takeruoji's review against another edition
3.0
Zunächst einmal zur Ausgangssituation: Ich habe diesen dritten Band der Reihe „Sexualität und Wahrheit“ eigentlich nur gelesen, um für die soeben erschienene deutsche Übersetzung des aus dem Nachlass veröffentlichten vierten Band, „Die Geständnisse des Fleisches“, ein wenig auf dem letzten Stand zu sein. Den zweiten Band der „Sexualität und Wahrheit“ habe ich bis heute noch nicht gelesen. Und das hat sich wahrscheinlich ein wenig gerächt, bilden der zweite und dritte Band doch eigentlich mit der Antike eine historische Einheit. Allerdings ist in diesem dritten Band die spätere Antike, genauer die Römische Kaiserzeit, historischer Ausgangspunkt der Analyse. Ungeachtet dessen dreht sich auch dieser Band um die Frage, wie das Sexualverhalten im klassischen griechischen Denken reflektiert worden ist, hier allerdings im Gegensatz zur klassischen Zeit vor allem in Form des Hellenismus und damit einhergehend auch bei römischen Autoren wie Marc Aurel.
Hauptgegenstand ist wie schon im zweiten Band die chresis aphrodision — der Gebrauch der Lüste. Wie der Titel „Die Sorge um sich“ erkennen lässt, wird der Entwicklung der Lüste auch durch die einhergehende Subjektivierung nachgezeichnet. So dreht sich das zweite Kapitel dann auch um die „Kultur seiner selbst“ — ohne jedoch hier großartige Informationen zu gewinnen. Und das ist auch gleich der Hauptkritikpunkt, der für nahezu alle Kapitel gilt: Foucault argumentiert hier ungewohnt schwach, mit teils wenigen Quellen. Die Argumente wirken teils sehr konstruiert, sodass die Glaubwürdigkeit des Gesamtprojekts stark unter der durchschnittlichen Qualität leidet. Ein weiteres Indiz hierfür ist auch der im Vergleich zum zweiten Band stark gesunkene Umfang. Und so wirken die einzelnen Kapitel eher wie lose Abschnitte, deren Zusammenhang nicht immer klar ist bzw. nicht immer argumentativ stichhaltig ist.
Das erste Kapitel etwa, über das Traumbuch des Artemidor, ist ein gutes Beispiel hierfür. Foucault verwendet diesen Abschnitt, um anhand des Traumbuches (eine Art Anleitung zum Verstehen von Träumen) einen Moralkodex abzubilden, wie er etwa laut Artemidor in Geltung war. Foucault ist sich dabei natürlich der Schwäche dieser Methode klar — es wird teilweise etwas als unmoralisch (ungesetzlich bis hin zu widernatürlich) dargestellt, allerdings wir nur wenig darauf eingegangen wieso dies so war. Andererseits galten manche Vorzeichen wie Inzest mit der Mutter im Traum als gutes Vorzeichen, was natürlich einer allgemeinen Moral ebenfalls nicht entsprach. Jedenfalls stellt Foucault dieses Kapitel an den Beginn. Inhaltlich zwar teils interessant stellt sich die Frage, wie dieses Werk jetzt in den Gesamtdiskurs eingeordnet werden kann. Was für Dispositive ergeben sich etc. Auf all diese Fragen gibt Foucault nicht wirklich eine Antwort, sondern geht direkt über in das zweite bereits erwähnte Kapitel.
Das dritte Kapitel „Man selber und die anderen“ gibt eine erste mögliche Ahnung, wo Foucault hinwill mit diesem Werk. Der erste Abschnitt in diesem Kapitel widmet sich der Rolle der Ehe — die uns im folgenden in allen Kapiteln weiter beschäftigen wird und deren „Genealogie“ noch am interessantesten und plausibelsten scheint, da sie von verschiedenen Seiten aus betrachtet wird. Der zweite Abschnitt im dritten Kapitel beschäftigt sich mit dem politischen Spiel bzw. den Veränderungen zwischen der Rolle der Politik im persönlichen Leben in der klassischen Zeit und eben in der Spätantike im römischen Reich. Ist zwar nicht uninteressant, aber ziemlich kurz.
Das vierte Kapitel widmet sich antiken Aufzeichnungen über den Körper in Bezug auf den Gebrauch der Lüste. Das wirkt beim Lesen unfreiwillig komisch, ist von Foucault aber durchaus systematisch und überzeugend aufbereitet — lediglich die Einbettung in das Gesamtwerk erschließt sich gar nicht, das Kapitel bleibt lose im Raum stehen.
