a bit ranty about ISIS, don't get me wrong. This is fundamentally (heh) a depressing story of two nations degenerating into repression and violence.
The book was substantially written before 2017, and then recently updated since the military defeats of ISIS. The new material is primarily in the introduction and the lengthy epilogue, and there are some strange inconsistencies as a result (Abu Bakr al Baghdadi's tense jumps around). But Gerges' analysis holds up, so mostly it works.
This analysis is largely that ISIS' distinguishing features were its willingness to use violence against Muslims, it's oppositional focus on the Shi'a, its attempts to form a Caliphate - even without state power - and the use of flamboyant cruelty, such as beheadings. It's success was a combination of these things - the idealism of the Caliphate mixed with a ruthless willingness to murder/eliminate all internal opponents or ideological alternatives - combined with a focus on recruiting working and destitute Sunni peoples. He argues that many in Syria and Mosul supported ISIS simply because they fixed power and water, and established civil services when these had been long abandoned. This wasn't necessarily what I expected from accounts I've read of survivors from Raqqa and other occupied cities, which have indicated that terror was ever present living under ISIS, but experiences change over time, so this may have been more so in the early days.
Or the other issue may be that most of what I have read is written by women, and women are remarkably absent from this narrative. Gerges rarely - quite possibly never - mentions gender. But the reality is that ISIS fighters, who make up the bulk of the supporters he discusses, were overwhelmingly male, and the women who joined ISIS had very different experiences. This felt like a big gap in the book, and I would suggest that readers think of supplementing this with Azedah Moaveni's Guest House for Young Widows, for example.
But despite those complaints, this is a thorough look at ISIS and the personalities who created and maintained it, and is particularly strong in examining the relationship between Al Qaeda and ISIS.
nirvanahy's review against another edition
the first is that ISIS can be seen as an extension of AQI, which was itself a creature of the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq and its aftermath. By destroying state institutions, the invasion reinforced popular divisions along ethnic and religious rather than national lines, creating an environment that was particularly favorable for the implantation and expansion of groups such as AQI and ISIS. Second, the fragmentation of the post Sadam Hussein political establishment and its incapacity to articulate policies that emphasized the country's national identity further nourished inter-communal distrust, thus deepening and widening and Sunni-Shia divide. Thirdly, the breakdown of state institutions in Syria and the country's descent into a full flown war is a significant factor in the revitalization of ISIS. Finally, ISIS could not have consolidated the gains it made with the Syrian war without the derailment of the Arab Spring uprisings and the consequent spreading fires in neighboring Arab countries.
The US-led invation and occupation of Iraq in 2003, cobined with the subsequent social turmoil and prolonged and costly armed resistance, led to the dismantling of state institutions and the establishment of a political system based on muhasasa, or the distribution of the spoils of power along communal, ethnic, and tribal lines.
ISIS thrives among poor, disenfranchised Sunni communities, including those in the Fallujah, Tikrit and Anbar regions in Iraq; the al-Raqqa province and Deir al-Zour in Syria; Akkar, Tripoli, and the Bekka Valley in Lebanon; and Maan and Zarqa in Jordan. The lower-class background of ISIS's combatants explains why the organization justifies its actions as a defense of the poor and disfranchised as well as why it targets areas with natural and raw resources.
The 2003 US led invasion and occupation of Iraq caused a rupture in an already fractured Iraqi society. America's destruction of Iraqi institutions, particularly its dismantling of the army and the Baathist ruling party, unleashed a fierce power struggle, mainly along sectarian lines, creating fissures in society.
US was aware of Maliki's rising authoritarianism but continued to publicly support him. The document describes Maliki as paranoid and outlines how his decisions and policies produced increasing centralization of power in the hands of an inner circle of Shia Islamist at the expense of the formal chain of command. It even goes as far as to warn that Maliki was following in the footsteps of Hussin.
Of all the factors fueling ISIS's resurgence, the inability of the coalition and the Iraqi political establishment to put forward an inclusive national project and rebuild the political landscape tops the list. Rather than moving away from the political authoritarianism and cult of personality that epitomized the Hussin years, the political class that inherited the spoils failed to end factionalism and social fragmentation. Even those Iraqis who cooperated with the US forces and the Iraqi government against AQI were aligned along sectarian lines.
The rule elite didn't take a series measure to fill the vacuum left by de-Bathification, particularly in terms of redefining the identity of the new Iraq. Within this vacuum of ideas and social chaos, which intensified because of the dismantling of Iraq's security institutions and armed resistance, there hardly existed a nationalist vision to replace the old regime's, no unifying symbol that would galvanize Iraqis as a whole.
