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readback's review
4.0
Particularly interesting in light of current views of Physics about the nature of reality, causality, and epistemology.
carise's review against another edition
3.0
“As we are constantly obliged to make inferences, we grow so accustomed to it that in the end we no longer notice this distinction, and often, as in the case of the so-called deception of the senses, mistake what we have only inferred for something perceived immediately” (291).
This was part of my endeavour to read through some key works in enlightenment philosophy. I certainly didn’t understand everything Kant was saying, but I’ll give my thoughts on my first read.
One of Kant’s central arguments is that, contrary to Hume’s fork, there are synthetic propositions which can be made a priori. One of the best examples would be “everything which happens has a cause”. Kant argues that this proposition isn’t known by reason or even the senses; rather, it is what makes “the unity of experience possible” (294). In other words, it’s a necessary proposition in order for us to experience the world at all.
I find this (along with most of the work), at best, interesting. I think that Kant makes a number of assumptions that are rooted in ancient thought, particularly that space and time are a priori concepts. It seems as though he gets there from the reasoning that space and time can be conceived of without drawing from the sensory experience of a particular place or moment. In fact, this is how Kant justifies most of his a priori concepts. However, I have to agree with Philip Sheldrake on this matter: “We come to know in terms of the particular knowledge of specific places before we know space as a whole or in the abstract” (7). I see no other means by which we come to know space and time other than by a flimsy inference from places and sequences. They are merely abstractions derived from our experience of the material world. This is probably why Kant’s criticisms of Hume didn’t stick for me.
I do, however, find that causality as a synthetic a priori proposition poses some interesting questions. For example, if causality is merely a concept we have that enables us to order our sensory experiences, and if too space and time are concepts not derived from experience, then what does that mean for inferences like the existence of a first cause? Kant addresses this question by comparing the theses and antitheses of some cosmological ideas (422). I do find some of the reasons favouring the theses are fallacious. Namely, that the antithesis “robs us” of supports like religion; or, that the antithesis opens further questions while the thesis quells our discomfort with a lack of a foundation. In fact, most of Kant’s support of theism seems to come from a moral standpoint (which he expands on at the very end), rather than any use of logic. He seems personally uncomfortable with the societal implications of the non-existence of a god, which reflects his bourgeois thinking.
A noteworthy criticism Kant makes against the infinite regress argument for a beginning, is that the lack of a transcendent foundation does not result in an infinite regress necessarily—only an indeterminately continued regress (454). He gets there by simply deconstructing the false dichotomy: “either x is infinite or x is finite”. Rather, “either x is infinite or x is not infinite”, under which an indeterminately continued regress would be included in the latter. In my own view, I find this conclusion (or lack of one) precludes any ability for us to locate a nature to any cause or being in this regress, given its own indeterminacy.
I’ve heard a lot of reviews of this book emphasize how difficult it is, and the need to consult secondary sources. While this would help, and having read Hume first is pretty important, I would advise prospective readers to just give it a go. It was less daunting than I thought it would be, and regardless of my own limitations, I learned a lot.
This was part of my endeavour to read through some key works in enlightenment philosophy. I certainly didn’t understand everything Kant was saying, but I’ll give my thoughts on my first read.
One of Kant’s central arguments is that, contrary to Hume’s fork, there are synthetic propositions which can be made a priori. One of the best examples would be “everything which happens has a cause”. Kant argues that this proposition isn’t known by reason or even the senses; rather, it is what makes “the unity of experience possible” (294). In other words, it’s a necessary proposition in order for us to experience the world at all.
I find this (along with most of the work), at best, interesting. I think that Kant makes a number of assumptions that are rooted in ancient thought, particularly that space and time are a priori concepts. It seems as though he gets there from the reasoning that space and time can be conceived of without drawing from the sensory experience of a particular place or moment. In fact, this is how Kant justifies most of his a priori concepts. However, I have to agree with Philip Sheldrake on this matter: “We come to know in terms of the particular knowledge of specific places before we know space as a whole or in the abstract” (7). I see no other means by which we come to know space and time other than by a flimsy inference from places and sequences. They are merely abstractions derived from our experience of the material world. This is probably why Kant’s criticisms of Hume didn’t stick for me.
I do, however, find that causality as a synthetic a priori proposition poses some interesting questions. For example, if causality is merely a concept we have that enables us to order our sensory experiences, and if too space and time are concepts not derived from experience, then what does that mean for inferences like the existence of a first cause? Kant addresses this question by comparing the theses and antitheses of some cosmological ideas (422). I do find some of the reasons favouring the theses are fallacious. Namely, that the antithesis “robs us” of supports like religion; or, that the antithesis opens further questions while the thesis quells our discomfort with a lack of a foundation. In fact, most of Kant’s support of theism seems to come from a moral standpoint (which he expands on at the very end), rather than any use of logic. He seems personally uncomfortable with the societal implications of the non-existence of a god, which reflects his bourgeois thinking.