Das fünfte (und zusammen mit dem sechsten Kapitel das längste) Kapitel widmet sich der veränderten Rolle der (Ehe)Frau. Foucault zeichnet hier sehr deutlich eine historische Veränderung nach, von der Rolle der Frau als reine Hausverwalterin in der klassischen Zeit hin zur Ideal der monogamen Ehe. Hier gelingt es Foucault sehr gut, die verschiedenen Änderungen aus diversen Blickwinkeln zu betrachten und die Veränderung der Stellung der Frau glaubhaft nachzuzeichnen. Dieses Kapitel stellt somit das mit Abstand beste Kapitel in dem Band dar.
Das sechste und abschließende Kapitel über die Entwicklung der Reflektion über die Knabenliebe (=Päderastie) ist interessant, aber hier bezieht sich Foucault wiederum nur auf drei Werke, die er en detail beschreibt. Das ist wieder ein wenig mager, auch wenn dieser Abschluss in Bezug auf Inhalt des zweiten Bandes der „Sexualität und Wahrheit“ verständlich und aus dieser Sicht nicht schlecht gewählt ist.
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Es bleibt ein langweiliger Nachgeschmack nach der Lektüre. Man hat den Eindruck, dass Foucault entweder die Zeit gefehlt hat oder er schon so sehr mit der nachfolgenden Forschung, der Sexualmoral im Christentum, beschäftigt war, als dass er mit dieser Thematik schnell abschließen wollte. Und dass ist schade. Der Zeitraum der Kaiserzeit wäre sicherlich ein sehr breites und interessantes Feld, das im Gegensatz zum Mittelalter oder der klassischen Antike noch weit weniger aufgearbeitet ist. Hier wäre imho noch einiges möglich gewesen. Für die ansonsten in meinen Augen sehr hohe Qualität in Foucault’s Werken ist die Lektüre dieses Werkes leider enttäuschend.
Hauptgegenstand ist wie schon im zweiten Band die chresis aphrodision — der Gebrauch der Lüste. Wie der Titel „Die Sorge um sich“ erkennen lässt, wird der Entwicklung der Lüste auch durch die einhergehende Subjektivierung nachgezeichnet. So dreht sich das zweite Kapitel dann auch um die „Kultur seiner selbst“ — ohne jedoch hier großartige Informationen zu gewinnen. Und das ist auch gleich der Hauptkritikpunkt, der für nahezu alle Kapitel gilt: Foucault argumentiert hier ungewohnt schwach, mit teils wenigen Quellen. Die Argumente wirken teils sehr konstruiert, sodass die Glaubwürdigkeit des Gesamtprojekts stark unter der durchschnittlichen Qualität leidet. Ein weiteres Indiz hierfür ist auch der im Vergleich zum zweiten Band stark gesunkene Umfang. Und so wirken die einzelnen Kapitel eher wie lose Abschnitte, deren Zusammenhang nicht immer klar ist bzw. nicht immer argumentativ stichhaltig ist.
Das erste Kapitel etwa, über das Traumbuch des Artemidor, ist ein gutes Beispiel hierfür. Foucault verwendet diesen Abschnitt, um anhand des Traumbuches (eine Art Anleitung zum Verstehen von Träumen) einen Moralkodex abzubilden, wie er etwa laut Artemidor in Geltung war. Foucault ist sich dabei natürlich der Schwäche dieser Methode klar — es wird teilweise etwas als unmoralisch (ungesetzlich bis hin zu widernatürlich) dargestellt, allerdings wir nur wenig darauf eingegangen wieso dies so war. Andererseits galten manche Vorzeichen wie Inzest mit der Mutter im Traum als gutes Vorzeichen, was natürlich einer allgemeinen Moral ebenfalls nicht entsprach. Jedenfalls stellt Foucault dieses Kapitel an den Beginn. Inhaltlich zwar teils interessant stellt sich die Frage, wie dieses Werk jetzt in den Gesamtdiskurs eingeordnet werden kann. Was für Dispositive ergeben sich etc. Auf all diese Fragen gibt Foucault nicht wirklich eine Antwort, sondern geht direkt über in das zweite bereits erwähnte Kapitel.