Initially, the large-scale popular uprising in Syria was socially and politically driven, originating in rural areas -like Dara'a - that were hit hard by years of drought and a decade of neo-liberal policies that siphoned resources away from the pressed agrarian sector toward the tertiary sector.
From the late 1980s until the outbreak of the revolutionary uprising in 2011, the Syrian regime forged capital networks that allied business elites from the country's large cities with state officials, thus transforming the country, in a twenty-year period, from a state-controlled to a capitalist economy characterized by cronyism.
sectarianism is the fuel that has powered the ISIS surge. Fundamentally, ISIS utilizes identity as the driving force for the movement and its expansion, expressed through a narrow-minded and intolerant Salafi-jihadist ideology.
This entails addressing legitimate Sunni grievances through the reconstruction of the state based on the rule of law, citizenship, and inclusiveness, not sect, ethnicity and tribe.
The US-led invation and occupation of Iraq in 2003, cobined with the subsequent social turmoil and prolonged and costly armed resistance, led to the dismantling of state institutions and the establishment of a political system based on muhasasa, or the distribution of the spoils of power along communal, ethnic, and tribal lines.
ISIS thrives among poor, disenfranchised Sunni communities, including those in the Fallujah, Tikrit and Anbar regions in Iraq; the al-Raqqa province and Deir al-Zour in Syria; Akkar, Tripoli, and the Bekka Valley in Lebanon; and Maan and Zarqa in Jordan. The lower-class background of ISIS's combatants explains why the organization justifies its actions as a defense of the poor and disfranchised as well as why it targets areas with natural and raw resources.
The 2003 US led invasion and occupation of Iraq caused a rupture in an already fractured Iraqi society. America's destruction of Iraqi institutions, particularly its dismantling of the army and the Baathist ruling party, unleashed a fierce power struggle, mainly along sectarian lines, creating fissures in society.
US was aware of Maliki's rising authoritarianism but continued to publicly support him. The document describes Maliki as paranoid and outlines how his decisions and policies produced increasing centralization of power in the hands of an inner circle of Shia Islamist at the expense of the formal chain of command. It even goes as far as to warn that Maliki was following in the footsteps of Hussin.
Of all the factors fueling ISIS's resurgence, the inability of the coalition and the Iraqi political establishment to put forward an inclusive national project and rebuild the political landscape tops the list. Rather than moving away from the political authoritarianism and cult of personality that epitomized the Hussin years, the political class that inherited the spoils failed to end factionalism and social fragmentation. Even those Iraqis who cooperated with the US forces and the Iraqi government against AQI were aligned along sectarian lines.
The rule elite didn't take a series measure to fill the vacuum left by de-Bathification, particularly in terms of redefining the identity of the new Iraq. Within this vacuum of ideas and social chaos, which intensified because of the dismantling of Iraq's security institutions and armed resistance, there hardly existed a nationalist vision to replace the old regime's, no unifying symbol that would galvanize Iraqis as a whole.
Initially, the large-scale popular uprising in Syria was socially and politically driven, originating in rural areas -like Dara'a - that were hit hard by years of drought and a decade of neo-liberal policies that siphoned resources away from the pressed agrarian sector toward the tertiary sector.
From the late 1980s until the outbreak of the revolutionary uprising in 2011, the Syrian regime forged capital networks that allied business elites from the country's large cities with state officials, thus transforming the country, in a twenty-year period, from a state-controlled to a capitalist economy characterized by cronyism.
sectarianism is the fuel that has powered the ISIS surge. Fundamentally, ISIS utilizes identity as the driving force for the movement and its expansion, expressed through a narrow-minded and intolerant Salafi-jihadist ideology.
This entails addressing legitimate Sunni grievances through the reconstruction of the state based on the rule of law, citizenship, and inclusiveness, not sect, ethnicity and tribe.
caffeinatedfae's review
3.0
Okay, I will admit, I am not the most knowledgeable individual in the world which is exactly why I decided to read/listen to this book.
ISIS is a scary group that can keep you up at night if you think about it too much. With that said, this was an enlightening book that was filled with great information. I think that anyone who cannot tell the difference between muslims & ISIS should read this book. It will hopefully change your view.
This was probably one of the most dry books I have ever read. If it weren't for it being an audiobook I am sure that I would have put it down. I was bored through a lot of the book but I will say that it was interesting to learn the history of ISIS.
This is definitely dry, but it has a lot of good information.
ISIS is a scary group that can keep you up at night if you think about it too much. With that said, this was an enlightening book that was filled with great information. I think that anyone who cannot tell the difference between muslims & ISIS should read this book. It will hopefully change your view.
This was probably one of the most dry books I have ever read. If it weren't for it being an audiobook I am sure that I would have put it down. I was bored through a lot of the book but I will say that it was interesting to learn the history of ISIS.