A noteworthy criticism Kant makes against the infinite regress argument for a beginning, is that the lack of a transcendent foundation does not result in an infinite regress necessarily—only an indeterminately continued regress (454). He gets there by simply deconstructing the false dichotomy: “either x is infinite or x is finite”. Rather, “either x is infinite or x is not infinite”, under which an indeterminately continued regress would be included in the latter. In my own view, I find this conclusion (or lack of one) precludes any ability for us to locate a nature to any cause or being in this regress, given its own indeterminacy.
I’ve heard a lot of reviews of this book emphasize how difficult it is, and the need to consult secondary sources. While this would help, and having read Hume first is pretty important, I would advise prospective readers to just give it a go. It was less daunting than I thought it would be, and regardless of my own limitations, I learned a lot.
sidharthvardhan's review against another edition
4.0
Kind of good actually. If you get used to style; Kant rocks it when talking about limitations of logical reasoning. He is brilliant in pointing out fallacies in reasoning of different philosophical systems (well, philosophers are normally very good at pointing out faults in each-other's systems.) If you love logical reasoning, you will love this book - ironically given that book is supposed to be a critique of pure reason. Kant gives some very good reasons and examples to show limitations of reason.
I wish he had left it at that. The trouble with refusing to believe in our senses and reasoning is that we do not have any third method of acquiring knowledge.
At the end, he has so thoroughly crushed ability of reason to find out anything new that he has very little to work with. And then he starts acting illogical - after doing a very thorough job at proving that reason can not be used to prove existence of God; he goes ahead that it must assume existence of God, not because such an assumptions suggests itself for some good reasons, rather because he can not defend his moral value system without that assumption.
I wish he had left it at that. The trouble with refusing to believe in our senses and reasoning is that we do not have any third method of acquiring knowledge.
At the end, he has so thoroughly crushed ability of reason to find out anything new that he has very little to work with. And then he starts acting illogical - after doing a very thorough job at proving that reason can not be used to prove existence of God; he goes ahead that it must assume existence of God, not because such an assumptions suggests itself for some good reasons, rather because he can not defend his moral value system without that assumption.
casparb's review
Stomped through it eventually and glad I spent the time. It is unavoidable in the landscape and I think I would struggle going further without. It reconfigured a lot of what I've read already- but of course it would. I've studied Kant before in limited capacities and certainly that experience proved a help in orienting myself in certain sections but there's no substitute for reading the CoPR.
So everybody bitches about the style, Kant's clunky sentences, his seeming hostility to any ring of clarity in expression. I'm not about to suggest it isn't difficult because it is and I found it slow and task to parse at times but there's also been worse. The fundamental principle of his style seems to be reiteration, and the game the reader has to play is working out whether what he has said is a repetition with difference (or a difference with repetition). Speaking of, Deleuze's Difference and Repetition bears a lot of similarity in terms of expression (as well as conceptual retreads under 'difference/alteration') -- Did GD intentionally 'borrow' the Kantian style? I recall in NaP he describes Nietzsche's Genealogy as a rewrite of the CoPR so perhaps D&R can be read as his Genealogy and thus his first Critique? Pure guesses.
It's kind of nice to hit something heavy again - I've missed it since Hegel. Kant is more of what we in the industry call a 'total messy bitch', in that he clearly takes a lot of pleasure in calling out philosophers by name and dragging them. Hegel, in the Phenomenology at least, is more reserved and tends to avoid stating with whom he is disagreeing at any one point. But I like that for Kant so good for him.
Ave to Immanuel for now - I'd like to get to the other critiques at some point. He's not scared me off yet.
So everybody bitches about the style, Kant's clunky sentences, his seeming hostility to any ring of clarity in expression. I'm not about to suggest it isn't difficult because it is and I found it slow and task to parse at times but there's also been worse. The fundamental principle of his style seems to be reiteration, and the game the reader has to play is working out whether what he has said is a repetition with difference (or a difference with repetition). Speaking of, Deleuze's Difference and Repetition bears a lot of similarity in terms of expression (as well as conceptual retreads under 'difference/alteration') -- Did GD intentionally 'borrow' the Kantian style? I recall in NaP he describes Nietzsche's Genealogy as a rewrite of the CoPR so perhaps D&R can be read as his Genealogy and thus his first Critique? Pure guesses.
It's kind of nice to hit something heavy again - I've missed it since Hegel. Kant is more of what we in the industry call a 'total messy bitch', in that he clearly takes a lot of pleasure in calling out philosophers by name and dragging them. Hegel, in the Phenomenology at least, is more reserved and tends to avoid stating with whom he is disagreeing at any one point. But I like that for Kant so good for him.
Ave to Immanuel for now - I'd like to get to the other critiques at some point. He's not scared me off yet.