Das dritte Kapitel „Man selber und die anderen“ gibt eine erste mögliche Ahnung, wo Foucault hinwill mit diesem Werk. Der erste Abschnitt in diesem Kapitel widmet sich der Rolle der Ehe — die uns im folgenden in allen Kapiteln weiter beschäftigen wird und deren „Genealogie“ noch am interessantesten und plausibelsten scheint, da sie von verschiedenen Seiten aus betrachtet wird. Der zweite Abschnitt im dritten Kapitel beschäftigt sich mit dem politischen Spiel bzw. den Veränderungen zwischen der Rolle der Politik im persönlichen Leben in der klassischen Zeit und eben in der Spätantike im römischen Reich. Ist zwar nicht uninteressant, aber ziemlich kurz.
Das vierte Kapitel widmet sich antiken Aufzeichnungen über den Körper in Bezug auf den Gebrauch der Lüste. Das wirkt beim Lesen unfreiwillig komisch, ist von Foucault aber durchaus systematisch und überzeugend aufbereitet — lediglich die Einbettung in das Gesamtwerk erschließt sich gar nicht, das Kapitel bleibt lose im Raum stehen.
Das fünfte (und zusammen mit dem sechsten Kapitel das längste) Kapitel widmet sich der veränderten Rolle der (Ehe)Frau. Foucault zeichnet hier sehr deutlich eine historische Veränderung nach, von der Rolle der Frau als reine Hausverwalterin in der klassischen Zeit hin zur Ideal der monogamen Ehe. Hier gelingt es Foucault sehr gut, die verschiedenen Änderungen aus diversen Blickwinkeln zu betrachten und die Veränderung der Stellung der Frau glaubhaft nachzuzeichnen. Dieses Kapitel stellt somit das mit Abstand beste Kapitel in dem Band dar.
Das sechste und abschließende Kapitel über die Entwicklung der Reflektion über die Knabenliebe (=Päderastie) ist interessant, aber hier bezieht sich Foucault wiederum nur auf drei Werke, die er en detail beschreibt. Das ist wieder ein wenig mager, auch wenn dieser Abschluss in Bezug auf Inhalt des zweiten Bandes der „Sexualität und Wahrheit“ verständlich und aus dieser Sicht nicht schlecht gewählt ist.
————————————————————————
Es bleibt ein langweiliger Nachgeschmack nach der Lektüre. Man hat den Eindruck, dass Foucault entweder die Zeit gefehlt hat oder er schon so sehr mit der nachfolgenden Forschung, der Sexualmoral im Christentum, beschäftigt war, als dass er mit dieser Thematik schnell abschließen wollte. Und dass ist schade. Der Zeitraum der Kaiserzeit wäre sicherlich ein sehr breites und interessantes Feld, das im Gegensatz zum Mittelalter oder der klassischen Antike noch weit weniger aufgearbeitet ist. Hier wäre imho noch einiges möglich gewesen. Für die ansonsten in meinen Augen sehr hohe Qualität in Foucault’s Werken ist die Lektüre dieses Werkes leider enttäuschend.
rvandenboomgaard's review against another edition
5.0
Foucault is, actually, surprisingly neutral given his position on the direction the dominant morality of his time took towards sexuality. This is an incredibly rich, truly interdisciplinary work - which becomes all the more clear, the further one progresses along the volumes. Although I might very well need a break from ‘The History of Sexuality’, I am definitely looking forward to reading (and, admittedly, buying) the fourth and final volume. I am keen to read how Foucault rounds this project off in ‘Confessions of the Flesh’, all the more so because it is about double the size of the average amount of pages for the first three volumes. If about half of that work consists of the address of a topic as all the former three have done (which will likely be the long-awaited topic of the approach to sexuality as held in christianity, and (philosophical) ground thereof), that would mean the other half would likely be spent on a synergy of all four parts. To me, that sounds like an absolute treat.
Truly exhilarating to come to realise not only the extent to which sexuality (in)forms our outward identity, but even more so the extent to which sexuality can be seen as a practice of the inner self. This way, it stresses how identity really is not much more than the outer layer of our personality, the layer of veneer that is shown and shaped in interaction with others, of which we can wonder if it is even connected to the self at all, and not rather a mask of sorts. It opens possibilities to distinguish the discrepancies between self and identity that are so prevalent in humanity, especially in our current societal blueprints. Additionally, note how this opens the way to various other incarnations of 'The History of...' - if this goes for sexuality, why not for the discussed dietetics (understood as that which we consume as to best suit our individual bodies)? Or of friendship? Or affectionality, intellectuality, sensuality?
If there is one thing to take away from these series, it is that none of us are exactly the same, although we might have been wrought from the same matter.