This is definitely dry, but it has a lot of good information.
tonka_blue's review against another edition
4.0
Izuzetno zanimljiva knjiga koja opisuje okolnosti u kojima je ISIS nastao i što je te na koji način utjecalo na jednu od najvećih sigurnosnih prijetnja danas. Autor detaljno opisuje ideologiju tj. manjak iste na kojoj počiva ISIS, odnose između ključnih ljudi ISIS-a i Al Qaide te način na koji organizacija funkcionira.
Za nekoga tko želi znati više, ovo je uistinu odlična knjiga upravo zbog jasnoće svojeg pisanja.
Za nekoga tko želi znati više, ovo je uistinu odlična knjiga upravo zbog jasnoće svojeg pisanja.
mburnamfink's review against another edition
3.0
ISIS: A History is a strongly sourced, objective account of the rise, personnel, and characteristics of the world's most infamous terrorist group. It's also a poorly edited mass that requires a lot of prior knowledge of the field, and could use at least two more passes to find some actual structure.
Gerges investigates the continuity and change between ISIS and previous Jihadi groups, like Al Qaeda in Iraq. ISIS focuses on the "near enemy" of Shiites and insufficiently devout Sunnis instead of the "far enemy" of the US and the Israel. Thanks to a complete collapse in State authority caused by the Syrian Civil War and Iraq's corrupt and sectarian government, ISIS expanded from a hunted band to a Caliphate dominating millions of people in a medieval nightmare. Gerges and his graduate assistants do the best possible job tracing the rise of ISIS's leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi from the propaganda, but the man is still largely a cipher.
Gerges describes ISIS as theocratic plagiarists, making little advancement to Salafi-Jihadist thinking, but he doesn't really explain what that thinking is, or the importance of establishing of the Caliphate in the kind of utopian Muslim thinking that characterizes Jihad. From a conventional polisci perspective, it's true that ISIS provides basic government services (water, sewage, schools, police, etc) in areas that Iraq and Syria have abandoned, but the same could be said of the Taliban, and the Taliban hasn't attracted tens of thousands of foreign fighters, or routed professional armies. Gerges claims that ex-Baathist officers in the upper ranks contributed to ISIS taking Mosul, but I need more evidence for strategic thinking from the people who brought you the Iraq-Iran War.
Obviously, there's a lot about ISIS that is simply unknowable to the West, because of their tendency to behead journalists and other outsiders. But I found Graeme Wood's 2015 article in The Atlantic a much more coherent introduction to the organization, that if less detailed, is far more revealing.
Gerges investigates the continuity and change between ISIS and previous Jihadi groups, like Al Qaeda in Iraq. ISIS focuses on the "near enemy" of Shiites and insufficiently devout Sunnis instead of the "far enemy" of the US and the Israel. Thanks to a complete collapse in State authority caused by the Syrian Civil War and Iraq's corrupt and sectarian government, ISIS expanded from a hunted band to a Caliphate dominating millions of people in a medieval nightmare. Gerges and his graduate assistants do the best possible job tracing the rise of ISIS's leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi from the propaganda, but the man is still largely a cipher.
Gerges describes ISIS as theocratic plagiarists, making little advancement to Salafi-Jihadist thinking, but he doesn't really explain what that thinking is, or the importance of establishing of the Caliphate in the kind of utopian Muslim thinking that characterizes Jihad. From a conventional polisci perspective, it's true that ISIS provides basic government services (water, sewage, schools, police, etc) in areas that Iraq and Syria have abandoned, but the same could be said of the Taliban, and the Taliban hasn't attracted tens of thousands of foreign fighters, or routed professional armies. Gerges claims that ex-Baathist officers in the upper ranks contributed to ISIS taking Mosul, but I need more evidence for strategic thinking from the people who brought you the Iraq-Iran War.
Obviously, there's a lot about ISIS that is simply unknowable to the West, because of their tendency to behead journalists and other outsiders. But I found Graeme Wood's 2015 article in The Atlantic a much more coherent introduction to the organization, that if less detailed, is far more revealing.
tonka_blue's review
4.0
Izuzetno zanimljiva knjiga koja opisuje okolnosti u kojima je ISIS nastao i što je te na koji način utjecalo na jednu od najvećih sigurnosnih prijetnja danas. Autor detaljno opisuje ideologiju tj. manjak iste na kojoj počiva ISIS, odnose između ključnih ljudi ISIS-a i Al Qaide te način na koji organizacija funkcionira.
Za nekoga tko želi znati više, ovo je uistinu odlična knjiga upravo zbog jasnoće svojeg pisanja.
Za nekoga tko želi znati više, ovo je uistinu odlična knjiga upravo zbog jasnoće svojeg pisanja.
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