Truly exhilarating to come to realise not only the extent to which sexuality (in)forms our outward identity, but even more so the extent to which sexuality can be seen as a practice of the inner self. This way, it stresses how identity really is not much more than the outer layer of our personality, the layer of veneer that is shown and shaped in interaction with others, of which we can wonder if it is even connected to the self at all, and not rather a mask of sorts. It opens possibilities to distinguish the discrepancies between self and identity that are so prevalent in humanity, especially in our current societal blueprints. Additionally, note how this opens the way to various other incarnations of 'The History of...' - if this goes for sexuality, why not for the discussed dietetics (understood as that which we consume as to best suit our individual bodies)? Or of friendship? Or affectionality, intellectuality, sensuality?
If there is one thing to take away from these series, it is that none of us are exactly the same, although we might have been wrought from the same matter.
leelulah's review against another edition
1.0
Before I start, I'd like to warn you that there's a NSFW link in this review: it's the one about Sappho.
Foucault analyzes the importance of self discipline when it comes to sexual relationships and marriage, the normalization of heterosexuality through marriage and the condemnation of homosexuality by greek and by some roman thinkers, argues that a lot of it, though it influenced Christianity is not quite at the same level of banning homosexuality and masturbation. He analyzes the medical and philosophical point views and quotes authors, but bases his views on a fundamentally incorrect reading of Church Fathers, to argue that married couples out not to get any kind of pleasure out of sexual acts, which is not what they meant at all. I wonder how interested would Foucault be in Theology of the Body, considering it didn't exist at his time, but probably not much. Or probably a lot... just to trash talk it because it's presented in a friendly way but it's "more repressive stuff from the Church".
I disagree with Foucault, and maybe because of an Augustinian-Renaissance approach, I believe a lot of the common sense of stoics and other virtuous pagan philosophers may have paved the way for Christianity. As a Catholic, of course I believe that Jesus' coming is the fulfilling of Revelation, but I think that, like Celts and Native Americans had mythologies which made it easier for them to accept the new religion, so happened with greeks and romans, so much of their thought had common points with Christians, that Christians learned to appreciate such things and used it in their favor, much like Celtic legends suffered.
Also, he seems disillusioned with the abandonement of the practice of pederasty, which makes it all more repulsive (it's not my job to judge homosexuality, but seriously? Old men chasing teens? No matter your views on homosexuality, that is a justification of pedophilia, so I'll pass). The interesting aspect of this book is that he recognizes that this self-discipline could be also applied in the education of a politician, and that is indeed useful.
It also helped me to understand stoics a bit better. So, as a closer, it's less preachy than the first volume, and less blatantly pro-male homosexuality than the second volume, but still kind of gross, because he gets on the justificactions for homosexuality, and one of them is that "women wear makeup to hide their ugliness, so basically women are liars". I'm not new to this argument, and I know it's not like he invented it, he's after all, just quoting Greek pagan people. But, just because men didn't bother to understand women back then, it didn't meant that we were uninteresting, and liars while at that.
I have survived 17 years with no makeup. I see how it could be necessary for a woman who seeks to hide a disease of the skin, or the mark of an accident, be it scar from burning, scratching, etc. I still like wearing it, I have been doing it for 6 years now, and I don't think a woman could fool a man just because she has an unnatural color in her hair for her age or genetics, extremely red lips, weirdly colored eyelids, prominent eyelashes and perfectly rosy cheeks, among with weirdly colored nails. It's just an emulation, and sometimes exaggeration of traits men like in women: youth and beauty. Basically, the greeks' argument was that women are shallow.
I don't see how Foucault is this "inclusive defensor of minorities, especially queers", if women are often looked with disdain and left out of his dissertations, the marginal allusions to lesbianism (though, I think I should say female same sex-attraction: lesbian is a political term and based loosely on opinions about Sappho), because greeks looked down on it, or at least Plato and a bunch of greek ancient doctors did, is inexcusable.
Sappho and all the myths surrounding her, would be interesting for a start, but I guess that by getting into radical feminist theory, I could get an idea of that. And radical feminists do hate his look on male homosexuality as much as I do, though for different reasons.
I agree with the idea that "hetero" and "homosexual" naming of human sexual and romantic relationships is unfortunate. For different reasons, rather than the fact that greeks did not make a distinction for it. The problem is that it allows people to tag others according to sexual "preference" or "orientation", and define them by such. I believe the use of expressions such as same-sex attraction is less aggressive. And even people who have opposite sex attraction can experience same-sex attraction. You don't get to define them by "orientations", but recognize the fact that they feel attracted (whether romantically or sexually, but those distinctions concern gender theorists more, I guess... though sexual attraction without a romantic attraction would be no less than a desire for prostitution in my opinion). You could also feel an attraction you don't want to feel, much like intrusive thoughts, so I'm also opposed to the terms "preference" and "orientation".
As always, I don't agree with Foucault, but it has been thought provoking. Not his best, though.
Foucault analyzes the importance of self discipline when it comes to sexual relationships and marriage, the normalization of heterosexuality through marriage and the condemnation of homosexuality by greek and by some roman thinkers, argues that a lot of it, though it influenced Christianity is not quite at the same level of banning homosexuality and masturbation. He analyzes the medical and philosophical point views and quotes authors, but bases his views on a fundamentally incorrect reading of Church Fathers, to argue that married couples out not to get any kind of pleasure out of sexual acts, which is not what they meant at all. I wonder how interested would Foucault be in Theology of the Body, considering it didn't exist at his time, but probably not much. Or probably a lot... just to trash talk it because it's presented in a friendly way but it's "more repressive stuff from the Church".
I disagree with Foucault, and maybe because of an Augustinian-Renaissance approach, I believe a lot of the common sense of stoics and other virtuous pagan philosophers may have paved the way for Christianity. As a Catholic, of course I believe that Jesus' coming is the fulfilling of Revelation, but I think that, like Celts and Native Americans had mythologies which made it easier for them to accept the new religion, so happened with greeks and romans, so much of their thought had common points with Christians, that Christians learned to appreciate such things and used it in their favor, much like Celtic legends suffered.
Also, he seems disillusioned with the abandonement of the practice of pederasty, which makes it all more repulsive (it's not my job to judge homosexuality, but seriously? Old men chasing teens? No matter your views on homosexuality, that is a justification of pedophilia, so I'll pass). The interesting aspect of this book is that he recognizes that this self-discipline could be also applied in the education of a politician, and that is indeed useful.
It also helped me to understand stoics a bit better. So, as a closer, it's less preachy than the first volume, and less blatantly pro-male homosexuality than the second volume, but still kind of gross, because he gets on the justificactions for homosexuality, and one of them is that "women wear makeup to hide their ugliness, so basically women are liars". I'm not new to this argument, and I know it's not like he invented it, he's after all, just quoting Greek pagan people. But, just because men didn't bother to understand women back then, it didn't meant that we were uninteresting, and liars while at that.
I have survived 17 years with no makeup. I see how it could be necessary for a woman who seeks to hide a disease of the skin, or the mark of an accident, be it scar from burning, scratching, etc. I still like wearing it, I have been doing it for 6 years now, and I don't think a woman could fool a man just because she has an unnatural color in her hair for her age or genetics, extremely red lips, weirdly colored eyelids, prominent eyelashes and perfectly rosy cheeks, among with weirdly colored nails. It's just an emulation, and sometimes exaggeration of traits men like in women: youth and beauty. Basically, the greeks' argument was that women are shallow.
I don't see how Foucault is this "inclusive defensor of minorities, especially queers", if women are often looked with disdain and left out of his dissertations, the marginal allusions to lesbianism (though, I think I should say female same sex-attraction: lesbian is a political term and based loosely on opinions about Sappho), because greeks looked down on it, or at least Plato and a bunch of greek ancient doctors did, is inexcusable.
Sappho and all the myths surrounding her, would be interesting for a start, but I guess that by getting into radical feminist theory, I could get an idea of that. And radical feminists do hate his look on male homosexuality as much as I do, though for different reasons.
I agree with the idea that "hetero" and "homosexual" naming of human sexual and romantic relationships is unfortunate. For different reasons, rather than the fact that greeks did not make a distinction for it. The problem is that it allows people to tag others according to sexual "preference" or "orientation", and define them by such. I believe the use of expressions such as same-sex attraction is less aggressive. And even people who have opposite sex attraction can experience same-sex attraction. You don't get to define them by "orientations", but recognize the fact that they feel attracted (whether romantically or sexually, but those distinctions concern gender theorists more, I guess... though sexual attraction without a romantic attraction would be no less than a desire for prostitution in my opinion). You could also feel an attraction you don't want to feel, much like intrusive thoughts, so I'm also opposed to the terms "preference" and "orientation".
As always, I don't agree with Foucault, but it has been thought provoking. Not his best, though.
spacestationtrustfund's review against another edition
3.0
Apt qu'il est arrivé au sujet de la Rome antique dans le volume qu'il a intitulé après « souci de soi ».
tdwightdavis's review against another edition
4.0
Much like volume 2, this is a true history of sexuality and has little theory. Foucault, interestingly, doesn't focus as much on the concept of power in volumes 2 and 3 of his sexuality trilogy. Here we get the shifting focus in the first centuries of the common era to a care of the self in sexual ethics. An interesting read.
jakebittle's review against another edition
The Plutarch chapter alone is worth the price of admission.
cetian's review against another edition
4.0
Neste último volume, Foucault liga toda a história que escreveu até aqui à modernidade, à criação da sexualidade e sexologia - algo que tomamos como certo mas que também é cultural (os termos são muito recentes na história humana).
Surpreende-nos com uma inesperada ligação (feita numa longa e tortuosa transição). A discursificação do cristianismo, que foi tratanto o sexo no confessionário através dos pecados rigorosamente catalogados, onde já as palavra pederastia e pederasta tinham sido herdadas dos gregos ganhando contornos malignos deu lugar às patologias da sexologia.
Antes ainda de Freud, a obsessão em descobrir parafilias e patologias sexuais deu-nos a fauna classificativa que ainda hoje usamos e muita que abandonámos visto que hoje seria considerada insultuosa ou cientificamente aberrante. Invertido era palavra usada quer por clérigos quer por sexólogos. Quando os psicanalistas começam a sentar as pessoas no divã é com a ideia de que os pacientes se devem libertar das ideias negativas, das leis que a o cristianismo criou, associando o sexo ao pecado, e com a culpa impedindo o prazer sexual de ser experimentado na sua plenitude. Era uma ideia utópica, que foi reinventado de muitas maneiras, de que libertando da culpa as pessoas, a sexualidade seria melhor. A ideia surpreendente, que Foucault traz é que o método da psicanálise foi precisamente o de criar discurso, apresentando esta discursificação específica alguma continuidade ou pelo menos pontos de contacto com o cristianismo. Foi, mais uma vez, fazer as pessoas confessar. Escutá-las, fazê-las dizer o que tinham feito, com quem. Ainda que não no sentido de se sentirem culpadas, mas no sentido oposto, de que as pessoas deixassem de se sentir-se culpadas.
Nunca mais a sexualidade no ocidente deixaria, até hoje, de ser vivida como um discurso de si.
Esta obra imensa de Foucault, estes três volumes, são uma obra de história do pensamento, como o autor avisa no início. Abre horizontes e dá imensa bibliografia para percebermos de onde vêm as limitações da nossa cultura - com isso também perceber pistas para nos superarmos. É um trabalho muito bem fundamentado, rigoroso e, felizmente, muito bem escrito. É um prazer ler Foucault.
Esta é a nossa história, a da cultura ocidental (à falta de melhor palavra). Fico com uma ideia de que houve outros percursos. A moral foi uma moral masculina, as relações de poder foram desiguais. O sexo foi sobretudo discurso. E acabámos por nos interessar sobretudo pela sua patologia. Quando nos interessámos finalmente pelo sexo, inventámos-lhe uma sexualidade e uma sexologia. O que Foucault chama de "scientia sexualis". Noutras culturas, como a indiana, a chinesa e a árabe (até há uns séculos atrás, a cultura árabe que produziu o Jardins Perfumados) inventou-se o que Foucault chamou de Ars Erotica. Nessas culturas, o importante não foi descobrir patologias, invertidos. Foi escrever manuais sobre como o sexo, vê-lo como uma forma de arte e, em alguns momentos, como uma forma de transcendência e algo de espiritual.
Para mim, um exemplo onde se nota a cristalização da nossa cultura de "sexualidade" e "discursificação" é na produção obsessiva de discurso sobre pontos erógenos. Que continua na discussão sobre, por exemplo, o ponto G. Sobre se existe, não existe. Tudo isto, sempre, como discurso, "conversa", "tema", algo "académico", "conselhos". Ao ponto de de discutir que pressão coloca falar-se spobre algo que assume contornos de mito, que novas expectativas coloca sobre a mulher, o casal, a "relação sexual", o "prazer", o "sexo". E entretanto dizendo a frase sacramental da sexualidade ocidental, o enorme paradoxo:
"O maior ponto erógeno é o cérebro".
A contrastar a esta imprecisão obsessiva do discurso da "scientia sexualis" ocidental, a ars erotica oriental tem uma imprecisão serena, que é notória por exemplo no kama sutra. As posições sexuais sugeridas em ilustraçoes antigas. A irrealidade que por vezes assumem, são uma delícia. Não interessa nenhuma noção de rigor anatómico. Estimulam a imaginação. Existe uma ideia de arte erótica, que serve como forma de estimular a líbido. E é isso que se procura fazer, de forma prática e directa: estimular quem vai ter sexo. Numa analogia, se houvesse um conselho como, existe um ponto (chamemos-lhe o ponto da manga, já que por exemplo os genitais são por vezes comparados a frutos) que é bom estimular, não é dado como sexologia. Como um conselho médico, de anatomia. É dado como um conselho de um guru do prazer. E ao ser lido, já é lido com prazer. O próprio texto já se aproxima do erótico. A ideia de ficar ansioso por ler o kama sutra ou por receber conselhos para o prazer não faz sentido.
O Zizek diz que hoje ao contrário do que acontecia no tempo de Freud, os psicanalistas dizem aos seus pacientes que são livres de dizerem que não têm prazer. Que se não são felizes, que se não estão a ter prazer a toda a hora, isso é normal, e podem expressá-lo livremente. Porque existe uma pressão enorme para o gozo.
Tempos estranhos.
As traduções da Relógio d' Água são excelentes.
Surpreende-nos com uma inesperada ligação (feita numa longa e tortuosa transição). A discursificação do cristianismo, que foi tratanto o sexo no confessionário através dos pecados rigorosamente catalogados, onde já as palavra pederastia e pederasta tinham sido herdadas dos gregos ganhando contornos malignos deu lugar às patologias da sexologia.
Antes ainda de Freud, a obsessão em descobrir parafilias e patologias sexuais deu-nos a fauna classificativa que ainda hoje usamos e muita que abandonámos visto que hoje seria considerada insultuosa ou cientificamente aberrante. Invertido era palavra usada quer por clérigos quer por sexólogos. Quando os psicanalistas começam a sentar as pessoas no divã é com a ideia de que os pacientes se devem libertar das ideias negativas, das leis que a o cristianismo criou, associando o sexo ao pecado, e com a culpa impedindo o prazer sexual de ser experimentado na sua plenitude. Era uma ideia utópica, que foi reinventado de muitas maneiras, de que libertando da culpa as pessoas, a sexualidade seria melhor. A ideia surpreendente, que Foucault traz é que o método da psicanálise foi precisamente o de criar discurso, apresentando esta discursificação específica alguma continuidade ou pelo menos pontos de contacto com o cristianismo. Foi, mais uma vez, fazer as pessoas confessar. Escutá-las, fazê-las dizer o que tinham feito, com quem. Ainda que não no sentido de se sentirem culpadas, mas no sentido oposto, de que as pessoas deixassem de se sentir-se culpadas.
Nunca mais a sexualidade no ocidente deixaria, até hoje, de ser vivida como um discurso de si.
Esta obra imensa de Foucault, estes três volumes, são uma obra de história do pensamento, como o autor avisa no início. Abre horizontes e dá imensa bibliografia para percebermos de onde vêm as limitações da nossa cultura - com isso também perceber pistas para nos superarmos. É um trabalho muito bem fundamentado, rigoroso e, felizmente, muito bem escrito. É um prazer ler Foucault.
Esta é a nossa história, a da cultura ocidental (à falta de melhor palavra). Fico com uma ideia de que houve outros percursos. A moral foi uma moral masculina, as relações de poder foram desiguais. O sexo foi sobretudo discurso. E acabámos por nos interessar sobretudo pela sua patologia. Quando nos interessámos finalmente pelo sexo, inventámos-lhe uma sexualidade e uma sexologia. O que Foucault chama de "scientia sexualis". Noutras culturas, como a indiana, a chinesa e a árabe (até há uns séculos atrás, a cultura árabe que produziu o Jardins Perfumados) inventou-se o que Foucault chamou de Ars Erotica. Nessas culturas, o importante não foi descobrir patologias, invertidos. Foi escrever manuais sobre como o sexo, vê-lo como uma forma de arte e, em alguns momentos, como uma forma de transcendência e algo de espiritual.
Para mim, um exemplo onde se nota a cristalização da nossa cultura de "sexualidade" e "discursificação" é na produção obsessiva de discurso sobre pontos erógenos. Que continua na discussão sobre, por exemplo, o ponto G. Sobre se existe, não existe. Tudo isto, sempre, como discurso, "conversa", "tema", algo "académico", "conselhos". Ao ponto de de discutir que pressão coloca falar-se spobre algo que assume contornos de mito, que novas expectativas coloca sobre a mulher, o casal, a "relação sexual", o "prazer", o "sexo". E entretanto dizendo a frase sacramental da sexualidade ocidental, o enorme paradoxo:
"O maior ponto erógeno é o cérebro".
A contrastar a esta imprecisão obsessiva do discurso da "scientia sexualis" ocidental, a ars erotica oriental tem uma imprecisão serena, que é notória por exemplo no kama sutra. As posições sexuais sugeridas em ilustraçoes antigas. A irrealidade que por vezes assumem, são uma delícia. Não interessa nenhuma noção de rigor anatómico. Estimulam a imaginação. Existe uma ideia de arte erótica, que serve como forma de estimular a líbido. E é isso que se procura fazer, de forma prática e directa: estimular quem vai ter sexo. Numa analogia, se houvesse um conselho como, existe um ponto (chamemos-lhe o ponto da manga, já que por exemplo os genitais são por vezes comparados a frutos) que é bom estimular, não é dado como sexologia. Como um conselho médico, de anatomia. É dado como um conselho de um guru do prazer. E ao ser lido, já é lido com prazer. O próprio texto já se aproxima do erótico. A ideia de ficar ansioso por ler o kama sutra ou por receber conselhos para o prazer não faz sentido.
O Zizek diz que hoje ao contrário do que acontecia no tempo de Freud, os psicanalistas dizem aos seus pacientes que são livres de dizerem que não têm prazer. Que se não são felizes, que se não estão a ter prazer a toda a hora, isso é normal, e podem expressá-lo livremente. Porque existe uma pressão enorme para o gozo.
Tempos estranhos.
As traduções da Relógio d' Água são excelentes.
inept_scholar's review
4.0
So I am actually glad that I read the entire three volumes of History of Sexuality by Michel Foucault. And though I enjoyed reading Foucault's dissemination of the discourse on sexuality through ancient Greek texts, God only knows how much I actually understood! Also would it be weird if I said that the second and third books felt many times like a self-help book? But in a manner of speaking, this is exactly the sort of idea of the self that Foucault examines through Aristotelian and Platonic texts. .
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Perceiving the care of the self as one that is to be achieved through abstinence from physical desires/ aphrodisia, this view is further extended by Foucault to show how this model behavior was considered an ideal for those men responsible for management of a household or a city, as well as framing of different kinds of relationships such as through marriage or through the pursuit of one's male lover. With this view, Foucault also argues that later discourses on sexuality after the spread of Christianity sought to associate it with sin and to construct new categories of the self, that sought to contain as well as to expose 'deviant' variations of sexuality in order to define and control these repurposed ideas of sexuality.
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A lot of these ideas on construct of the self, power and surveillance, are frequent themes in Foucault's book. The first book in the volume is short but utterly intriguing to read. But you do feel bogged down by the time you reach the third! And sometimes there is just too much repetition and excessive verbosity that tends to make Foucault's works a little hard to digest. Still I would say, it is definitely worth reading more than once, since these are those kind of books where you learn something new every time you go back them.
#michelfoucault #historyofsexuality #threevolumes #ancientgreektexts #readinglistforhistory #readinglist2019
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Perceiving the care of the self as one that is to be achieved through abstinence from physical desires/ aphrodisia, this view is further extended by Foucault to show how this model behavior was considered an ideal for those men responsible for management of a household or a city, as well as framing of different kinds of relationships such as through marriage or through the pursuit of one's male lover. With this view, Foucault also argues that later discourses on sexuality after the spread of Christianity sought to associate it with sin and to construct new categories of the self, that sought to contain as well as to expose 'deviant' variations of sexuality in order to define and control these repurposed ideas of sexuality.
.
.
A lot of these ideas on construct of the self, power and surveillance, are frequent themes in Foucault's book. The first book in the volume is short but utterly intriguing to read. But you do feel bogged down by the time you reach the third! And sometimes there is just too much repetition and excessive verbosity that tends to make Foucault's works a little hard to digest. Still I would say, it is definitely worth reading more than once, since these are those kind of books where you learn something new every time you go back them.
#michelfoucault #historyofsexuality #threevolumes #ancientgreektexts #readinglistforhistory #readinglist2019